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Understanding Taqlid: the Good, the Bad & the Ugly [1/2]

Must each Muslim know the proofs behind a religious action before performing that act? In Islam, what counts as “proof”? Is accepting a fatwa of a qualified Muslim scholar on trust, without knowing his legal reasoning, blind following? Can ordinary Muslims who’ve had no legal training evaluate proof-texts and identify the strongest view. How can Muslim laymen utilise their God-given intellects in matters of fiqh? How true is it that there is no “clergy” or magisterium in Islam when it comes to religious authority and knowledge? And who were the Four Imams addressing when they forbade taqlid? Such questions lie at the very heart of understanding what sound Islamic epistemology and orthodoxy is; generating huge schisms, strife and religious anarchy in the ummah wherever and whenever they are misunderstood. This article is an attempt to shed some much needed clarity, balance and authenticity on the subject; God-willing.

Now if we strip these contentions down to their bare bones, they’ve historically been framed simply like this: What is the Islamic ruling (hukm) concerning taqlid, in terms of qualified jurists, as well as in terms of non-jurists and the general Muslim public? It is from this perspective that we’ll broach the above questions. For convenience sake, I’ve split the article into two parts because of its length.

A final point: Some will notice that I mostly cite from Hanbali and Shafi‘i scholars. The reason for this is simply because I have a working familiarity with the Hanbali school and its legal theory, and an acquaintance with Shafi‘i legal theory. But I cannot say the same for Hanafi and Maliki legal literature: hence the slant. Despite this, I believe that the overall picture represent the normative legal theory of all four law schools.

I. DEFINING TAQLID

Let us begin by first defining a few basic terms, so as to avoid any cross wires or being at cross purposes. Thus in Islam’s legal culture, the term taqlid has two meanings: one lexical, the other religious. Lexically, it stems from the word qalladah – a “collar” – and is defined as: ِ‎وَضْعُ الْشَّيءِ فِي العُنُقِ مُحِيطاً بِه – ‘To place something around the neck so as to encircle it.’1 For the one doing taqlid, the muqallid, has entrusted his affair to the one he makes taqlid of. He is, so to speak, like someone being led by the collar.

Its religious/legal definition is: قَبُلُ قَوْلِ الغَيْرِ بِغَيْرِ حُجَّةٍ – ‘To accept the opinion of someone without knowing the proof.’2

Usually, but not always, the term taqlid refers to a layman (‘ammi) accepting a religious ruling from a qualified jurist, without knowing the proof (dalil) or legal rationale (ta‘lil) behind the ruling. In doing so, the layman resigns his affair to the scholar and agrees to be guided by him, out of a trust and a confidence he has in his scholarship. It is in this sense that jurists conventionally employ the term.3

II. UNDERSTANDING IJTIHAD

The science that evolved in understanding the shari‘ah, or Sacred Law of Islam, is called fiqh: usually translated as “jurisprudence”, and comes from the word faqiha, meaning: “to understand”. Fiqh, therefore, is all about understanding these divine laws and the way they shape the life-pattern of believers. Strictly speaking, shari‘ah refers to the body of laws revealed to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ which he taught and lived by in his day to day life; while fiqh is the science of understanding, extracting and developing these laws – and this involves human effort.

Now “effort” in the area of jurisprudence is known as ijtihad (lit. “exertion”), and is the task of the mujtahid – a jurist qualified and capable of such juristic efforts, though only after receiving rigorous and prolonged legal training. For uncovering the intent of the Lawgiver – the murad al-shari‘ – and to infer new rulings and legislation from the root sources of Islamic law – the Qur’an and Sunnah, as well as analogy (qiyas) and scholarly consensus (ijma‘) – can be an uphill task. Often a mujtahid must struggle through long days and nights to reach a conclusion.

The phrase used to describe this effort is: بَذْلُ المَجْهُوْد or اِسْتِفْراغُ الْوُسْعِ – “expending every possible effort” so as to reach a legal judgement.4 The significance here is that ijtihad is not just one of juristic effort or exertion, but one of exhaustion! The mujtahid spends every possible effort, leaving no stone unturned, in order to arrive at a ruling. Ijtihad is certainly not merely surfing a few websites on the internet, or skimming some pages of a few Arabic books. It is nothing less than examining and interrogating all the relevant proof-texts on the matter before arriving at a legal judgement or hukm – however many hours, days weeks or months it may take.

III. AN INSIGHT INTO IJTIHAD

Jumping the gun slightly, let’s just get an idea into what level of learning is required so as to undertake ijtihad. Now ijtihad has varying levels. The highest is when a jurist can perform absolute ijtihad – i.e. they can infer rulings directly from the primary texts of the Qur‘an or Sunnah, unrestricted by anyone else’s legal framework. A mujtahid who reaches this rank is called a mujtahid mutlaq. Imam Ibn Hazm was one such mujtahid-jurist. Contextualising Ibn Hazm’s words: ‘I follow the truth, make ijtihad, and do not confine myself to a single law school (madhhab),’ Imam al-Dhahabi wrote:

نَعَمْ، مَنْ بَلَغَ رُتْبَة الاجْتِهَاد، وَشَهِد لَهُ بِذَلِكَ عِدَّة مِنَ الأَئِمَّةِ، لَمْ يَسُغْ لَهُ أَنْ يُقَلِّدَ، كَمَا أَنَّ الفَقِيْه المُبتدئ وَالعَامِي الَّذِي يَحفظ القُرْآن أَوْ كَثِيْراً مِنْهُ لاَ يَسوَغُ لَهُ الاجْتِهَاد أَبَداً، فَكَيْفَ يَجْتَهِدُ، وَمَا الَّذِي يَقُوْلُ؟ وَعلاَم يَبنِي؟ وَكَيْفَ يَطيرُ وَلَمَّا يُرَيِّش؟

“Yes! Whoever reaches the level of ijtihad, and a number of scholars testify to it, taqlid is not allowed to him. Much like how a novice jurist, or a layman who has memorised the Qur’an or most of it, is not permitted to attempt ijtihad at all. How could he make ijtihad? What could he possible say? On what can he base his opinion? How can he fly and he has yet to grow wings?5

He then proceeds to detail the type of learning needed to reach a rank of ijtihad below that of the highest or absolute level. He says:

 الفَقِيْهُ المنتهِي اليَقظ الفَهِم المُحَدِّث، الَّذِي قَدْ حَفِظ مُخْتَصَراً فِي الْفُرُوع، وَكِتَاباً فِي قوَاعد الأُصُوْل، وَقرَأَ النَّحْو، وَشَاركَ فِي الفضَائِل مَعَ حِفْظِهِ لِكِتَابِ اللهِ وَتشَاغله بتَفْسِيْره وَقوَةِ مُنَاظرتِهِ، فَهَذِهِ رُتْبَة مِنْ بلغَ الاجْتِهَاد المُقيَّد، وَتَأَهَّل لِلنظر فِي دلاَئِل الأَئِمَّة، فَمتَى وَضحَ لَهُ الحَقُّ فِي مَسْأَلَة، وَثبت فِيْهَا النَّصّ، وَعَمِلَ بِهَا أَحَدُ الأَئِمَّةِ الأَعْلاَمِ كَأَبِي حَنِيْفَةَ مِثْلاً، أَوْ كَمَالِك، أَوِ الثَّوْرِيِّ، أَوِ الأَوْزَاعِيِّ، أَوِ الشَّافِعِيِّ، وَأَبِي عُبَيْدٍ، وَأَحْمَدَ، وَإِسْحَاق، فَلْيَتَّبع فِيْهَا الحَقّ وَلاَ يَسْلُكِ الرّخصَ، وَلِيَتَوَرَّع، وَلاَ يَسَعُه فِيْهَا بَعْدَ قيَام الحُجَّة عَلَيْهِ تَقليدٌ.

‘An extremely versed and brilliant jurist who – having committed to memory a primer in law, as well as a book on juristic maxims and on legal theory; has mastered grammar; memorised the Book of God and busied himself with its exegesis; possessesing a sharp, analytical mind – has now reached a rank of restricted ijtihad and is thus qualified to investigate the textual reasoning of the leading scholars. Thus when the truth becomes apparent to him in a given issue, and the proof well established, and it has been acted upon by one of the great Imams like Abu Hanifah, for instance, or Malik, al-Thawri, al-Awza‘i, al-Shafi‘i, Abu ‘Ubayd, Ahmad or Ishaq, he follows [what he sees as] the truth; without chasing concessions, but instead by being diligent. Taqlid is unlawful to him in the issue after the proofs have been established to him.’6

Now compare this with the da‘wah that insists (or at the very least, encourages) those who don’t have even an iota of the above depicted skill-set to “investigate” and “weigh-up” the proofs! Such an insane approach isn’t just reckless. It is possibly the single most significant cause for religious anarchy, extremism, and undermining shari‘ah structures to have ever afflicted the body of the ummah. For when juristic restraints are loosened, and handed to those wholly unfit for purpose, all things run amok!

IV. DIVINE LAW AND THE DETAIL

Let’s shuffle back to the issue of taqlid. In Islam, religious terms or concepts often have nuances or multiple meanings. Thus, both justice and academic integrity demand that we take to tafsil, “distinction” and “detail” and not be black and white. It might even be said (figuratively, of course) that when it comes to Islamic law, it is the divine – and not the devil – that is in the detail! To this end, Ibn al-Qayyim versified:

فَعَلَيْكَ باِلتَّفْصِيْلِ وَالتَّميِيْزِ فَال/إِطْلاقُ والإجْمالُ دُوْنَ بَيانِ
قَدْ أفْسَدَا هَذَا الوُجُودَ وخَبَّطَا الْ /أَذْهانَ وَالآراءَ كُلَّ زَمانِ

‘Take to distinction and differentiation;
For generalisations without clarification;
Have corrupted this existence and ruined
Intellects and opinions in every age.’7

With that in mind, the texts of the Book and the Sunnah, and the words of the eminent jurists, identify that taqlid is of two types: one prescribed, the other prohibited. Getting to the nub of the matter, one jurist wrote: ‘It is obligatory upon the lay people who do not have the ability to learn [proofs or means of juristic inference], to ask the scholars, and to then act on the fatwas they are given. This is taqlid in the conventional sense; its reality being: “Accepting the view of someone without knowing the proof.” And it is of two types: permissible and impermissible.’8

V. THE PRESCRIBED TAQLID

Here now is an outline of the lawful form of taqlid, courtesy of Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti, followed by its textual justifications:

وَالتَّحْقِيقُ : أَنَّ التَّقْلِيدَ مِنْهُ مَا هُوَ جَائِزٌ، وَمِنْهُ مَا لَيْسَ بِجَائِزٍ … أَمَّا التَّقْلِيدُ الْجَائِزُ الَّذِي لَا يَكَادُ يُخَالِفُ فِيهِ أَحَدٌ مِنَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ ، فَهُوَ تَقْلِيدُ الْعَامِّيِّ عَالِمًا أَهْلًا لَلْفُتْيَا فِي نَازِلَةٍ نَزَلَتْ بِهِ ، وَهَذَا النَّوْعُ مِنَ التَّقْلِيدِ كَانَ شَائِعًا فِي زَمَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ. فَقَدْ كَانَ الْعَامِّيُّ يَسْأَلُ مَنْ شَاءَ مِنْ أَصْحَابِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ  عَنْ حُكْمِ النَّازِلَةِ تَنْزِلُ بِهِ ، فَيُفْتِيهِ فَيَعْمَلُ بِفُتْيَاهُ

‘Inquiry establishes that there is a type of taqlid that is permissible and a type that isn’t permissible … As for the permissible taqlid, which none from the Muslims contest, it is a layman’s taqlid of a scholar qualified to give fatwas about various occurrences. This type of taqlid was in vogue during the Prophet’s time ﷺ and there was no difference about it. So the layman would ask whoever he wished from the Companions of Allah’s Messenger ﷺ about the ruling for the situation he faced. When a response was given, he acted on it.’9

As for the textual proof for this type of taqlid, and who it applies to, this next account goes a long way in bringing clarity to the matter:

‘The legislated taqlid is performing taqlid of the scholars whenever there is an inability to decipher proof-texts. Those to whom this applies are of two groups: Firstly, the lay people who aren’t versed in jurisprudence (fiqh) or in the prophetic traditions (hadiths); nor can they evaluate the words of the scholars. Such people are required to perform taqlid; there being no contention over this. In fact, a number of jurists have recorded a consensus to this effect.

