One hadith states: ‘Whoever dresses in clothes of attracting attention (shuhrah, lit. ‘fame’) in this life, Allah shall clothe him in garbs of humiliation on the Day of Resurrection.’1 The way we dress can and often does, therefore, have to do with the inward state of our souls.
We are told in the scholarly commentaries that attracting attention means: To dress so that fingers start pointing at you, because of being extravagantly, unusually, or shabbly dressed, relative to the rest of society. In such a case, the intention in dressing as such is usually to either brag, boast, show-off, be the centre of attention, or desire to stand out from everyone else — all of which are base motives of the lower self.2
Al-Mardawi, one of the foremost Hanbali jurists of his age, wrote in al-Insaf: ‘It is detestable to wear clothes which involves attracting attention, or that differ from the clothes of the people of one’s city — according to the correct view of the [Hanbali] school. It is said that it is prohibitted … Shaykh Taqi al-Din [Ibn Taymiyyah] said: “Shuhrah is forbidden, by which one intends to feel superior or project humility, due to the salaf’s hatred of this.”’3
The same idea about dressing as per the norms or conventions of one’s society (providing it doesn’t clash with any shari‘ah prohibition) comes to us in a number of scholarly testimonies; from them: Sufyan al-Thawri said about the venerable salaf: ‘They hated two types of attracting attention: elegant clothing which draws attention and makes people stare, and trampish clothes that he is derided for and which humiliates his religion.’4
As for Imam Ahmad: He saw a man wearing a black and white striped cloak, so he advised: ‘Leave this and wear the attire of those in your city,’ adding: ‘It isn’t forbidden, but had you been in Makkah or Madinah, I would not have faulted you.’5 Presumably this type of cloak was a customary item of clothing in the two Holy Cities at that time.
Ibn Abi Shaybah relates: Zubayd al-Yami once wore a hooded cloak (burnasa), and heard that Ibrahim al-Nakha‘i had criticised him for doing so. So he went to him and said: ‘The people used to wear it. Ibrahim replied: “For sure! But those who once wore it have passed away. If anyone were to wear it now, he would attract attention and fingers would point at him.”’6
Even in how a Muslim man abides by raising one’s lower garment above his ankles, he does so demurely and unassumingly, without drawing more attention than is necessary by raising it too high. Otherwise it will be regarded as shuhrah, a form of attention seeking or wanting to be pointed out. Ibn al-Jawzi narrates under a section discussing excessively shortening one’s clothes, with his chain to Ibn Hani; who said: ‘I came to Abu ‘Abd Allah Ahmad b. Hanbal one day whilst wearing a tunic [that came just] below the knee and above the shin. He said: “What is this?’ and censured it, saying: ‘This should not be done again.”’7
As for the Hanbali madhhab’s actual ruling on isbal – letting the lower garment of a man fall below his ankles, if not done from pride, it is disliked (makruh); with pride, it is forbidden (haram).8
Those in Muslim majority countries have their diverse sartorial norms. As for Muslims in the West, as a norm, we take on the dress conventions of our societies; as long as it doesn’t entail any clear shari‘ah forbiddance. A believing man’s dress, therefore, should not be tight fitting, but instead be loose, modest, unassuming and, of course, be dignified and respectable. For such are traits of a believer’s inward state. As for the Arabisation of Muslim dress codes, outside of Arab cultures, such distortions of Islam and the Sunnah need to be swiftly remedied. This mindset usually springs either from ignorance, or worse still, shuhrah! But to then dress in clothes that aren’t dignified, or that tightly hug the body, is unbefitting and going to another extreme.
As for ladies, their dress is for concealment (satr) and recognition (ta‘arruf). On the one hand they dress in order to conceal their personal beauty and charm; on the other, their hijab-attire is so that they may be known [Q.33:59] who they are and what they stand for. That it must be black, or Saudi-styled, is likely to be a bid‘ah if one believes that is what is religiously-sanctioned. Instead, one finds godly and intelligent ways to make the attire reflect being locally rooted and practical, while fulfilling the shari‘ah conditions and not making ‘fashion statements’.
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1. Abu Dawud, no.4029; Ibn Majah, no.3606. The hadith was graded hasan in Muhammad b. Muflih, al-Adab al-Shar‘iyyah (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1999), 3:497.
3. ‘Ali b. Sulayman al-Mardawi, al-Insaf fi Ma‘rifat al-Rajihi min al-Khilaf ‘ala Madhhab al- Imam al-Mubajjal Ahmad b. Hanbal (Egypt: Matba‘ah al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah, 1956), .1:473.
4. In Ibn Abi Dunya, al-Tawadu‘ wa’l-Khumul (Cairo: Dar al-I‘tisam, 1986), 127-8; no.64.
5. Ibn Muflih, al-Adab al-Shar‘iyyah, 3:497.
6. Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-Musannaf (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 2004), 8:366; no.25655.
7. ‘Abd al-Rahman b. al-Jawzi, Talbis Iblis (Beirut: Dar al-Qalm, 1403H), 198. The basis for it is found in Ishaq b. Ibrahim b. Hani, Masa’il al-Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1400H), 2:146; no.1820.
The following is a chapter from my upcoming book, God-willing, called: Salafism Reconsidered: True Salafism, False Salafism & Ijma’ Theology. This is the fortieth chapter, and discusses the issue of whether or not Muslims can publicly criticise their Muslim ruler or government (if so, where, when and how), and if rebelling against state authority would Islamically be allowed? This article is a long read, comprised of seven sections.