‘Secondly, a person that has acquired some awareness of a law school, and has studied a few of the texts of the later scholars … yet despite this, is deficient in examining proofs or evaluating the opinions of the jurists. Such a person must also perform taqlid. He is not obliged to shoulder what he cannot, for: Allah does not charge a soul with more than it can bear. [2:286]

‘The textual stipulations from the scholars about the legality of taqlid for such people are many, well-known, and rooted in Allah’s words: فَاسْأَلُوا أَهْلَ الذِّكْرِ إِنْ كُنتُمْ لاَ تَعْلَمُونَSo ask the people of knowledge if you do not know. [21:7]; and in the Prophet’s words ﷺ that say: أَلاَّ سَأَلُوا إِذْ لَمْ يَعْلَمُوا فَإِنَّمَا شِفَاءُ الْعِيِّ السُّؤَالُ – “Why didn’t they ask if they knew not? The cure for ignorance is to ask.”10

‘The lay people haven’t ceased – since the time of the Companions, the Successors, and their followers – asking their scholars about rulings of the shari‘ah. Scholars, in turn, have readily responded to such queries without necessarily mentioning proofs; nor did they forbid this to them in the least. So this is a point of consensus on the lawfulness of the laity making taqlid of their mujtahid scholars, and that they are only required to do this of one whom they consider to be a scholar.’11

VI. CONSENSUS OVER THE PRESCRIBED TAQLID

As alluded to, the prescribed taqlid is a matter about which jurists are unanimous. That is to say, it is a point of scholarly agreement or consensus (ijma‘), and is thus a hallmark of Islamic orthodoxy; of ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama‘ah. In fact, historically, only a handful of deviant innovators have ever rejected it.

So, for instance, Ibn Qudamah stated: وَأَمَّا التَّقْلِيدُ فِي الْفُرُوعِ فَهُوَ جَائِزٌ إِجْمَاعًا – ‘As for taqlid in the detailed branches of the law (furu‘), it is permitted by consensus.’12

Imam al-Qurtubi has similarly written: ‘There is no difference among the scholars that the lay people should perform taqlid of their scholars.’13

Ibn Qudamah also tells us of who injected this erroneous idea into the religion, seeking to burden the masses, and other non-specialists in fiqh, with an impossible task:

وَذَهَبَ بَعْضُ الْقَدَرِيَّةِ إِلَى أَنَّ الْعَامَّةَ يَلْزَمُهُمُ النَّظَرُ في الدَّلِيْلِ في الْفُرُوْعِ أَيْضاً ، وَهُوَ بَاطِلٌ بِإِجْمَاعِ الصَّحَابَةِ

‘It is the view of some of the Qadariyyah that the lay people are required to investigate the proofs, even in the furu‘. But this is futile by consensus of the Companions.’14

Thus the belief requiring lay people to first know the evidence for the religious ruling they wish to act upon, isn’t just a hopeless and undoable task. The actual antecedent or predecessors of this bid‘ah was a faction of the Qadariyyah: one of the most heterodox and misguided of the seventy-two sects.

VII. THE MUQALLID & THE COMPLETE PICTURE

Now if taqlid is defined as a person following a scholarly opinion while not knowing the proof, how can a partially learned person, or a layman who is familiar with a proof-text or two in a few religious issues, be considered a muqallid? Ibn Taymiyyah furnishes us with the answer. He explains:

فَأَمَّا مَنْ لَمْ يَعْرِفْ إلَّا قَوْلَ عَالِمٍ وَاحِدٍ وَحُجَّتَهُ دُونَ قَوْلِ الْعَالِمِ الْآخَرِ وَحُجَّتِهِ فَإِنَّهُ مِنْ الْعَوَامِّ الْمُقَلِّدِينَ؛ لَا مِنْ الْعُلَمَاءِ الَّذِينَ يُرَجِّحُونَ وَيُزَيِّفُونَ

‘As for a person who knows the opinion of one scholar and his proof, but not the other scholar and his proofs, then he is from the generality of the muqallids. He isn’t from the scholars capable of evaluating and weighing-up [proofs].’15

This is a highly important point that is all too often misunderstood. The great bulk of jurists maintain that if a person knows a proof-text for any given issue, but is unaware of the complete proofs, he is still a muqallid (albeit one familiar with a proof or two, but not enough to evaluate the juristic strengths and weaknesses of each argument). This “complete” knowledge has three aspects to it: Firstly, knowing the relevant proof-texts. Secondly, knowing how legal rulings are extracted from them. Thirdly, knowing how to resolve any textual conflicts (ta‘arrud al-adillah). So the muqallid includes: (i) a layman who does not know the proof-texts; and (ii) someone who knows some proof-texts, but in an incomplete manner.

VIII. LET US ALL GROW IN SACRED LEARNING

The Prophet ﷺ said in regards to the excellence of seeking sacred knowledge: مَنْ سَلَكَ طَرِيقًا يَلْتَمِسُ فِيهِ عِلْمًا سَهَّلَ اللَّهُ لَهُ طَرِيقًا إِلَى الْجَنَّةِ – ‘Whosoever traverses a path in order to seek knowledge, Allah will make easy for him a path to Paradise.’16

Another hadith says: مَنْ تَعَلَّمَ عِلْمًا مِمَّا يُبْتَغَى بِهِ وَجْهُ اللَّهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ لاَ يَتَعَلَّمُهُ إِلاَّ لِيُصِيبَ بِهِ عَرَضًا مِنَ الدُّنْيَا لَمْ يَجِدْ عَرْفَ الْجَنَّةِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ – ‘Whoever learns knowledge by which the face of Allah is to be sought, but does so only to acquire some worldly thing, shall not smell the fragrance of Paradise on the Day of Resurrection.’17

Just because lay people aren’t obligated to know the proof behind a fatwa of ruling they read or are given, should not prevent them from increasing in their overall knowledge of the Qur’an or the Hadith corpus. As a rule of thumb, it is encouraged for all Muslims to increase in their share of sacred knowledge. Let the lay people apply their God-given intellects to grow in understanding textual proofs related to religious foundations (usul al-din), ethics and good character, matters of the heart and spiritual growth, and basic rights and responsibilities. Books like Imam al-Nawawi’s Riyadh al-Salihin are priceless in this regard. It is only in the area of detailed Islamic law, in fiqh, where the proofs are usually complex and difficult to fathom without legal training. And it is here that taqlid is legislated in order to relieve such hardships. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi remarked:

‘As far as the Islamic rulings go, they are of two types. Firstly, those known by necessity to be part of the Prophet’s religion ﷺ – like the five daily prayers, zakat, or pilgrimage; and the prohibition of adultery, intoxicants, etc. In such issues taqlid is not allowed, for these are issues every person must know. The second: rulings that need to be inferred, like the details of the acts or worship (‘ibadat) or the social transactions (mu‘amalat). It is in these issues that taqlid is permitted.’18

So let the lay people grow in sacred knowledge and engage with the texts of the Qur‘an and hadiths in such clear-cut and unambiguous matters; whilst avoiding giving fatwas, inventing their own interpretations or speaking about religious matters without sound comprehension. And there’s plenty here for them to get on with. Even then, when they are unsure of what the texts mean or point to, let them heed Allah’s bidding: فَاسْأَلُوا أَهْلَ الذِّكْرِ إِنْ كُنتُمْ لاَ تَعْلَمُونَSo ask the people of knowledge if you do not know. [21:7].

Perhaps it doesn’t need saying, but I’ll say it anyway. It’s not that the muqallid is seen as foolish or unintelligent. For muqallids could be theoretical physicists, mathematicians, doctors, erudite economists, philosophers, accountants, or a host of other professions which require intelligence and specialist learning. They could even be scholars in other branches of Islam: hadith experts, seasoned Arabic grammarians, cultivated linguists, accomplished theologians, or highbrow historians. But they aren’t schooled in fiqh and legal theory, and are not capable of ijtihad in juristic matters. And that, in itself, is not a blight upon their faith, character, or intellectual abilities.

IX. GOOD TAQLID: THE BOTTOM LINE

It terms of the legislated taqlid, it pretty much boils down to what Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah encapsulated when he said:

وَاَلَّذِي عَلَيْهِ جَمَاهِيرُ الْأُمَّةِ أَنَّ الِاجْتِهَادَ جَائِزٌ فِي الْجُمْلَةِ؛ وَالتَّقْلِيدَ جَائِزٌ فِي الْجُمْلَةِ لَا يُوجِبُونَ الِاجْتِهَادَ عَلَى كُلِّ أَحَدٍ وَيُحَرِّمُونَ التَّقْلِيدَ وَلَا يُوجِبُونَ التَّقْلِيدَ عَلَى كُلِّ أَحَدٍ وَيُحَرِّمُونَ الِاجْتِهَادَ وَأَنَّ الِاجْتِهَادَ جَائِزٌ لِلْقَادِرِعَلَى     الِاجْتِهَادِ وَالتَّقْلِيدَ جَائِزٌ لِلْعَاجِزِ عَنْ الِاجْتِهَادِ 

‘That which the vast majority of the ummah hold to is that ijtihad is allowed in general, and taqlid is allowed in general. Ijtihad isn’t obligated on everyone and taqlid forbidden, nor is taqlid obligated on everyone while ijtihad forbidden. Rather, ijtihad is for the one capable of it, while taqlid is for those who are incapable of it.’19

Again, stressing the limitations of a muqallid layman in the detailed and exacting art of fiqh, Ibn Taymiyyah reminds us that the muqallid is in no position whatsoever to make a just or knowledge-based evaluation of the proof-texts or scholarly positions in strictly legal matters:

لَا يَجُوزُ لِأَحَدِ أَنْ يُرْجِحَ قَوْلًا عَلَى قَوْلٍ بِغَيْرِ دَلِيلٍ، وَلَا يَتَعَصَّبُ لِقَوْلِ عَلَى قَوْلٍ وَلَا قَائِلٍ عَلَى قَائِلٍ بِغَيْرِ حُجَّةٍ؛ بَلْ مَنْ كَانَ مُقَلِّدًا لَزِمَ حُكْمَ التَّقْلِيدِ، فَلَمْ يُرَجِّحْ، وَلَمْ يُزَيِّفْ، وَلَمْ يُصَوِّبْ، وَلَمْ يُخَطِّئْ؛

‘It is not permissible for anyone to prefer one view over another without a proof, nor to be bias towards one opinion over another; or one person’s saying over another, without an evidence. Instead, whoever is a muqallid, then the ruling of taqlid applies to him: he cannot weigh-up, evaluate, or judge [a view] to be correct or incorrect.’20

Another demand arising from taqlid is: ‘There is a consensus among the Muslims that it is unlawful for a muqallid to state that something is halal or haram in those issues of ijtihad where he is doing taqlid of someone else. What he may say is: “This is the ruling in the madhhab I follow” or that: “I sought a fatwa and this was the response.”’21 If only people stuck to their levels and put the above rule into practice. So many quarrels and disputes would vanish into the twilight as egos wore thin and righteous conduct rolled in. But alas! Our social media age, whilst permitting a greater flow of information, has now elevated the hasty and ill-informed opinion to the same level as the seasoned and qualified one!