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IT’S AN INARGUABLE fact Islam does not abide anarchy on any grounds. Even as something as simple and mundane as a group of people travelling on a journey, we see the Prophet ﷺurging: ‘When three [or more] people set out on a journey they should appoint one of them as their leader.’1 It is even more urgent for a country to have a clear leader having executive authority. A well-known hadith says: ‘Each of you is a shepherd, and each of you is answerable for what you shepherd. So the leader over the people is a shepherd and answerable for his flock. The man is a shepherd for his family and is answerable for his flock. The woman is a shepherd over her husband’s home and children and is answerable for them. The servant is a shepherd over his master’s property and is answerable for it. Indeed, each of you are shepherds and each of you is answerable for their flock.’2 The Holy Qur’an states: O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those in authority among you. [Q.4:59]
Ibn Taymiyyah, following in the footsteps of earlier scholars, and quoting something much older, offers the usual take on orderly governance (even if it be oppressive) being better than all-out anarchy. Thus he wrote in his short treatise on political thought:
‘It has been said: “Sixty years of tyrannical rule is better than a single night without a ruler.” And experience bears this out.’3
Some have falsely read this as the Islamic political tradition not being too bothered with how bad tyranny and despotic government is. Yet that’s the very opposite point being made by Ibn Taymiyyah, which we might better see after the Arab Spring. The point of the adage is to tell us just how bad anarchy and lawlessness actually are.
But is there any limit to acquiescing to state authority? Does Islam allow the public to object to, or openly criticise a ruler’s public policy or action? And are there any circumstances where Muslims can withdraw their hand of obedience to the ruler to rebel and replace him? This is what we’ll look at in this chapter, to see if there is an ijma‘ on any of these matters such that it could be said that this is the way of the salaf. Also, can the classicalnotions to do with ruler and the ruled, the government and the governed, be applied to today’s nation states and situation? Or has modernity made these ideas redundant or simply untenable?
I. OBEDIENCE TO AL-RAHMAN TRUMPS OBEDIENCE TO THE SULTAN
The entry point in this issue is something no one disagrees over, which is that obedience to the ruler or political authorities is conditional on it not involving disobedience to Allah. About this, the Prophet ﷺsaid: la ta‘ata li makhluq fi ma‘siyat al-khaliq — ‘There is no obedience to the created if it entails disobedience to the Creator.’4 This applies between ruler and the subjects or citizens, parents and children, husband and wife, or any other dynamic where one has a conditional right of obedience from the other. In Islam, there simply is no obedience to anyone if it means disobedience to Allah, mighty and majestic is He. While this in itself doesn’t allow anyone to rebel against the state or incite political agitation and rebellion, does it permit public criticism of the ruler or government? That is the next query to be addressed.
II. OPENLY CRITICISING THE RULER’S PUBLIC ACTS OR POLICIES
There are two ends of a spectrum where public criticism of the ruler falls. At one end we read in the following report: It was said to Usamah b. Zayd: ‘Will you not enter upon [the caliph] ‘Uthman and speak to him?’ He said: ‘Do you think I haven’t spoken to him unless you hear it? By Allah! I have spoken to him concerning what is between me and him, without opening a matter which I would not like to be the first to open.’5 Offering advice privately to the ruler, so as not to stir up any public resentment or ill-will against him (which is what Usamah b. Zayd was trying to avoid), comes to us in this hadith too: ‘Whoever intends to advise the ruler, let him not do so publicly. Instead, let him take him by the hand [and do so] privately. If he accepts, then fine; if not, he has discharged his duty to him.’6 Private advise, even about public errors or infringements of a ruler, is seen as the best way to yield the desired result of getting the ruler to redress his wrong or correct the erroneous act. The standard manner of speaking to political authority comes to us in the verse where Allah tells Moses, peace be upon him, to go to Pharaoh and: ‘Speak to him with mild words, that perchance he may take heed or fear [Allah].’ [Q.20:44]
At the other end of the corrective spectrum we have this. Tariq b. Shihab relates: The first person who began delivering the khutbah of ‘Id day before the prayer was Marwan. A man stood up and said: ‘Prayer [comes] before the khutbah!’ Marwan said: ‘This [practice] has been done away with.’ Upon which Abu Sa‘id said: ‘As for this [man], he has fulfilled what was due upon him. I heard Allah’s Messenger ﷺsay: “Whosoever of you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; if he is unable to, then with his tongue; if he is unable to, then with his heart — and that is the weakest of faith.”’7
This, and other textual proofs like it, lead us to understand that it’s a part of faith to correct the public wrongs and sins of a ruler, ideally addressing him while he is present, if possible; but if not, to still correct the wrong so as not to leave the public in doubt as to its reprehensibility and unIslamic nature.
Imam al-Nawawi, squaring the text about public rebuke with the report of Usamah b. Zayd advising the ruler privately, explained:
وَفيهِ الأَدبُ مع الأُمَرَاءِ واللُّطفُ بِهم وَوَعْظُهُمْ سِرًّا وَتَبْلِيغُهُمْ ما يقولُ النَّاسُ فِيهِم لِيَنْكَفُّوا عَنهُ، وَهَذَا كُلُّه إذا أَمكَنَ ذلك، فإِنْ لم يُمكنِ الوَعظُ سِرًّا وَالإِنكارُ فَلْيَفْعَلْهُ عَلانيَةً؛ لِئَلَّا يَضِيعَ أَصلُ الحَقِّ.