One last point. If this kind of taqlid is sanctioned by the Book and the Sunnah; and not only that, but jurists have a consensus about its legality, one cannot use a derogatory term for what Islam prescribes – i.e. taqlid is merely “blind-following.” Rather, this type of taqlid is Islamic, praiseworthy and must be seen for what it truly is: ‘The following of qualified scholarship in the details of the religion.’ After all, does one not get rewarded by Allah for this type of taqlid? Does it not count as an act of divine obedience drawing one closer to Allah?

X. THE PROHIBITTED TAQLID

Having covered the outlines of the prescribed taqlid, in particular how it relates to the layperson and anyone else incapable of ijtihad, let us now turn to the forbidden taqlid. Here, Ibn al-Qayyim said: ‘A mention about the details of taqlid and that it is classified into: [1] the prohibited; [2] the obligatory; [3] the permitted, but not obligatory.’22

Then he writes that the forbidden kind of taqlid takes three forms, which he goes on to elaborate as being:

أَمَّا النَّوْعُ الْأَوَّلُ فَهُوَ ثَلَاثَةُ أَنْوَاعٍ : أَحَدُهَا: الْإِعْرَاضُ عَمَّا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ وَ عَدَمُ الِالْتِفَاتِ إلَيْهِ اكْتِفَاءً بِتَقْلِيدِ الْآبَاءِ.  الثَّانِي: تَقْلِيدُ مَنْ لَا يَعْلَمُ الْمُقَلِّدُ أَنَّهُ أَهْلٌ لَأَنْ يُؤْخَذَ بِقَوْلِهِ. الثَّالِثُ: التَّقْلِيدُ بَعْدَ قِيَامِ الْحُجَّةِ وَ ظُهُورِ الدَّلِيلِ عَلَى خِلَافِ قَوْلِ الْمُقَلَّدِ

‘The first category is of three types: Firstly, to turn away from what Allah has revealed and not resort to it, sufficing instead with following one’s forefathers. Secondly, doing taqlid of someone, not knowing if they are qualified so that they can be authoritatively followed. Thirdly, doing taqlid in the face of the proof being established, and it is clear that the proof opposes the view of the authority being followed.‘23

This concludes the first part of the discussion. The second begins by looking into each of these three types of forbidden taqlid and, in the process, sweep away the myths and misinterpretations that have crept into this area, and that erroneously pass as religion in certain quarters of Muslim thought. The words of the Four Imams and their censure of taqlid will also be put into their rightful context. Finally, I’ll attempt to round off the article with a brief word about madhhabs.

1. Al-Tufi, Sharh Mukhtasar al-Rawdah (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1410H), 3:650.

2. Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul (Cairo: Maktabah al-Tijariyyah, 1356H), 2:387.

3. See: Bakr Abu Zayd, al-Madkhal al-Mufassal ila Fiqh Ahmad b. Hanbal (Riyadh: Dar al-Tawhid, 1411H), 1:64.

4. See: al-Ba‘li, Talkhis Rawdat al-Nazir (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 1429H), 347.

5. Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1419H), 18:191.

6. ibid., 18:191.

7. Al-Kafiyat al-Shafiyah (Makkah: Dar ‘Alam al-Fawa’id, 1428H), vv.774-75; 237.

8. Bakr Abu Zayd, al-Madkhal al-Mufassal, 1:64.

9. Al-Shanqiti, Adwa’ al-Bayan (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1417H), 7:318.

10. Abu Dawud. no.336; Ibn Majah, no.572. It was graded sahih due to supporting chains in al-Albani, Sahih al-Jami‘ al-Saghir (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1406H), no.4362.

11. Ibn Mu‘ammar, Risalah fi’l-Ijtihad wa’l-Taqlid (Jeddah: Dar al-Andalus, 1421H), 43-6.

12. Rawdat al-Nazir wa Jannat al-Manazir (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 1414H), 3:1015

13. Al-Jami‘ li Ahkam al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1417H), 11:181

14. Rawdat al-Nazir, 3:1019.

15. Majmu‘ Fatawa (Riyadh: Dar ‘Alam al-Kutub, 1412H), 35:233.

16. Muslim, no.2699.

17. Abu Dawud, no.3664. Al-Nawawi declared its chain sahih in Riyadh al-Salihin (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 1422H), no.1399.

18. Al-Faqih wa’l-Mutafaqqih (Riyadh: Dar al-Ifta, 1389H), 2:67.

19. Majmu‘ Fatawa, 20:203-04.

20. ibid., 35:233.

21. Al-Madkhal al-Mufassal, 1:73.

22. I‘lam al-Muwaqqi‘in (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 1423H), 3:447.

23. ibid., 3:447.

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Jihad & Martyrdom, War & Peace

khalid_ibn_al-waleed_battle_warrior_islam_sword_of_allah-1-pngIs Islam a conquest ideology more than an actual religion, as some now claim? Is Jihad identical to ‘perpetual war’ in Islam’s grand political scheme of things? And is the life of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ mostly about blood and gore and body counts? These are the issues addressed here.

Muslim scholars have long identified two types of jihad (lit. “striving” in God’s cause): an outer form of jihad and an inner one. The outer usually refers to state-sanctioned military force (i.e. armed combat), which is waged to defend both religion and realm, fight preemptively, or guard the vulnerable against unjustified aggression. As for the inner jihad (jihad al-nafs), it is the struggle to oppose one’s ego (nafs) and false desires, until they are in submission to God. This inner jihad is known as the “greater” jihad, as per mainstream Sunni scholarship, and can be read about here.

What follows is a perusal through the reality of the outer jihad – as per Islam’s source texts and the words of classical and contemporary Muslim jurists:

1. The outer jihad connotes a wide range of meanings which embraces: (i) the tongue, (ii) the hand and (iii) the sword. It can refer to the act of enjoining others to good and forbidding them from evil, as in the hadith: ‘So whoever strives against them with his hand is a believer; whoever strives against them with his tongue is a believer; whoever strives against them with his heart is a believer. Beyond this, there is not even a grain of faith.’1 It includes speaking truth to power: ‘The greatest jihad is to speak a word of truth in front of a tyrannical ruler.’2 Striving in dutiful service of our parents is also a form of jihad, as in the Prophet’s reply ﷺ to a young man who desired to participate in armed combat, and whose parents were still alive: ‘Strive in their service – fa fihima fa jahid.’3 Then there is that all-important mode of jihad: da‘wah – inviting others to Islam by conveying its teaching: Strive against them with it [the Qur’an], with the utmost striving. [25:52] And of course there is fighting in war. In brief: not all jihad is fighting, but nor is all fighting jihad.

2. Without doubt, jihad in the sense of qital (“fighting”, “military war”) is enjoined on the faithful at numerous places in the Qur’an and is seen as a highly meritorious form of duty and sacrifice in Islam. Al-Raghib wrote about the schematics of jihad in these terms: ‘Jihad is of three types: jihad against the apparent enemy; against the devil; and against the ego (nafs). All three types are included in Allah’s words, exalted is He: And wage jihad in Allah’s path with all the striving that is due to Him. [22:78] And wage jihad with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah. [9:41] … Jihad is to be waged with the hand and the tongue, as he [the Prophet] ﷺ said: “Wage jihad against the unbelievers with your hands and your tongues.”45 That said, the idea of jihad being a ‘holy war’ is alien to the Islamic vocabulary. When rendered into Arabic, the term reads: al-harb al-muqaddas, which doesn’t exist in any form in the Islamic teachings. War in Islam may be sanctioned or unsanctioned; but never holy.

3. Islam’s overall take on warfare can best be seen in these words of our Prophet ﷺ: ‘Never wish to meet your enemy, but ask Allah for safety. If you do meet them, be firm and know that Paradise lies beneath the shades of swords.’6 That is to say, pursue the path of peace and reconciliation; if such a path be denied by hostile intentions, then be prepared to act differently. The next hadith might also be used as a support: ‘After me there will be conflicts and affairs. If you are able, resolve them peacefully.’Also revealing are these words expressed by the Prophet ﷺ: ‘The most detested of names to Allah are War (harb) and Bitterness (murrah).’8 Given the above; and given also the numerous peace accords or ententes the Prophet ﷺ initiated so as to halt or mitigate the woes of war; let alone how he forgave and pardoned mortal enemies wherever he could, it’s simply fictitious, mischievous or fallacious to describe the Prophet as a ‘war monger’. A reluctant warrior, and a leader who took to combat to safeguard his nation from extinction or subjugation, are far truer descriptions of him ﷺ.

4. In classical Islam, warfare is regulated by an all-important shari‘ah dictum that says about jihad: wujubuhu wujubu’l-wasa’il la al-maqasid – ‘Its necessity is the necessity of means, not of ends.’9 That is, jihad of the military kind is not the goal; it’s a means to a goal. That goal being: the free and unhindered invitation to Islam and the summons to worship God alone. Islam treats war, given the harm, destruction or loss of life that takes place, as a necessary ‘evil’ of sorts: For had it not been for God’s checking some men by means of others, monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques wherein God’s name is often mentioned, would have been destroyed. [22:40] Two or three centuries after Islam’s birth, its jurists would define jihad in terms of armed combat against disbelievers who did not have a peace treaty, for advancing the religion. Al-Kasani said it is: ‘Expending one’s utmost abilities and strength to fight in Allah’s way, with one’s person, property, tongue, or other than this.’10 And al-Qastalani defined it as: ‘Fighting the disbelievers, so as to support Islam and make the word of God supreme.’11

5. This martial jihad has rules and codes of conduct too. Among them is that the head of state carefully evaluate the potential pros and cons of war; ensure non-combatants [civilians] are not killed or wilfully targeted; abide by any peace treaty or international agreement it has signed up to; and keep in mind receptivity to the call of Islam. The classical Islamic doctrine which forbids killing civilians in a military jihad takes its cue from the Prophet’s saying ﷺ: ‘March forth in the name of God, trusting in God and adhering to the religion of God. Do not kill elderly men, infants, young children nor women.’12 And Ibn ‘Umar narrates that the Prophet ﷺ ‘forbade the killing of women and children.’13 After quoting the last hadith, al-Nawawi stated: ‘Scholars agree upon acting by this hadith and forbid the killing of women and children, provided that they do not engage in combat. If they do, the great majority of scholars (jamahir al-‘ulema) hold that they can be fought.’14 And al-Buhuti reminds us: ‘Declaring jihad or not is entrusted to the head of state and his decision, for he best knows the condition of the Muslims and of the enemy.’15 I’ve discussed the difference between acts of terror and a bonafide jihad in: Terrorism is to Jihad as Adultery is to Marriage.