‘In it is [evidence for] politeness with the leaders, being courteous to them, admonishing them privately, and relating what the people are saying about them so as to get them to stop. All this is if it’s possible. If it is not possible to admonish or correct them privately, then let him do so publicly so that the foundation of truth is not lost.’8
Again, we have this salaf-report informing us that Ka‘b b. ‘Ujrah said that he entered the mosque while ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Umm al-Hakam was giving the khutbah sitting down. I said: ‘Look at this wretched person delivering the khutbah seated, while Allah says: Yet when they see some merchandise or distraction, they break away to it and leave you standing. [Q.62:11]’9 To this, Imam al-Nawawi said: ‘These words entail a rejection of evil, and a rebuke to those in authority when they oppose the prophetic guidance.’10
Another example of public inkar of those in authority, or of their deputies and ministers, is seen in a report where al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf was delivering a khutbah in the Sacred Precinct of Makkah where he stated: ‘Indeed Ibn al-Zubayr has altered the Book of Allah.’ Upon this, Ibn ‘Umar stood up and said: ‘You lie! Neither Ibn al-Zubayr, nor you, have the ability to alter the Book of Allah.’ Al-Hajjaj said: ‘You are an old man who has grown senile. Sit down!’ Ibn ‘Umar replied: ‘As for you, if you recant [what you said], I’ll recant too.’11
Shaykh Muqbil b. Hadi, who throughout the eighties and nineties was seen as being the fourth of the kibar Salafi scholar (after Ibn Baz, al-Albani and Ibn ‘Uthaymin), waded into the issue with these words:
‘As for rebuking them [openly], then this is fine, along with announcing to the Muslims that you aren’t inciting to rebellion or a coup. You are calling to change the wrong, and that instead of standing against the ruler, to stand against these decadent matters which are corrupting the society. This is an obligation. As for defaming them, then this is as has preceded. If the point is to incite people to rebel against them, then no! If the aim is to motivate people to rebuke the [evil and the] people of evil, that’s a good thing.’12
Shaykh al-‘Uthaymin states the following, in one of the numerous sittings with him that was documented in a multi-volume collection of responses known as Liqa’ al-Bab al-Maftuh:
‘Likewise is the case of advising the rulers. Of the people are those that take one side of the texts, which is to publically denounce those in authority, no matter if it results in more harm. And of them are those who say that it isn’t right to publically [rebuke them] categorically and that it is a duty to advise them privately, as occurs in the text the questioner cited. We say: the texts do not belie each other, nor clash with each other. So when is the criticism [to be] done publically? When there is benefit. The benefit being that evil is eliminated and replaced by good. It is done privately when public criticism does not serve a benefit; neither in eradicating the evil, nor in replacing it with good.’13
To hold that publically rebuking a ruler for the open sin he perpetrates or flaunts, or for an anti-shari‘ah policy he enacts, contradicts the way of the salaf, and to then label anyone who does so to be a modern-day Kharijite, is to be up to one’s knees in the slime of false Salafism. Of course, niyyah is crucial here, as are the likely consequences. For if the intention is just to shame the ruler and insult him, or if it is to whip-up people’s anger and incite them to lawlessness or armed rebellion — or even if it is not, but the probable consequence of openly speaking about a ruler’s falsehood is that it will result in public disorder — then one cannot critique the authorities openly. Public criticism of leaders is tied to whether or not a greater good prevails in society, and whether or not evil is reduced or eliminated. We’ll do well to recall that shirking the duty of commanding good or forbidding wrong, even to those in authority, is to possibly invite the curse of Allah upon us: Those of the Children of Israel who went astray were cursed by the tongues of David and Jesus, son of Mary. That was because they rebelled and transgressed. They forbade not one another from the wickedness they did. Evil indeed is what they used to do. [Q.5:78-9]
III. NOT GETTING BLOOD ON OUR HANDS
There is yet another reason why it is important to keep alive the spirit of justice and the deisre to right wrongs, political or otherwise. And that’s due to the maxim:
‘Being content with the act is like [doing] the act [in terms of] punishment or reward, even when devoid of the act or intent.’
In other words, so much depends on how we dispose our soul towards what is just and unjust, what is good and evil. The right attitude towards good and evil makes all the difference. Such is the centrality of the heart’s state and orientation. It’s when the heart becomes desensitised to sin, injustice and violating revealed guidance, that’s when the real rot has set in. That’s when you can say that there’s a seriously damaged soul. Ibn Mas‘ud once heard someone say that whoever does not command good or forbid evil has persished. At which he was compelled to say: ‘Rather, one whose heart does not recognise the good, nor reject the evil, perishes.’14 For a believer, such must be the heart’s knowledge and sensitivity. It’s not overdramatic to say that between modernity and believers, it’s all a battle for hearts!