6. This brings us to another vital aspect about jihad in Islam: who may be fought? Are Muslims required to wage jihad against disbelievers due to their disbelief (kufr)? Imam Ibn Taymiyyah takes up the issue, stating: ‘The disbelievers, they are only to be fought on condition of them waging war first – as is the view of the majority of scholars; and as is proven by the Book and the Sunnah.16 Which is to say, Islam permits fighting disbelievers, not because of their disbelief, but only if they initiate war against Muslim societies, or manifest belligerence towards them. The Qur’an says: Fight for God’s sake those that fight against you, but do not transgress the limits. [2:190] Along similar lines, Ibn al-Qayyim, another medieval jurist, held that: ‘Fighting is only a duty in response to being fought against, not in response to disbelief. This is why women, children, the elderly and infirm, the blind, and monks who stay out of the fighting are not fought. Instead, we only fight those who wage war against us.’17

7. Ibn al-Qayyim also said about the Prophet ﷺ: ‘Never did he force the religion upon anyone, and he only fought those who waged war against him and fought him. As for those who entered into a peace treaty with him, or concluded a truce, he never fought them, nor ever coerced them to enter his religion, abiding by his Lord’s order: There is no compulsion in religion. True guidance has become distinct from error. [2:256] … It will be clear to whoever ponders the life of the Prophet ﷺ, that he never coerced anyone to enter his religion and that he only fought those who fought against him first. As for those who ratified a peace treaty with him, he never fought them, provided they kept to their covenant and did not violate its terms.’18 Such was the majority juristic view, that jihad is waged due to hostility; not religious affiliations, and eventually prevailed within Sunni Islam. Thus, the Prophet’s defensive battles, like Badr, Uhud, Ahzab and Hunayn, were where the enemy launched an offensive against the Muslims who then had to defend religion and realm. While battles like Khaybar, Mu‘tah or Tabuk, where the Muslim state was aware of the enemy’s impending aggression, resulted in a need to strike pre-emptively as a form of defence.

8. In light of the above, how do we explain jihad talab – “offensive” war? Classical law manuals almost invariably include the likes of the following statement in their martial codes: ‘Jihad in Allah’s path [is to be waged] every year.’19 Also: ‘It is a communal duty once each year.’20 So how does this square with what’s previously been stated? Well, jihad doctrines were based on defence, not only in terms of actual hostilities launched against Muslims, but also preemptively in cases of likely aggression. This doctrine was devised at a time when the Islamic state was surrounded by other states with whom there was no peace treaty, or who were openly belligerent to it. In such a dog eat dog world, one either attacked first, or else was attacked first. Such was the state of affairs throughout the pre-modern world. The twentieth century, however, changed all that. The U.N. Peace Charter has effectively made peace the default between nation states. As such, Muslim juristic voices began to reflect this new reality: ‘It is essential to note that the world today is united under a single organisation where each member [state] adheres to its terms and conditions. The Islamic ruling in this case is that it is obliged to fulfil all agreements and treaties that the Islamic lands commit themselves to, as is stipulated by the law of fulfilling treaties endorsed by the Qur’an. Based on this, those non-Muslim countries that are members of this world organisation are not deemed as the Abode of War (dar al-harb). Instead, they should be seen as Abodes of Truce (dar al-‘ahd).’21

9. Most qualified jurists and recognised fatwa committees of our age hold – and their word in shari‘ah affairs is authoritative and represents orthodoxy – that a state of war shall not exist between Muslims and others except if hostility against a Muslim land is initiated or barriers to da‘wah erected. Al-Khallaf wrote: ‘The legislated jihad is there to carry the Islamic call and to defend the Muslims against any belligerency. Whoever does not respond to the call, nor resists its taking place, nor initiate hostilities against Muslim polities, then it is not permissible to fight them. A state of security cannot be altered for that of fear … A state of war will not exist between the Muslims and others except in cases where hostility towards Muslims is initiated, or barriers to da‘wah are erected, or harm is perpetrated towards the callers or the call.’22 Inarguably, in an age of the Internet and social media, as well as global movement or displacement, it’s nigh on impossible for countries to erect barriers to prevent the da‘wah to Islam.

10. As for when the Muslim army is in the thick of a religiously-sanctioned war, this is where the following passages of the Qur’an (and their like) come into play: Slay them wherever you find them; drive them out of the places from which they drove you. [2:190-91] Also: Slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them [captive] and besiege them, and lie in ambush for them everywhere. [9:5] And then, of course, there is this: But if they incline towards peace, incline to it too. [8:61] Observing peace accords with non-Muslim polities again demonstrates Islam’s willingness to live peacefully with its neighbours, regardless of their religion. When Muslims are instructed to fight treaty-breakers, it is the breaking of a treaty that invites conflict, not the fact that the treaty-breakers are disbelievers: Will you not fight a people who have broken their pacts and desired to drive out the Messenger and attacked you first? [9:13]

11. If any Muslim state contracts a truce with a non-Muslim one, other Muslim states aren’t bound by this peace treaty. For each Muslim country has its own peace accords and foreign policies that are specific to itself. The cue for this is taken from the Treaty of Hudaybiyah where the persecuted Makkan Muslim fugitives, like Abu Busayr, Abu Jandal and their men, weren’t bound by the treaty ratified by the Prophet ﷺ with the Makkans. Nor was their guerrilla warfare against the non-Muslim Makkans, or their raids against their caravans, seen as a breach of the Prophet’s truce ﷺ: for they were tantamount to being a self-governing state not bound by the political jurisdiction of the Prophet ﷺ. Ibn al-Qayyim stated: ‘The peace treaty between the Prophet ﷺ and the [Makkan] idolaters wasn’t a treaty that included Abu Busayr or his followers.’23 In other words, each Muslim state is required to honour its own international accords, and not aid or support other Muslim states against those with whom they have a pact of non-aggression. Such is the weight that the Qur’an places on covenants of security and peace accords and truces, as Allah says: But if they seek help from you in the affair of religion then it is your duty to help them, except against a people between whom and you there exists a treaty. [8:72]

12. Ibn Taymiyyah once wrote: ‘The Prophet ﷺ was the most perfect in terms of this bravery – which is appropriate for commanders in war. He did not kill anyone [in war] save Ubayy b. Khalaf; killing him on the day of Uhud. He didn’t kill anyone else before or after this.’24 Of the twenty-seven battles (ghazwat, sing. ghazwah) which took place in his life, the Prophet ﷺ participated in nine.25 The total number of deaths on both sides was one thousand and eighteen persons. Of those, seven-hundred and fifty-nine were enemy deaths; two-hundred and fifty-nine were Muslims. In fact, the number of enemy fatalities drops to three-hundred and fifty-nine when speaking of those killed on the actual battlefield.26 Such were the pious restraints that infused the spirit of jihad of the Prophet ﷺ. What’s remarkable, Gai Eaton wrote, isn’t just the rapid pace with which Islam spread across the then known world, rather ‘the fact that no rivers flowed with blood, no fields were enriched with the corpses of the vanquished … they were on a leash. There were no massacres, no rapes, no cities burned. These men feared God to a degree scarcely imaginable in our time and were in awe of His all-seeing presence, aware of it in the wind and the trees, behind every rock and in every valley … [T]here had never been a conquest like this.’27 All this being so, despite the blood-thirsty image that ISIS-like extremists; on the one hand, and Islamophobes; on the other, continue to portray about Islam and the Prophet ﷺ.

13. Speaking of death tolls in war, Dr. Naveed Sheikh’s essay: Body Count, is something of an eye-opener. It’s a statistical study which attempts to put numbers on the human death toll of religious and political violence during the last two thousand years, and relate these to religio-cultural civilisations. These civilisations, as well as their locales, are: Antitheist (former Communist block); Buddhist (East Asia, parts of South Asia); Christian (Europe, the Americas, few parts of Africa); Indic (India, Nepal, Mauritius); Islamic (Middle East, parts of Asia, parts of Africa); Primal-Indigenous (parts of Africa, the Americas before colonialism); and Sinic (China, some neighbouring states). Key findings showed that the Christian world was responsible for the highest death count in history (responsible for 31% of all deaths: 178,000,000); followed by the Antitheist (22%: 125,000,000); then the Sinic world (19%: 108,000,000); then Primal-Indigenous (8%: 46,000,000); after which came the Islamic world (5%: 31,000,000); and lastly the Indic (less than 0.5%: 2,000,000 fatalities). In contrast to the Islamic world, Buddhist civilisation has an exceptionally good press in the West. Yet the Buddhist contribution to world fatalities is three times higher than the Islamic; the Christian world’s being six times higher, while the Antitheist four times. Yet despite only the Indic civilisation having a lower death toll, the Muslim world tends to always be on the receiving end of media charges and stereotypes of violence, murder and intolerance.28

14. Lastly, let’s touch on the following: a believer’s love for martyrdom. In one hadith, we see the Prophet ﷺ relish the following: ‘By Him in whose hand is my life. I would love to be killed in Allah’s way and then be brought back to life; then be killed and be brought back to life; then be killed and be brought back to life; then be killed.’29 The Prophet ﷺ cherished martyrdom, not because of the love of blood and gore; nor for the glory of war itself; nor for the clanging of steel or the thrill of the fight. He loved it because of what it manifested of the highest service and the ultimate sacrifice for God. To surrender to Allah one’s actual life, for a cause Allah loves and honours, is the greatest possible expression of loving Allah. It’s no wonder, then, that the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘Whoever dies without partaking in a battle, or even desiring to do so, dies upon a branch of hypocrisy.’30 Believers, though, whilst they long to meet a martyr’s death, strive to live a righteous life. For how can one truly desire to die for God, if one does not sincerely try to live for God?

For much of the twentieth century the ‘ulema examined and reexamined the contents of the Sacred Law, so as to accord Muslims some principled accommodation with the emerging global consensus. Islam’s legal tools were, as it happens, well-equipped for the task at hand. The juristic practices of tahqiq al-manat (identifying the context for laws in order to ascertain their current form and application) and maslahah mursalah (taking account of public interest and utility) moved the jurists of the great centres of Muslim scholarship in the direction of acclimatization, adjustment and adaption. And while it is not Islam’s calling to conform to the age – Islam is, after all, the great global dissent – it can and must furnish Muslims with the spiritual and social technologies required to live in the age and navigate its eclectic mix of challenges. More than that, religion must offer believers insights on how best to heal modernity’s discontents and disillusionments too.

Those doctors of Islamic law who are also blessed with being spiritually rooted in the realities of ihsan, teach us that God’s law exists to instantiate mercy not severity; ease not hardship; good news (tabshir) not alienation (tanfir). They insist that today’s times call for tashil – facilitation; but not tasahul – slackness and over-leniency. And that far from capitulating to the secular monoculture, as the short-sighted or fiqh-less zealots imagine, this path maintained a wise, far-sighted openness to gentleness, which long predated the advent of the modern world. Even in the fourteenth century Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah pointed to this salient fact: ‘The shari‘ah is based and built upon wisdom and [achieving] public welfare, in both this life and the next. It is justice in its entirety, mercy in its entirety, welfare in its entirety, and wisdom in its entirety. Any issue that departs from justice to injustice, mercy to its opposite, public welfare to corruption, or wisdom to folly cannot be part of the shari‘ah, even if it is claimed to be so due to some interpretation.’31

The above discussion about war and peace is the outcome of how most contemporary Muslim jurists have engaged the new global paradigms. As individual Muslims, we are each part of a larger transnational ummah. We each also belong to individual nations which are all committed to the global principle of non-aggression. This arrangement is certainly not perfect. But on the whole it has been instrumental in maintaining a fragile global peace – notwithstanding a few illegal occupations, continued conflicts, and even some modern genocides.

At the turn of the second millennium, Gai Eaton wrote that the West still sees Islam as a religion of war, bent on conquest. ‘They have inherited the fear,’ he insists, ‘which obsessed their ancestors when Muslim civilization was dominant and Christendom trembled before the “heathen” threat.’32 He says that even Westerners who’ve turned their back on Christianity still share these fears and prejudices today. As for Muslims, he feels, historically they’ve seen Christianity, and now the secular West, as inherently hostile. Indeed, even today, many Muslims are convinced (and there is much rhyme and reason behind their convictions) that the ‘Christian’ West will carpet bomb them or shred them with missiles if they step out of line. ‘They react either with impotent fury or with a degree of subservience, but always with a deep sense of injustice.’33 He concluded with this sober resolve: ‘There is, then, no end to this argument, so let me leave it where it is and consider what Islam actually teaches about peace and war.’34 And this, more or less, is what I’ve tried to do here.

1. Muslim, no.50.

2. Abu Dawud, Sunan, no.4344; al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, no.2175, saying: ‘A hasan hadith.’

3. Al-Bukhari, no.3004.

4. Abu Dawud, no.2504. Its chain is sahih, as per al-Nawawi, Riyadh al-Salihin (Riyadh: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 2000), no.1357, but with the wording: ‘ … with your wealth, lives and tongues.’

5. Al-Raghib al-Asbahani, Mufradat Alfaz al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 2002), 208; under the entry, j-h-d.

6. Al-Bukhari, no.3024; Muslim, no.172.

7. Ahmad, Musnad, no.695. Its chain was graded sahih by Ahmad Shakir, al-Musnad al-Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal (Egypt: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1954), 2:84-5, despite the presence of two questionable narrators in the chain: Faysal b. Sulayman and Iyas b. ‘Amr.

8. Abu Dawud, no.4950. The hadith, with its various chains, strengthen each other to yield a final grading of sahih. Consult: al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1987), no.1040.

9. Ibn Hajr al-Haytami citing al-Zarkashi, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj bi Sharh al-Minhaj (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1972), 9:211.

10. Al-Kasani, Bada’i‘ al-Sana’i‘ (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1986), 7:97.

11. Irshad al-Sari (Egypt: Bulaq, 1887), 5:31.

12. Abu Dawud, no.2614. The chain contains Khalid b. al-Fizr, who has been criticised. Hence the hadith was declared weak (da‘if) in al-Albani, Da‘if al-Jami‘ al-Saghir (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1990), no.1346. The ruling of not targeting civilians or other non-combatants, however, is well established in other hadiths and juristic consensus.

13. Al-Bukhari, no.3015; Muslim, no.1744.

14. Sharh Sahih Muslim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1995), 12:43.

15. Kashshaf al-Qina‘ (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Nasr al-Hadithah, n.d.), 3:41.

16. Kitab al-Nabuwwat (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1985), 140.

17. Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimmah (Dammam: Ramadi li’l-Nashr, 1997), 1:110.

18. Hidayat al-Hiyara (Makkah: Dar ‘Alam al-Fawa’id, 2008), 29-30.

19. Al-Dardir, Aqrab al-Masalik (Nigeria: Maktabah Ayyub, 2000), 54.

20. Al-Ghazali, Al-Wajiz (Beirut: Sharikah Dar al-Arqam b. Abi’l-Arqam, 1997), 2:188.

21. Abu Zahrah, al-‘Alaqat al-Duwaliyyah fi’l-Islam (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1995), 77. Also see: al-Jasim, Kashf al-Shubuhat fi Masa’il al-‘Ahd wa’l-Jihad (Kuwait: Jam‘iyyat Ihya al-Turath al-Islami, 2004), 49.

22. Al-Khallaf, al-Siyasat al-Shar‘iyyah (Cairo: Matba‘ah al-Salafiyyah, 1931), 75.

23. Zad al-Ma‘ad (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1998), 3:274-5.

24. Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah (Riyadh: Jami‘ah al-Imam Muhammad bin Sa‘ud, 1986), 8:78.

25. Cf. al-Azmi, al-Lu’lu al-Maknun fi Sirat al-Nabi al-Ma’mun (Riyadh: Dar al-Sumay‘i, 2013), 4:374. Ibn Sayyid al-Nas stated, Nur al-‘Uyun (Beirut: Dar al-Minhaj, 2010), 40-1: ‘His ﷺ battles in this period numbered twenty-five; some say twenty-seven, of which he fought in seven.’

26. Muhammad Sulayman Mansurpuri, Rahmatan li’l-‘Alamin (Riyadh: Dar al-Salam, 1997), 468. The casualties and death tolls for each side, and each battle, is tabulated on pp.433-56. In the original Urdu edition, cf. Rahmatan li’l-‘Alamin (Pakistan: Markaz al-Haramayn al-Islami, 2007), 2:462-80.

27. Islam and the Destiny of Man (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1997), 30.

28. Consult: Sheikh, ‘Body Count: A Comparative Quantitative Study of Mass Killings in History’, in Muhammad, Kalin & Kamali (eds.), War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (Cambridge: MABDA & The Islamic Texts Society, 2013), 165-214.

29. Al-Bukhari, no.2797; Muslim, no.1497.

30. Muslim, no.1910.

31.  I‘lam al-Muwaqqi‘in (Riyadh: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 2002), 4:337.

32. Remembering God: Reflections on Islam (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2000), 101.

33. ibid., 102.

34. ibid., 102.

Fitnah: Coming to a Sin-e-World Near You! (Part 2)

red-apple-temptation-sanjay-nayarThe first part of this blog (here) discussed the fitnah or tribulation of wealth, civil war and men’s weakness for women. The second and final part of the blog discusses three more fitnahs – that of callers to misguidance, spreading of inverted understandings of Islam, and the question of governments seeking to domesticate Islam and its scholars. And Allah’s help is sought.

4Fitnah of Callers to Misguidance: Hudhayfah b. al-Yaman narrates: People would ask Allah’s Messenger ﷺ about the good, but I used to ask about the evil, for fear of it reaching me. I said: O Messenger of Allah! We used to be in a state of ignorance and evil, but then Allah sent you with this good. Will there be any evil after this good? He said: ‘Yes.’ I said: Will there be any good after this evil? He answered: ‘Yes, but it will be tainted.’ I asked: What shall taint it? He said: ‘A people who will guide with other than my guidance. You shall approve of them and disapprove.’ I said: Will there be any evil after this good? He replied: ‘Yes! Callers to the gates of Hellfire, whoever responds to them will be thrown into it.’ I inquired: O Allah’s Messenger, describe them for us. He said: ‘They will be of your skin and speak your language.’ I said: What do you order me if I should reach this? He said: ‘Cling to the united body (jama‘ah) of the Muslims and their leader.’ What if there is no united body or leader, I asked? He said: ‘Then remove yourself from all these sects, even if you have to cling to the trunk of a tree until death comes to you and you are in that state.’1

In this hadith the Prophet ﷺ spoke about: du‘at ‘ala abwabi jahannam – ‘callers to the gates of Hellfire.’ Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani commented on the hadith, saying: ‘[Qadi] ‘Iyad stated: “What is intended by the first evil is the tribulation (fitnah) that occurred after the murder of ‘Uthman. The intent of the good that comes after is what happened in the caliphate of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. What is intended by those you will approve of and disapprove of are: the rulers who come after; among whom are those who adhere to the Sunnah and to justice, and among whom are those who call to innovations and to acting oppressively.”‘2 Ibn Hajr then says that these callers to the gates of Hell refer to: ‘Those who rise up seeking power and authority, from the Khawarij and their ilk.’3

A few centuries earlier, Imam al-Nawawi put slightly more flesh on the issue when he said about them: ‘Scholars say: They are those rulers who call to innovations or other deviations, like the Khawarij, Qaramitah, or the agents of the Inquisition (mihnah).’4

If the above hadith refers to rulers or regimes that were propagandists for innovation or heresy – endorsing it, sponsoring it and spreading it – this next hadith refers to the fitnah of innovators and persons of misguidance. Ibn Mas‘ud said: Allah’s Messenger ﷺ drew a line on the ground for us, saying: ‘This is Allah’s path.’ He then drew lines to its right and left, then said: ‘These are other paths; upon each path there is a devil calling to it.’ He then recited [6:153]: This is My straight path, so follow it; and follow not others paths, lest you be parted from His path.5

It shouldn’t need stating, but let’s do so anyway, that one of the foundational duties of every Muslim is to spurn religious innovation (bid‘ah). Our Prophet ﷺ warned in no uncertain terms: ‘Beware of newly-invented matters; for every newly-invented matter is an innovation, and every innovation is misguidance.’6 Also: ‘Whosoever introduces into this affair of ours what is not of it will have it rejected.’7 What is meant by bid‘ah is: ma uhditha mimma la asl lahu fi’l-shari‘ah yadullu ‘alayhi – ‘That which is newly-introduced, having no basis in the Sacred Law to substantiate [prove] it.’8 If what is newly-introduced does have a basis in the shari‘ah, then some scholars consider that a bid‘ah in the lexical sense; not the technical one. Others simply call it a ‘praiseworthy’ bid‘ah.9 Regardless of what one categorises it as, there’s absolute scholarly agreement that certain matters related to religion that came after the Prophet’s time, which have a basis in the din to prove their validity – either from the Qur’an, Sunnah, scholarly consensus (ijma‘), or analogy (qiyas) – can be brought under the umbrella of Islam and Islamic legislation. For in light of the second hadith quoted above in this paragraph: whoever introduces into this affair of ours what is of it will be accepted. It is just those matters that are newly-introduced as religious acts, but: la asl lahu fi’l-shari‘ah – ‘have no basis in the shari‘ah – which must be rejected and blacklisted.

All of this is to say that the primary obligation upon each Muslim is ittiba‘ – following what has been legislated and laid down in the Sacred Law; not ibtida‘ – innovating or introducing into the religion that which has no basis in the Sacred Sources. Moreover, the fact that some in our age have nosedived into extremes in this regard – so quickly and casually labelling any view opposing theirs as being a deviant innovation (and all too often accusing those holding such differing views as deviant innovators) – doesn’t excuse the rest of us from being lax in this fundamental area of faith, or shuffling into the opposite extreme.