We can begin to see how this relates to the above principle. In one hadith, the Prophet ﷺinforms us: ‘When a sin is committed on earth, one who is present but detests it, is as one who was not there. While one who wasn’t there but is okay with it, is as if he was present.’15 That is to say: ‘The one who approves of the sin, shares in the ruling of the sinner.’16 There’s also this hadith: ‘There will soon be rulers who you will approve of and object to. Whoever abhors their evil is absolved. Whoever objects to it is saved. But whoever is pleased with it or approves of it [is sinful].’17 On this basis, Imam al-Sha‘bi once said to a man who expressed contentment with the killing of ‘Uthman: sharikta fi damihi – ‘You share in his blood.’18
It goes both ways. To approve (or perhaps even be blasé about) the crime of murdering a ruler illegally, or without the due process of law, is to have blood on one’s hands. Yet the same goes for when rulers or political heads kill dissidents and political opponents; wage wars on other Muslim states knowing only too well the death toll will consist mainly of ordinary men, women and children; or imprison ‘ulama and citizens because of justified critiques of unIslamic state actions. The hope in this last scenario is that such people have a share spoken of in the hadith: ‘The greatest jihad is to speak a word of truth in front of a tyrannical ruler.’19 One doesn’t have to be in the actual presence of such a ruler to engage in this jihad. It suffices to know the ruler’s reach extends even to you, were you to speak truth to power, and that your life would likely be in serious danger for doing so. In all such cases, approving of, or giving a nod to such evils amount to being a partner in such crimes, possibly with blood on our hands! To twist all of this clear teaching about loving justice and having even the heart’s piety and courage to reject the open acts of state fawahish, under the falsehood that publically criticising such political wrongs is against the ijma‘ or way of the salaf, is perverting the truth and continues to be the howling of false Salafism. Yet more bizarre is when the voices go into fanboy mode for the ruler, pushing all sorts of nonsensical validations for such shari‘ah crimes, in the attempt to make people feel at ease with these evils and vindicate the ruler. Rather, what is wajib in Islam, as a bare minimum, is our heart’s repudiation of these evil — lest we too wish to share in such crimes against the ways of our Lord. If we find scholars known for their God-fearingness and knowledge urging that advice to the ruler be given privately, instead of publically, that may simply be due to their perception of the prevailing political mood and the social turmoil that may likely kick-off if things go public; then possibly viral! But an ijtihadi fatwa does not amount to being the way of the salaf.
IV. KHURUJ: VIVA LA REVOLUTION
What is an incontestable fact concerning early Islamic history in the days of the venerable salaf, is that a few notable pious individuals did attempt to rebel against what they saw as the rule of a hardened tyrant. Rebellion, or khuruj (lit. ‘to leave’ allegiance to the ruler and ‘come out’ against him, so as to remove and replace him) was a deeply disputed issue in the first two generations of the salaf, as was its wisdoms and perceived benefits. When al-Husayn sought to rebel against Yazid, Ibn ‘Umar, Ibn ‘Abbas and others objected to this course of activism.20 Likewise, when Ibn al-Ash‘ath and many of the notable tabi‘un rebelled against al-Hajjaj, al-Hasan al-Basri, Mujahid and others from the tabi‘un objected.21 Moreover, the prominent amongst the sahabah who were still alive, like Anas b. Malik, Sahl b. Sa‘d, ‘Abd Allah b. Abi Awfa, ‘Amr b. Abi Salamah, al-Miqdad and others, some of whom suffered severely at the hand of al-Hajjaj’s tyranny, all abstained from rebellion against him. As for Ibn al-Zubayr’s stand-off with al-Hajjaj, or his refusal to accept the hereditary khilafah of Yazid, it wasn’t rebellion as such.22 In fact, as Ibn Qudamah states, the affair was the opposite: ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwan rebelled against Ibn al-Zubair’s contested caliphate and had al-Hajjaj besiege and kill him.23 Nevertheless, the fact is that some of the righteous salaf did partake in rebellion.
So does that settle the issue on the legality of rebelling against tyrannical leaders? It certainly shows that there was a difference about it among the early salaf. And some continue to use this point of ikhtilaf for justifying it even today. But they err in doing so for two key reasons:
The first is that there is a volley of hadiths that speak on this very matter, and any clear-cut prophetic guidance must trump any ijtihadi opinion by any notable Imam. Among these hadiths are:
1 – In context of a Muslim ruler, the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘It is upon a Muslim to hear and obey in what he likes and detests, so long as he is not ordered to sin. If he is ordered to sin, then there is no hearing or obeying [in that matter].’24
2 – In the case of a subject or citizen seeing something objectionable from the ruler that can’t be remedied via any lawful political protocol through which to air objection or dissent, then the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘Whoever sees something from his ruler that he dislikes, let him be patience. For whoever separates from the ruler by even a handspan and dies, dies a death of [pre-Islamic] ignorance.’25
3 – This is the case, even if the ruler is a brutal despot or an autocrat. The Prophet ﷺ cautioned: ‘There will come rulers after me who will not guide by my guidance, nor will they follow my Sunnah. Among them will be me whose hearts are the hearts of devils in the bodies of men.’ He was asked: O Messenger of Allah, what should I do if I reach tha time? He said: ‘Hear and obey the ruler; even if he flogs your back and seizes your wealth, still hear and obey.’26
4 – One’s duty is to exercise patience, but never to acquiesce to the evil, as per this hadith: ‘There will soon be rulers whom you shall approve of and object to. Whoever detests their evil is absolved. Whoever objects to it is saved. But whoever is pleased with it or approves of it [is sinful].’27
5 – As for rising up in rebellion against a tyrannical Muslim ruler so as to remove him by force, we have this from our Prophet ﷺ: ‘The best of your rulers are those whom you love and they love you, and whom you pray for and who pray for you. The worst of your rulers are those whom you hate and who hate you, and whom you curse and they curse you.’ It was said: Shall we not raise the sword against them, O Messenger of Allah? He said: ‘No, not as long as they establish the prayer amongst you. If anyone sees from their leader something objectionable, let them hate his action and not withdraw their hand from obedience.’28
6 – Rising-up against an iron-fisted Muslim ruler so as to forcefully remove him is only lawful if he openly and unambiguously demonstrates disbelief. ‘Ubadah b. al-Samit said: ‘The Prophet ﷺ called on us to pledge the oath of allegiance to him. Among what we pledged was to hear and obey in what we like and dislike, in ease and in hardship, to give the rights due from us, and that we not remove the affair from its people unless we see clear-cut disbelief for which there is a proof from Allah.’29
So whilst we have the actions of a few of the salaf leading or partaking in the act of khuruj, or rebellion; and words of others from the salaf objecting to the act, we cannot ignore what the Prophet ﷺhimself had to say about the matter. So how do we reconcile all this in a way which neither ignores our history, nor denies the prophetic authority?