The best way to steer well clear of these extremes is to ensure that in our learning and practice of Islam we be people of isnad; those who are linked to an unbroken ‘chain’ of scholarship which extends all the way back to the prophetic age. On this, the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘This knowledge will be carried by the trustworthy ones of every generation. They will rid from it the distortions of the extremists; the false claims of the liars; and the flawed interpretations of the ignorant.’10 This hadith should help bury the myth that ‘authentic’ or ‘sahih’ Islam, after its golden first two centuries or so, was lost and unknown even to the scholars for most of Islam’s history (barring a brief come back in the 7th century), only to be rediscovered by a clique of Muslims in more recent times. For those interested, I have shown how this allegation is so way off the mark in: Being People of Isnad: Legitimate Islamic Learning.

5 – Fitnah of Inverted Understandings: The Prophet ﷺ foretold the following: ‘There shall come upon people years of deceit in which the liar shall be believed, the truthful one disbelieved, the treacherous trusted, the trustworthy considered treacherous, and the Ruwaybidah will speak out.’ It was said: Who are the Ruwaybidah? He ﷺ said: ‘The lowly, contemptible ones who will speak out about public affairs.’11

This inversion of understanding (inqilab al-fahm); such topsy-turvy ways of looking at things whereby good seems bad and bad good, or truth is seen as false and falsehood the truth, is foretold in other hadiths too. ‘When the affair is given to other than its rightful people, then await the Final Hour,’12 said the Prophet ﷺ. And: ‘Indeed from the signs of the Hour is that the virtuous will be demeaned and the wicked elevated.’13 Just how deeply this state of inversion has oozed into the soil of our ‘post-truth’ world and this age of ‘alternative facts’, is anyone’s guess. Much of this, it has got to be said, is a prelude; a trailer, for the drama of the Dajjal which will soon be showing in a sin-e-world near us all – and we seek refuge in Allah from Dajjal’s fitnah.

Our Prophet went out of his way to shield us all from this inqilab al-fahm. He ﷺ once averred: The stars are the custodians of the sky; when the stars depart, what has been decreed for the sky shall come to it. I am the custodian of my Companions; when I depart, what is decreed for my Companions will come to them. And my Companions are the custodians of my ummah; when my Companions depart, what is decreed for my ummah shall come to it.’14

So what has been decreed for this ummah after the Companions (sahabah) – who are its keepers, guardians and custodians – depart? Al-Nawawi tells us it is: ‘The spread of innovations and newly-invented matters in the religion, fitnahs in it …’15 Al-Munawi says, writing almost four-hundred years ago: ‘It is the proliferation of innovations, the dominance of [false] desires, schisms in creedal matters, the appearance of the Horns of Satan, the ascendency of the Romans [Christians], and the desecration of the Two Holy Places (haramayn). All of these miraculous predictions have occurred.’16

So how do we stop the rot? How do we halt the descent into deviation? The answer is straightforward, though getting our desires and egos to act upon it may not be quite so: Follow the revealed teachings, and shun innovations in religion. Let’s look at what else our Prophet ﷺ urged in this respect:

In one famous hadith, the Prophet ﷺ lays down this cure for the rot: ‘Those among you who live [long] will see many schisms. So cling to my Sunnah and to the Sunnah of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs after me; cling to it unyieldingly.’17

And the Prophet ﷺ said to his Companions one day: ‘Verily there will soon be fitnah.‘ They asked: How shall we be, O Allah’s Messenger, and what shall we do? He ﷺ said: tarji‘una ila amrikum al-awwal – ‘Return to your original affair.’18

The intent of the above two hadiths is made even more clear in these definitive words of the Prophet ﷺ: ‘My ummah will split-up into seventy-three sects; seventy-two are in the Fire, one in Paradise.’ They asked: Who is that one, O Allah’s Messenger? He ﷺ said: ‘That which I and my Companions are upon.’19 Historically, this one saved-sect became known as ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama‘ah; or Sunnis, for short.

What all this points to is that any method or call which outrightly rejects the Sunnah, or the integrity and authority of the Prophet’s Companions, or denies an established scholarly consensus (ijma‘), is utterly false – regardless of how appealing or academic the falsehood is made to seem. For it is the hermeneutics of reprehensible innovation; if not outright heresy. No weight must be given to it in matters of religion. Al-Bayhaqi said about such schisms from Islamic orthodoxy: ‘We have already stated in the book al-Madkhal, and elsewhere, that the blameworthy differing (al-khilaf al-madhmum) is whatever differs from the Book, the authentic Sunnah or a scholarly consensus.’20 Ibn Taymiyyah stated: ‘The hallmark of these [innovated] sects is them splitting from the Book, the Sunnah, or scholarly consensus. Whoever speaks with the Book, the Sunnah and the scholarly consensus is from ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama‘ah.21

For much of Islamic history, the question of who embodies the majoritarian orthodox path of ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama‘ah has been rather contentious. Scholars like Imam al-Safarini and others, however, extend the net as follows: ‘Ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama‘ah is of three groups: Atharis, whose leader is Ahmad b. Hanbal, may Allah be pleased with him; Ash‘aris, whose leader is Abu’l-Hasan al-Ash‘ari, may Allah have mercy upon him; and Maturidis, whose leader is Abu Mansur al-Maturidi.’22

Yet how can it be three sects, when the hadith clearly speaks of one saved-sect? In this broader view of ahl al-sunnah, the Atharis, Ash‘aris and Maturidis aren’t looked upon as different sects, but different ‘orientations’ or ‘schools’ with the same core tenets. And since all three ‘orientations’ consent to the integrity and authority of the Sunnah and the Companions, and to ijma‘ – contrary to the seventy-two other sects – they are all included under the banner of ahl al-sunnah. Differences between them may either be put down to semantics, variations in the branches of the beliefs (furu‘ al-i‘tiqad), or to bonafide errors of ijtihad. Given that the Athari creed represents the earliest, purest form of the beliefs of ahl al-sunnah; in the view of this writer, it should be preferred wherever there is a disparity between the three schools. Having said that, the fact is that after the rise and establishment of the Ash‘ari and Maturidi schools, one would be hard pressed to find a jurist, hadith master, exegist, grammarian or historian who wasn’t a follower of one of these two schools. Historically, and in short: the Hanafis have been Maturidis, all except a few; Malikis and Shafi‘is have been Ash‘aris, all save a few; and Hanbalis have been Atharis, all but a few.

One final point: Describing people as innovators from the seventy-two sects (in other words, outside the fold of ahl al-sunnah), isn’t saying they’re apostates outside the fold of Islam – as is spelled out in: The Seventy-Three Sects: Is Most of the Ummah Deviant? One can have innovated beliefs or practices and still be a Muslim; albeit a misguided one. As for what groupings come under the umbrella of Islam, The Amman Message of 2004, and its three-point declaration, directly addresses that. The Message doesn’t concern itself with who is a ‘true’, orthodox Muslim; but simply who is a Muslim. For its aim is to help halt the widespread evil of takfir on Muslims, and to wrest the giving of fatwas from those who do not have the prerequisite learning or qualification.

6 – The Fitnah of Governments Seeking to Domesticate Scholars: Our starting point is this advice from the Prophet ﷺ: ‘Whoever comes to the doors of the ruler is put to trial.’23 Discussion about this, I must admit, is a difficult and delicate one; so I’ll try to be as nuanced and even handed as possible. And Allah’s help is sought.

This concern, first off, is not new. Scholars down the ages of Islam have cautioned the scholarly community about the trial (fitnah) entailed in rubbing shoulders with rulers or governments. Ibn al-Jawzi sketches the usual pious concerns, thus:

‘From the Devil’s deception on the jurists is them mixing with the rulers and sultans, flattering them and leaving-off censuring them when able to do so. And perhaps they find allowances for them when there really isn’t one, in order to attain some worldly thing … In summary: entering upon rulers entails great danger. For the intention may be good at first, but then may change by them honouring you or bestowing [gifts] on you; or by [you] harbouring worldly ambitions; or by not being able to avoid flattering them; or leaving-off censuring them. Sufyan al-Thawri used to say: “I don’t fear them debasing or disgracing me. Rather, I fear them being generous towards me so that my heart inclines towards them.”‘24

Again, teasing out the soul’s psychology in this matter, and the subtle cravings of the ego, Ibn Rajab said: ‘Also, many of the salaf used to forbid those who desired to order the kings with good or prohibit them from evil, from entering upon them … And this was from fear of the fitnah of entering upon them. For when he is at a distance from them, the ego deceives the person into believing he will order and forbid them, and be stern with them. However, when he comes face to face with them, his soul is swayed towards them. For love of being honoured is concealed in his ego. Hence, he starts to flatter them, is over lenient with them, and perhaps he grows fond of them and loves them – especially if they treat him well and hold him in high regard, and he accepts this from them.’25

Of course; and this is the second point, this avoidance is by no means categorical, nor absolute. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr rounds-up the chapter in which he relates the salaf’s dislike of entering upon rulers and kings, stating: ‘The meaning of this entire chapter is with regard to the wicked, oppressive ruler (al-sultan al-ja’ir al-fasiq). As for the just among them, and the virtuous, then entering upon them; meeting them; and assisting them to rectify affairs is from the best deeds of righteousness … Thus when a scholar enters upon the ruler now and again, and whenever there is a need; and he says what is good and speaks with knowledge, then that is good and is a means of Allah’s pleasure until the Day he meets Him. Such meetings, however, are usually a fitnah; and safety lies in abandoning what is in them.’26

One will not find a ‘one-hat-fits-all-sizes’ rule in this area. For the needs and variables of each country or polity are different. The whole affair hinges on benefits and harms and final outcomes; and rests on the individual scholar’s intention and ability to cope with the fitnah, and the openness or otherwise of the ruler or regime. If a scholar feels strong enough in faith or feels obligated to to do so, or/and the ruler is open to advise, then one enters and does ones duty wisely, courageously and respectfully (respectful, if not of the actual ruler, then of the office they hold). Scholars should also keep this juristic maxim in play: ma la yudrak kulluhu la yutrak ba‘duhu – ‘If one cannot achieve the whole, one does not give-up [achieving] the part.’ What a scholar must not be is a sheepish partisan voice piece for the outrages and injustices of power, or an apologist for it. The scholar’s burden is neither to pander to the palace, and nor to the public. It is simply to be principled according to the dictates of piety.

My third and final point bears upon Muslim scholars in Britain (and North America, for that matter); especially in respect of helping their governments in the fight against extremism and the promotion of ‘moderate’ Islam. The aim in what follows is not to preclude any collaboration or cooperation between Muslim scholars (or activists) and governments. Instead, I wish only to point out that there are different fitnahs at work in any such union, which cannot be ignored.

One issue that tends to haunt the air of any genuine cooperation for many a scholar is the RAND report of 2007: Building Moderate Muslim Networks. The report strategised how the United States government could nurture what they accepted to be ‘moderate’ Muslims: those committed to the liberal values of democracy, human rights, equality, and who oppose terrorism or other illegitimate forms of violence. As for conservative shari‘ah expressions, they are seen as incompatible with this world view, needing to be either jettisoned or interpreted away. It suggested partners in this effort would best be found in secularists, liberal Muslims, and moderate traditionalists; including Sufis: but not Salafis or Islamists. It urged aiding liberals, moderate young scholars, activists and women’s groups; helping moderateness with an online presence too.27 A decade on, and much of that strategy is well under way – both in the US and in Britain. With this being so, it makes even well-intended cooperation with government, in the fight against extremism, more than a little murky and problematic.