V. … AND THEN THERE WAS IJMA‘
The second key reason why it is a mistake to legitimise rebellion against a Muslim ruler, even if he be a shabby tyrant or a despot — and our history, particularly our modern one, has its fair share of them — is because of what occurred immediately after that early period of failed rebellions, civil wars, mayhem, anarchy, and blood baths (the very socio-political state of affairs our Prophet ﷺspent his whole life redressing, healing and finally setting aright).
Sayyiduna al-Husayn was tragically martyred at Karbala, in 61H/680CE. Ibn al-Zubayr was killed in Makkah, in 73H/692CE. While the rebellion of Ibn al-Ash‘ath was thoroughly put down by 85H/703CE. It seems that around the time of the later tabi‘un and their followers in the third generation of the salaf, a scholarly consensus began to form around the ‘rebellion-hadiths’, and soon after crystalised in the form of forbidding rebellion against the Muslim ruler, even if he was tyrannical or unjust — as long as he remained a Muslim and didn’t commit clear-cut disbelief (kufr bawah). As for the act of rebuking the ruler’s public wrongs or shari‘ah violations, that remained intact and a communal duty. Therefore al-hafiz Ibn Hajr wrote under the biographical notice of al-Hasan b. Salih:
‘Their statement that “he saw the sword [was fit]” means that he deemed that armed rebellion against unjust rulers is right. This was the earlier position of the salaf. However, they eventually settled on renouncing this when they saw how the outcome of doing so was far worse than it [the ruler’s tyranny]. What happened at al-Harrah and with Ibn al-Ash‘ath and others is a lesson for whoever reflects.’30
Al-Nawawi rounds out the issue in these reconciling terms:
As for rebellion against them and fighting them, then this is forbidden by consensus of the Muslims, even if they are sinners or tyrants. The hadiths I have mentioned demonstrate this meaning that ahl al-sunnah are agreed on not removing the ruler due to sinfulness. As for the view mentioned in the books of fiqh of some of our [Shafi‘i] collegues that he can be removed, and it is related from the Mu‘tazilites too, this is incorrect and contradicts the ijma‘. The reason scholars give for not removing him or the forbiddance of not rebellion against him is what it leads to of civil discord, shedding of blood and dividing people. The damage in removing him is far worse than that of allowing him to remain … The vast majority of ahl al-sunnah, from the jurists, hadith masters and theologians, state that he isn’t removed due to sin, oppression or witholding rights; it isn’t allowed to remove him or to rebel against him because of this. Rather, it is obligatory to admonish him and instil into him fear [of Allah]. Al-Qadi states: “Abu Bakr b. Mujahid has claimed an ijma‘ in this. Some [have tried to] refute him in it by [using] the uprising of al-Husayn, Ibn al-Zubayr and the people of Madinah against the Ummayads; and the uprising of a sizeable body of tabi‘un and earlier ones against al-Hajjaj with Ibn al-Ash‘ath. Those who state this interpreted his words about not removing the authority from its people as referring to the just ruler. But the proof is with the majority. For their standing against al-Hajjaj was not due only to his sin; instead, it was due to him changing the shari‘ah and manifesting disbelief.” Al-Qadi [also] states: “It is said that this differing was in the beginning. Then a consensus was reached prohibitting rebellion against them.” And Allah knows best.’31
So using the uprising of al-Husayn, Ibn al-Ash‘ath or any other individual from the early salaf, prior to the ijma‘ being established, is incorrect. It is no longer a valid difference of opinion. The ijma‘ concerning it is a bit like the ijma‘ about writing down the hadiths. It wasn’t there at the beginning of Islam, but it crystalised soon after. Al-Dhahabi says: ‘Then an ijma‘ was established after the sahabah differed, may Allah be pleased with them, as to the desirability of recording this knowledge [hadiths] by putting it down in writing.’32
As for rebellion, it is an obligation with these conditions. That it does not lead to greater evil or instability is the first. That the ruler be replaced by a better one is the second. The critical question of the ruler’s apostasy or not is the third. Although a few theologians permitted rebellion against a ruler whose tyranny had become entrenched or widespread (provided the first two conditions could be met), most forbade it unless there appeared from such a ruler unambiguous, clear-cut disbelief (kufr bawah). Imam al-Nawawi and the best part of Sunni orthodoxy from just before the time of Imam Ahmad record an ijma‘ on the point. Without clear disbelief from the ruler, patience and restraint are what Islam makes incumbent: ‘Whoever sees something from his ruler he detests, let him be patience. For whoever separates from the ruler by even a handspan and dies, dies a death of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyyah).’33 In jahiliyyah, there was no single political leader; it was a bit of a free for all. In Islam, there always must be.