Not only have terms like ‘moderate’ Islam; ‘good’ Muslims; ‘Islamists’ and ‘terrorists’; or equating being too ‘conservative’ with an inclination for violence, been predefined and then institutionalised for all to fall in line with. But even spaces to air legitimate political dissent and social frustration are rapidly diminishing or being highly policed when it comes to Muslims. The irony may be that in the effort to root out extremism from Muslim communities and establish a government engineered ‘moderate Islam’, favourable conditions for driving disenfranchised individuals into the arms of violent extremism are being created.

In a climate where organisations and individuals are in a panic to establish themselves as bastions of moderate Islam, it is vital that Muslim scholars not get caught up in all the political posturing and money grabbing. They must also avoid succumbing to the pressures of employing religious vocabulary or definitions imported from outside the scholastic tradition. In fact, the onus is on them to inject some much needed nuance or tafsil into the discourse. One example concerns the driving factor behind terrorism of the ISIS type. Some insist it is driven solely by oppression, foreign policy, or other similar rational grievances: religion has no hand in it whatsoever. Others dismiss such naiveté and aver it is inspired purely by the vile, totalitarian ideology of Islamism (and for some, just Islam): they brook no further discussion about it.

The reality is that religion plays a role, less as a driver of their behaviour, but more as a vehicle for their pathologies and political outrage. To deny the role of foreign policy in nurturing violent extremism is as naive or coloured by self interest as denying the role of a twisted fiqh-cum-theology in fostering it. Until we acknowledge and tackle both gremlins, we fail public security and give kudos to a false political narrative. This has been my experience, since the early 1990s, while engaging some of the key voices and ideologues of such extremism. As for the twisted theology bit, I’ve attempted to discuss this in: Khawarij Ideology: ISIS Savagery.

Another fitnah scholars must be circumspect about is: giving fatwas under siege. Ibn Hamdan, a highly accomplished legalist in the Hanbali school, explains: ‘Fatwa is not to be given in a state where the heart is preoccupied or inhibited from examination or careful deliberation; because of anger, hunger, thirst, sadness, grief, fear, melancholy, overwhelming joy, sleepiness, fatigue, illness, irritating heat, intense cold, or needing to answer the call of nature.’28

If, as can be seen from above, pretty much any debilitating emotional or physical state renders giving a fatwa a no no, what about the state where a mufti is under relentless socio-political and psychological pressures to get Islam to conform to the essentially atheistic, liberal landscape? Or the case where a mufti’s mind and moods of the heart have already been significantly colonised by the attitudes of the dominant [Western] monoculture? How will that affect the quality, integrity and correctness of the fatwa? To think this does not already happen is to live in a cocooned or naive state. How else can one explain why proposed maqasid-based reforms to the shari‘ah so often seem to be of Western inspiration. ‘The public interest (maslahah, maqsad),’ says Shaykh Abdal Hakim Murad, ‘always turns out to take the form of what is intelligible and desirable to those outside Islam.’29

For the above reasons and more, scholars, perhaps more than ever before, need to be spiritually rooted. The temptations that are touted before them, or the convincers to compromise aspects of the faith and its scholastic teachings, are perhaps greater now than they’ve ever been. Fitnahs so easily throw intellects off balance, and sullying the intentions of a single scholar is more beloved to Iblis than causing a thousand feet of the general Muslim public to stumble. For such reasons our fiqh needs to be deepened and made much wiser; reading and intellectualisation need to be both broadened and sharpened; an atmosphere needs to be cultivated of being less judgemental and more judicious; hostility to sins needn’t be carried over to sinners; and the ego’s pretensions need to be reigned in and conditioned by humility and spiritual poverty (faqr). If we’re not spiritually-anchored, there’s a huge danger of being cast adrift in the tumultuous socio-political storms of the age.

As scholars try to remain alert against the fitnah of governments domesticating them; as they train themselves to deliberate not just on quick-fix fatwas or short term goals, but the longer-term vision too; and as they deepen the virtue of zuhd in their personal lives (the Prophet ﷺ stated: ‘What is little but suffices is better than what is plentiful but distracts’30), let them not loose sight of the following:

Where the Makkan Quraysh failed to see the disconnect between them and the pure message of Abrahamic monotheism and ethics; and failed to heed the discontent and exploitation of the masses by a powerful, wealthy elite, the Prophet ﷺ saw it, felt it, and Allah caused him to give voice to it. The fact that: ‘The scholars are the inheritors of the prophets,’31 as one hadith says, should cause them to follow suite in seeking to heal the disconnect and the discontent; in whatever community, and in whatever age or place.

To wrap-up: The Prophet ﷺ cautioned: ‘Fitnahs will be presented to hearts, just as a reed mat is woven stick by stick; and any heart that absorbs it, will have a black mark in it.’32 In order to guard our hearts from soaking up the poison of these fitnahs, the following should go some way, bi’idhni’Llah, in being inoculated against them: [1] gain sound Islamic knowledge of what shape or form fitnah can assail us; [2] shore-up our conviction in Islam’s revealed truths; [3] solicit abundant forgiveness for our sins and; [4] make copious du‘a that Allah shields us from fitnah, or grants us the patience and fortitude to bear it.

Of course, fitnahs are never sought after, or welcomed. Yet when they do come, even if they be in the form of political shake-ups, they can actually be blessings in disguise. For they can jolt us out of a false sense of security; reawaken in us a believer’s sense of sacred destiny; and bring home to us our need of Allah’s help and mercy, for both our worldly and spiritual prosperity.

Do people imagine that they will be left alone because they say: ‘We believe,’
and [that they] will not be tried? We tried those who came
before them. Allah shall know those who
are sincere, and He shall
know the liars.
[29:2-3]

1. Al-Bukhari, no.3606; Muslim, no.1847.

2. Fath al-Bari bi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Cairo: al-Dar al-‘Alamiyyah, 2012), 15:634.

3. ibid., 15:634.

4. Sahih Muslim bi Sharh al-Nawawi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1995), 12:199.

5. Al-Nasa’i, Sunan al-Kubra, no.11109; al-Darimi, no.202. The hadith was graded hasan by al-Albani, Takhrij Mishkat al-Masabih (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1979), no,27.

6. Abu Dawud, no.4607, whose wording it is; al-Tirmidhi, no.2676, stating the hadith is hasan sahih.’

7. Al-Bukhari, no.2697; Muslim, no.1718.

8. Ibn Rajab, Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa’l-Hikam (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1998), 2:127.

9. ibid., 2:127. I hope to post a more detailed discussion about bid‘ah, and whether it can be split into a good-bad/praiseworthy-blameworthy taxonomy, in the near future; Allah willing.

10. Al-Bayhaqi, Sunan, 10:209, and it is hasan. Cf. al-Albani, Takhrij Mishkat al-Masabih (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1979), no.248; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Miftah Dar al-Sa‘adah (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn ‘Affan, 1996), 1:500.

11. Ibn Majah, no.4036; al-Hakim, Mustadrak, 4:465, who said: ‘Its chain is sahih.

12. Al-Bukhari, no.59.

13. Al-Hakim, Mustadrak, 4:554. Its narrators are all those of the Sahih, as stated by al-Haythami, Majma‘ al-Zawa’id (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2001), 7:326.

14. Muslim, no.2531.

15. Sahih Muslim bi Sharh al-Nawawi, 16:68.

16. Fayd al-Qadir Sharh al-Jami‘ al-Saghir (Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘rifah, n.d.), 6:297.

17. Abu Dawud, no.4607; al-Tirmidhi, no.2676, who said: ‘This hadith is hasan sahih.’

18. Al-Tabarani, al-Mu‘jam al-Kabir, no.3307. It was graded as sahih in al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 2002), no.3165.

19. Al-Tirmidhi, no.2641, who graded it hasan.

20. Al-I‘tiqad wa’l-Hidayatu ila Sabil al-Rashad (Damascus: al-Yamamah, 2002), 354.

21. Majmu‘ Fatawa (Riyadh: Dar ‘Alam al-Kutub, 1991), 3:345.

22. Al-Safarini, Lawami‘ al-Anwar al-Bahiyyah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1991), 1:73. Other Hanbali scholars who share a similar outlook are: ‘Abd al-Baqi al-Mawhabi, Ibn al-Shatti, al-Qudumi and Ahmad al-Mardawi. See: al-Yafi, al-Manhajiyyah al-‘Ammah (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 2009), 35-8. It is also the position of Qadi Abu Ya‘la, as per Tabaqat al-Hanabilah (Cairo: al-Sunnah al-Muhamadiyyah, n.d.), 2:210, despite his vehement criticisms of the Ash‘aris.

23. Abu Dawud, no.2869; al-Tirmidhi, no.2256., who said: ‘This hadith is hasan gharib.’

24. Talbis Iblis (Cairo: Dar al-Minhaj, 2015), 175-6.

25. ‘Ma Dhi’ban Ja’i‘an’ in Majmu‘ Rasa’il al-Hafiz Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali (Cairo: al-Faruq al-Hadithah, 2003), 1:86.

26. Jami‘ Bayan al-‘Ilm wa Fadlihi (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 1994), 644.

27. See: RAND report, 2007: Building Moderate Muslim Networks, pp.65-74.

28. Kitab Sifat al-Mufti wa’l-Mustafti (Saudi Arabia: Dar al-Sumay‘i, 2015), 195.

29. Murad, Commentary on the Eleventh Contentions (Cambridge: The Quilliam Press, 2012), 42.

30. Al-Shihab, Musnad, no.1262. It was judged sahih by al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1995), no.947.

31. Abu Dawud, no.3641; al-Tirmidhi, no.2683. The hadith is hasan, due to its various chains that strengthen one another. See: Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, Fath al-Bari, 1:245.

32. Muslim, no.231.

Scholars, Speakers & the Culture of “Edu-Tainment” [2/2]

little-baby-with-big-adult-shoes-and-baseball-cap-beautiful-baby-wallpapersThe first part of the blog (here) discussed certain basics about what qualifications are required to be a scholar capable of giving fatwas, and how it is a vile and major sin to speak about the religion of Islam without proper knowledge. We observed how Imam Malik, rahimahullah, was fearful and reluctant to give religious rulings, because of the huge responsibility and consequence this entailed. ‘Before replying he should imagine Heaven and Hell infront of him, and consider his outcome in the Hereafter; only then should he respond,’ cautioned Imam Malik.1 And he was speaking to those who were qualified for the task, those fit for purpose; not those unschooled and ignorant in the science of fiqh!

In an age where craving for fame, recognition and celebrity-like status has found new outlets, “practicing” Muslims have found that they are not immune to such egotistical impulses. In fact, society and social media are currently awash with wannabe shaykhs, speakers and religious spokespersons – many (maybe even most) who are simply unfit for purpose. The Prophet ﷺ stated: ‘Today, you are in an age in which its scholars are many and its speakers few: whoever leaves a tenth of what he knows has followed his desires. Later there shall come an age in which its speakers are many and its scholars few: whoever clings to a tenth of what he knows will be saved.’2

Ours has become an age wherein an ever increasing number of speakers and da‘is sell themselves to the public as if they are seasoned scholars or well-grounded students of the sacred sciences; when most of them are clearly not. Such speakers and da‘is tend not to have the dignity, gravitas nor decorum of the scholars, let alone their learning or wisdom. And like toddlers trying to wear daddy’s or mummy’s shoes which are way too big for them, any attempt to take more than a few steps or walk at an adult pace is likely to result in a stumble or fall. But unlike the kid in daddy’s shoes or trainers, who is likely to elicit a smile or a sentiment of affection and cuteness from us, the wise are wary of such self-styled scholars and Allah’s awliya appalled at their false pretensions. We should be too.

As certain controversial inclinations wiggle their way into the da’wah – e.g. corporate attitudes, the conscious use of comedy and joking around, edutainment, the huge fees or honorariums that some da‘is now charge for their da‘wah, and the celebrity culture now surrounding some speakers – the final part of this blog tries to assess the validity or illegality, and the benefits and harms, of these matters in light of Islam’s revealed texts and scholarly teachings. Wa bi’Llahi’l-tawfiq.

Intending it as a nasihah and an opportunity for collective introspection, no specific individual or organisation is intended by any of the following points. But before the actual nitty gritty stuff, let’s start with some vital pointers about the layman:

1. The Prophet ﷺ exhorted: ballighu ‘anni wa law ayah – ‘Convey from me, even if it be [just] a verse.’3 Thus regardless of whether or not one is a scholar, this hadith urges every Muslim to pass on to others whatever little teachings of Islam they know, even if it is just a single verse from the holy Qur’an. Commenting on the phrase, ‘even if it be [just] a verse,’ hafiz Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani wrote: ‘So that everyone who heard him would hasten to convey whatever he heard of the verses, even if it was only a little. In this way, everything which he ﷺ came with would be relayed.’4 Of course, the caveat here is that they must be sure that such a piece of knowledge is actually part of Islam, and that there is no distorting it or relating it out of context.

2. Having established that conveying the teachings of Islam is not just the province of the ‘ulema, the non-scholar must observe the following rule: When a layman conveys something of Islam, if it is a well-known and agreed upon matter – like the obligation to pray and fast, or the prohibition of consuming wine or swine – then he may do so unconditionally. But if it is a detailed issue of fiqh, or one in which there is a bonafide juristic difference or controversy, the layman can only relate what he knows by citing the religious authority he is following in the matter. Using juristic vernacular, the rule runs like this: ‘Muslims have a consensus that it is impermissible for a muqallid to say that something is lawful or unlawful in matters of ijtihad where he is making taqlid of someone else. What he may say, however, is that: “This is the ruling in the madhhab I follow,” or: “I sought a fatwa and this was the reply.”‘5

3. Non-scholars spreading even the detailed teachings of Islam to others – accurately, wisely, responsibly and contextually – is something Islam promotes. But this must not be an excuse to forget our own levels of learning, invent fatwas and fictions about the religion, be careless in relating the words of the scholars, use da‘wah to vent the ego’s anger and frustrations, or imagine that one can weigh-up the evidences of the jurists and come to one’s own unlearned or delusional conclusion. About this latter practice, Ibn Taymiyyah had this to say: ‘As for someone who only knows the opinion of one scholar and his proofs, but doesn’t know the other scholar’s view or proofs, he is from the generality of the muqallids. He is not of the scholars who are capable of evaluating and weighing-up [the proofs].’6 In fact, even if the layman was aware of both scholarly opinions, unless he is a trained jurist, or a highly competent student-jurist, he would not have the expertise or skill to weigh-up proof-texts. To imagine otherwise is to be thoroughly deluded or thick-headed. In both instances, it would be a case of following the falsehood Satan has secreted into the soul.

4. As for how a layman determines who is a scholar, this is usually dealt with in works on Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh). Some ways of identifying a scholar are surer and far more certain than others. In decreasing levels of certainty, they are: [i] Established scholars testifying to the scholarly credentials of the person, or accrediting him with a scholarly authorisation (‘ijazah). [ii] A person holding a teaching post at a recognised institution of scholarly learning. [iii] Scholarly respect accorded to a person by other people of knowledge. [iv] A layman being informed by someone he deems trustworthy in religious issues that a particular person is indeed a scholar. [v] His general scholarly reputation in the Muslim community at large. In brief, the layman does his best to act on sure certainty (yaqin), or preponderant certainty (aghlab al-zann), as to whom he deems to be a qualified scholar.7

As for speakers feeling the urge to season their call to Islam and their exhortations to taqwa, tawbah and recollection of the akhirah, with comedy, jokes, or humour, then it is best if the following is kept in mind:

5. Sacred knowledge is to be conveyed with seriousness and dignity, given the sources it is being conveyed from and the realities it reveals. The Qur’an speaks about itself in these terms: We shall soon cast upon you a weighty word. [73:6] And: Do you then marvel at this discourse and laugh, but not weep. [53:59-60]

6. Even if we are not scholars, it behoves speakers and seekers of sacred knowledge to adopt the demeanour and comportment of the scholars. Imam Malik counselled: ‘It is a right upon a seeker of [sacred] knowledge to be solemn, dignified and have reverent fear [of Allah], and to follow in the footsteps of those who preceded him.’8 This must be done out of a love of virtue, beauty of adab, and saving others from the unsavoury aspects of our character; not from showing-off or pretending to be what we aren’t. Of course, actions are judged by their intentions.

7. Those giving religious instruction are supposed to help raise our levels of piety and make us serious people. They cannot pander to the mediocrity or frivolity that people steep themselves in, or surround themselves with, today. ‘Ali, radia’Llahu ‘anhu, said: ‘When you have learnt knowledge, retain it; and do not mix it with laughter or futility so that hearts spit it out.’9 Ibn al-Jawzi makes a similar point concerning the wa‘iz, or preacher, not laughing and joking nor behaving as common folk do, ‘so that they hold him in high esteem and thus benefit from his admonition.’10

8. The occasional dignified humour or light hearted remark is permitted, providing it does not undermine the seriousness of the message, nor makes light of it in peoples’ hearts. While advising the students of Hadith, advice that can also be applied to other scholars, teachers and preachers of Islam, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi wrote: ‘The seeker of Hadith is required to shun levity, frivolity, or lowering oneself in gatherings by being silly and idiotic, roaring with fits of laughter, excessive joking, or being too humorous and frivolous. However, a little humour is permitted occasionally, as long as it doesn’t transgress the bounds of refined manners or the way of knowledge. But as for foolish, immodest, or immoderate behaviour, or whatever else gives rise to it in peoples’ souls or creates harm, it is repugnant. Too much joking or laughter demeans one’s standing and diminishes one’s gentlemanliness (muru’ah).’11

With respect to corporate attitudes in da‘wah, this comprises a few issues. First there’s the ruling on taking money for da‘wah. Then there’s the matter of classes and courses designed as products to be purchased, and the need for such organisations to put out more and more products just to keep the revenue flowing in. Finally, there is the issue of these organisations not being able to defer to those more knowledgeable in other organisations, or point people to their events: that would simply be bad business! The bottom line underscoring much of what follows is the question of the soul’s sincerity, or ikhlas, to Allah ﷻ:

9. The Qur’an relates these words from one of Allah’s earlier prophets: ‘I am to you a trustworthy messenger. So fear Allah and obey me! I ask of you no wage for this; my wage is but from the Lord of the Worlds.’ [26:107-9] Again: ‘O my people! I ask of you no money for this. My reward comes only from Allah.’ [11:29] And the Qur’an says about one of the God-fearing people: And there came from the farthest part of the city a man running. He cried: ‘O my people! Follow those who have been sent. Follow those who ask of you no fee, and who are rightly guided.’ [36:20-1] This is a common theme running throughout the Qur’an, that Allah’s prophets, ‘alayhim al-salam, are trustworthy, sincere and selfless, and do not seek payment, wealth or fame for being the earthly means of bringing the message of Islam to their people.

10. When the above verses are read along with certain hadiths, the actual ruling about taking money or a salary for teaching Islam or giving da‘wah isn’t so obvious. A few of those hadiths include: The hadith of Ibn ‘Abbas where the Prophet ﷺ said to a group of Muslims who had stipulated a fixed payment in lieu of performing ruqyah, reciting passages of the Qur’an as incantation, over someone afflicted with an illness: ‘Indeed, the payment you are most deserving of taking is for the Book of Allah.’12 There’s also the hadith of Sahl in which the Prophet ﷺ married a man to a woman on condition he teach her what he knew of the Qur’an, as a dowry payment.’13 Then there are the Prophet’s words to ‘Umar: ‘When wealth comes to you which you neither craved nor asked for, then take it. Otherwise, do not covet it.’14 By contrast are hadiths that seem to imply the opposite: The Prophet ﷺ warned ‘Ubadah b. al-Samit, who had taught some Muslims the Quran and writing, and received a gift of a bow in return: ‘If you desire to have a bridle of fire around you, then accept it.’15 ‘Imran b. al-Husayn once heard a person reciting the Qur’an and then asking to be recompensed. So he related the hadith of the Prophet ﷺ to him: ‘Whosoever recites the Qur’an, let him ask Allah [for reward] for it. For a people will soon come who will recite the Qur’an and ask [for reward] for it from people.’16 Lastly, let’s bring the hadith of ‘Uthman b. Abi’l-‘As into the mix, who narrated the following: ‘The final undertaking of the Prophet ﷺ to me was that I should pick a muezzin (mu’adhdhin) who wouldn’t ask for a wage for giving the call to prayer (adhan).’17

11. Scholars have exerted much juristic energy and activity to try and make sense of the above assortment of proof-texts. In brief, I’ll quote what Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani said about the first hadith, ‘Indeed, the payment you are most deserving of taking is for the Book of Allah,’ so as to get a gist of the issue. He wrote: ‘The majority infer from it the permissibility of taking a wage for teaching the Qur’an; as opposed to the Hanafis who don’t permit it, but allow it for ruqyah …’18 Likewise, al-Shawkani, critiquing the chain of each hadith rigorously, along with the juristic reasons offered for and against taking a wage for the Qur’an, concludes by siding with the majority.19 For the sake of completion, a mention must be made of the stance of later Hanafi jurists. As the need for Qur’an teachers grew, and state support for such teachers significantly dwindled, Hanafi jurists felt the public interest would best be served by allowing teachers of the Qur’an to take a wage to help them in their profession of teaching.20 What applies to teaching the Qur’an, applies to the other sacred sciences of Islam too.21

12. Although scholars differ as to how this permissibility ought to best manifest itself, many urge that if one can have an income from another source other than teaching the din, that would be far better and safer. This way, when teaching the Qur’an, or any other sacred knowledge, ikhlas is less likely to be tainted by monetary considerations, and one can dedicate themselves wholeheartedly to seeking the pleasure of Allah ﷻ. Many also advise that money shouldn’t be given as a remuneration for teaching: that must be done only for Allah’s sake. Instead, it should be given as an aid for scholars to continue teaching and serving the general interests of the ummah.

13. The above refers to qualified scholars teaching the sac