VI. HOW DOES ALL THIS WORK IN THE MODERN AGE?
Quite frankly, with great difficulty. The Sunni position which stresses the duty of obeying the ruler, and which prioritises stability over other social considerations, grew out of these ‘rebellion hadiths’ and was significantly informed by well-known turbulent, historical realities. Muslims, even as late as the last century, could justify their readiness to tolerate a ruthless ruler so long as the government had a short arm and interfered very little in the lives of people. But the modern nation-state has extended the role of government into every nook and cranny of society. As such, some argue that pre-modern Muslim political theories cannot give us any satisfactory insight into the socio-political culture Muslims live under today. This line of thinking makes the case that given the hegemonic nature of the modern state – how it controls the economic life chances of allits citizens; defines the parameters of political participation; controls the nature and content of education; intrudes almost at will into the private lives of its citizens; and if it chooses, can tyrannise its citizens with impunity, for it alone has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in society – how realistic is it to be patient if the state does decide to inflict violence and tyranny on its citizens? So if what motivates Muslims to challenge the legitimacy of the state are issues that relate to economic security, political participation or basic human dignities, then scholars must carefully consider such matter before pronouncing on the validity or not of acts of civil disobedience and rebellion.
Yet while there is no doubt the modern state exerts a control over the lives of its citizens, in ways unimaginable in a pre-modern age, isn’t there still a case to be made for the contemporary relevance of the rebellion hadiths? For it is precisely because the modern state is so overbearing, and that its surveillance or securitisation apparatus is so intrusive, that this rebellion option is still so very unwise. The hadith which states: ‘The ruler is Allah’s shadow on earth’34 isn’t saying there’s a divine right of kings. It’s stressing that governance, even if tyrannical, allows for a certain ‘shade’ of law and order that rebellion and civil war will likely decimate. And then society is left to the mercy of rival political, religious or ethnic militias all locked in a bloody and protracted fight for their own self-interests. That’s not even taking into account the military establishment in those highly militarized societies, who alone alledge to know what is best for the national interest and the bigger picture of the complex, geopolitical realities. In militarized societies, the army doesn’t only guard the borders, it actively takes a role in political affairs. When Ibn Hajr said that what occurred at al-Harra’ and Karbala is a lesson for whoever reflects, might the same not be said about the Arab Spring? Libya, Syria and Yemen spiralled into long drawn out civil wars; Egypt backslid into further authoritarian rule; and Tunisia, the relative success story, struggles to endure parlimentary gridlock, economic disaster and continued protests and riots ten years on. And we dare not speak about the actual human cost of it all. Let’s recall Ibn al-Qayyim’s pertinent, yet unnerving observation here:
‘This is like disavowing the kings and rulers by rebelling against them. This is the basis of every evil or sedition till the end of time … Whoever reflects on the trials that have occurred in Islam, large or small, will see it is because of forsaking this principle and not being patience with the evil, and seeking to remove it by giving birth to what is worse than it.’35
VII. WHY SHOULD THIS MATTER?
Whilst the Arab Spring protests eventually fizzled out, the causes that led to them have not. In the pre-modern world, tyrannical rulers had limited scope to corrupt the religion or smother peoples’ liberties. Their reach was restricted. Not so in the modern age. Autocratic or despotic rulers control the news, educational curricula, appoint state muftis and liberalise in ways that corrupt public morality and are spiritually polluting. With exceptions aside, the Qur’an states: ‘Kings, when they enter a town, ruin it and make the proud among its people debased.’ [Q.27:34]
We urgently need our scholars to theologise ways which allow checks and measures, and modes of dissent against the abuse of state power, while at the same time reminding citizens of their Islamic duty of patience against tyranny, as well as not allowing the orderly structures of society to be torn down through thawrah — ‘revolution’.
Revolutions or rebellions are not events, they are processes – often, long, drawn-out ones – whose intended aim is seldom guaranteed. In fact, given our globalised world, powerful outside interests, as well as regional geo-politics, are far more likely to shape ultimate outcomes than are the well-conceived intentions of the masses. Mainstream Sunni orthodoxy has long been suspicious about rebellions, and with good cause. Whatever else the Arab Spring has taught us, one thing’s clear: Revolutions often travel fast, but they seldom travel well.
One final consideration. Given that as Muslims we glean our worldview in light of Allah’s Revelation, and given also that we believe politics is a part of the religion, what are we to make of the following verse; and how have we, to date, incorporated it into our politics — or even into this new post Arab Spring chapter in the struggle for freedom, human dignity and social justice? Allah informs us: Thus do We let some of the unjust have power over others due to their misdeeds. [Q.6:129] This sentiment is echoed in the well-known saying: kama takunun yuwalla ‘alaykum — ‘As you are, so shall your leaders be.’36 The traditional political rule of thumb here is that:
‘If those governed wish to rid themselves of the injustices of an unjust ruler, they too must abstain from unjust [sinful] acts.’37
So if our political theorising does not have this at the heart of its concerns or consideration, it’s hard to see just how Allah’s madad or help shall come about. For without it, we’re left to our own devices and delusions.
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1. Abu Dawud, no.2608. Its chain was graded hasan in Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi, Riyadh al-Salihin min Kalam Sayyid al-Mursalin (Jeddah: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 1421H), no.967.
2. Al-Bukhari, no.5188; Muslim, no.1829.
3. Ahmad b. Taymiyyah, Majmu‘ al-Fatawa (Riyadh: Dar ‘Alam al-Kutub, 1991), 28:391.
4. Al-Baghawi, Sharh al-Sunnah, no.2455, and it is sahih. See: Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Sahih al-Jami‘ al-Saghir (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1986), no.7520.
5. Al-Bukhari, no.3267; Muslim, no.2989.
6. Ahmad, no.14909. The hadith is debatebly sahih due to supporting chains. Cf. al-Albani,Takhrij Kitab al-Sunnah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1980), nos.1096-98.
7. Muslim, no.78.
8. Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1995), 18:92.
14. Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-Musannaf, no.37581; al-Tabarani, al-Mu‘jam al-Kabir, no.8564. The chain was declared sahih by Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ut in his critical edition of Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa’l-Hikam (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1998), 2:245.
15. Abu Dawud, no.4345, and it is hasan. Cf. al-Albani, Sahih al-Jami‘ al-Saghir, no.689.
18. Cited in Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‘ li Ahkam al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1996), 4:188.
19. Abu Dawud, no.4344; al-Tirmidhi, no.2175, saying: ‘The hadith is hasan.’
20. See: Isma’il b. Kathir, al-Bidayah wa’l-Nihayah (Dar al-Hijr, 1998), 11:494-8; Ahmad b. Taymiyyah, Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah (Riyadh: Jami’ al-Imam b. Su’ud al-Islamiyyah, 1986), 4:530.
21. Cf. Ibn Sa‘d, Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir (Cairo: Maktabah al-Khanji, 2001), 9:164-65.
23. Consult: Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, al-Mughni (Riyadh: Dar ‘Alam al-Kutub, 2007), 10:49.
24. Al-Bukhari, no.7144; Muslim, no.1839.
25. Al-Bukhari, no.7053; Muslim, no.1849.
26. Muslim, no.1837.
27. Muslim, no.1854.
28. Muslim, no.1855.
29. Al-Bukhari, no.7056.
30. Ahmad b. ‘Ali b. Hajr al-‘Asqalani al-Shafi‘i, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 2014), 1:399.
31. Al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim, 12:189. The Qadi mentioned is the famous Maliki jurist, Qadi ‘Iyad.
32. Al-Dhahabi, Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala, 3:80.
33. Al-Bukhari, no.7053; Muslim, no.1849.
34. Ibn Abi ‘Asim, al-Sunnah, no.1024. The hadith is collectively hasan, as per al-Albani, Zilal al-Jannah fi Takhrij al-Sunnah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1980), 492.
35. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, I‘lam al-Muwaqqi‘in ‘an Rabb al-‘Alamin (Riyadh: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 2003), 4:338-9.
36. Many cite this as a prophetic saying. But as a hadith, it is da‘if. Cf. al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Da‘ifah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1992), no.320.
37. ‘Ali b. Muhammad b. Abi’l-‘Izz, Sharh al-‘Aqidah al-Tahawiyyah (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1999), 2:579.
WHEN IT COMES to gender interactions, Islam insists on decent and appropriate behaviour and dignified conduct between the sexes. In other words, gender relations must be built upon the virtues of modesty (haya’), dignity (waqar) and respectability (haybah).
In fact, it’s probably not an exaggeration to say that men simply can’t be men, or rijal, in Islam, without modesty. Rajuliyyah – ‘manliness’ or ‘masculinity’ in Islam is predicated on it (one just needs to look at the life of the Prophet ﷺ, and also the best ever of non-prophet men, sayyiduna Abu Bakr). In that sense, the only pill Muslim men need to take is the green pill of Islam. Any other pill, red or otherwise, is likely to be a sign of mental confusion, bigging-up the ego, or some other dark and unhealthy pathology. It will also be a perversion of the prophetic norms of how men ought to be rijal. Masculinity in Islam comes from a place of taqwa, dignity and modesty; not ego, anger or insecurity. Likewise, women cannot be said to have the type offemininity Islam celebrates without rooting in themselves the beauty of haya’.
Islam very much sees itself as the religion about haya’ – modesty, shyness and a sense of reserve. The Prophet ﷺ said: “Every religion has a distinctive quality, and the distinctive quality of Islam is haya’.”1
We are reminded in the next hadith that: ‘Modesty is a branch of faith.’2
There are also these words from the Prophet ﷺ: ‘Never is haya’ present in a matter except that it beautifies it.’3
To be clear, although haya’ translates itself into words like modesty, shyness and of being unassuming in the estimation of one’s abilities; in Islam, it does not translate into being sheepish, timid or socially anxious or insecure. Rather, haya’ is, as scholars say: ‘a quality which induces one to shun whatever is ugly or reprehensible (khuluqun yab‘athu ‘ala ijtinabi’l-qabih).’4
Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali said: ‘What restrains acting in a shameful or deplorable manner is [the quality of] haya’. Therefore, one who has no haya’ will abandon themselves to any indecent or loathsome behaviour.’5
It is why the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘From the words still in currency from earlier prophets are: If you have no haya’, then do as you wish.’6
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Ibn Rajab goes on to write that the sense of modesty and shame are of two kinds. The first is an innate character trait that one is naturally disposed towards. The second is a modesty that is acquired through the fear of God, and through the voice of religious conscience which the teachings of faith nurture. He explains:
‘Realise that haya’ is of two types: Firstly, that which is an innate character trait which is not acquired. This is one of the noblest of qualities that Allah bestows on someone and fashions him upon. For this reason, he ﷺ said: “Modesty produces nothing except good”7 for it restrains him from committing foul deeds or displaying depraved morals, and spurs him onto honourable and virtuous character … Secondly, that which is acquired via knowledge of Allah, knowledge of His greatness and nearness to His servants; His awareness and complete familiarity of them; and [His knowledge] of the deceptions of the eyes and what hearts conceal. This is one of the most exalted traits of faith (iman). In fact, it is one of the loftiest degrees of spiritual excellence (ihsan).’8
So in the interaction between the sexes, a sense of modesty, haya’, is key. If innate modest is in short supply, modesty born of faith must prevail. If fear of God will not make people think twice before acting indecently or immodestly, the question for a believer is: What will?
And while there does need to be more discussion and better guidance on how Muslim men ought to be, in a growing demasculinised world, the irony seems to be that the Muslim Red Pill posse comes from exactly the same toxic place as Muslim feminists: They both share gender-biased worldviews and they seek solutions to their grievances from outside the healing light of Islam’s revealed guidance.
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1. Ibn Majah, no.4181. The hadith was graded sahih, due to its multiple paths of transmission. See: al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1985), no.940.
2. Al-Bukhari, no.9; Muslim, no.35.
3. Al-Bukhari, al-Adab al-Mufrad, no.601. It was graded sahih, al-Albani, Sahih al-Adab al-Mufrad (Saudi Arabia: Dar al-Siddiq, 1994), no.469.
4. Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, Fath al-Bari (Egypt: Dar al-‘Alamiyyah, 2013), 1:80.
According to the standard secular story that’s been repeatedly told to us for the past century or so, just a few short decades after the start of modernity, science was able to defeat religion with its sheer brilliance and power to explain. We’ve been led to believe that for centuries religion had been doing some extremely bad science. It tried to tell us how the universe began, how old the earth is, or where the sun sets each night, or why rainbows exist. But such lamentable attempts were finally put to bed when science came along and investigated reality with reason and evidence, thereby driving religion into near oblivion. As such, and as a result, we can put our worries aside, rest comfortably and enjoy the fruits of science and all the astonishing tech it spawns. At least, that’s what we are meant to believe.
As seductive as the story is, and as triumphant as it sounds, the story isn’t quite true. It intentionally and cleverly misrepresents the actual purpose of Religion, by first setting it up as something whose chief aim has been to do pretty much what science does: understand the natural world as well as the cosmic order, and then pointing out that it has done so very badly. Whereas science proceeded with its telescopes, microscopes, pipettes and equations, religion tried to interpret the workings of the physical universe with just an ancient holy book.
In truth, however, religion was never really interested in doing the things modern science does. It might have pointed out the odd fact or two about some aspect of science. It might have occasionally hinted at other facts. Its focus, though, was not really about explanations of the physical world or the physical workings of the cosmos. Its care and focus is altogether very different and profounder: guidance, self-knowledge and salvation; and the ways to actualise our core humanity and inner life. The framing of religion as a flawed, draft version of science needs to be seen for the myth that it actually is.
LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC & RATIONAL PROOFS
Now this might seem something of a party pooper to some, but there is nothing in the logic of the created order that can irrefutably point to beyond itself. Be it scientific observations, philosophical arguments, mathematical equations or rational proofs – they cannot point to beyond themselves. They are part of the material world. It’s one of the greatest blunders in religion to think we can come up with a watertight, rational argument that proves Theism irrefutably, beyond any shadow of a doubt. That’s just not possible. Materialist arguments can prove material things. It’s a closed system. The physical cannot encompass the metaphysical, but the metaphysical can encompass what is physical. The Holy Qur’an says: Vision encompasses Him not, but He encompasses all things. [Q.6:103] That is, our fallible physical perception (basr) cannot encompass Him, nor can our fallible rational argument (nazr). Why? Because they are from the created order. What they can do, however, is cogently ‘point to’ Theism, rather than irrefutably ‘prove’ Theism.
What you can do with scientific proofs, cosmological observations, or rational arguments, is point to the coherence of Theism and demonstrate how it best fits the evidence: how it’s by far the best available explanation. This is what rational theology in Islam has sought to do for over a millennium.
SOME MUSLIMS LABOUR under the mistaken notion that given the enormity of disbelief in Allah’s final Prophet ﷺ and Revelation, one must not speak well of a non-Muslim (kafir) when they pass away on disbelief. Islamic teachings do not, however, require or insist upon such an uncharitable approach.
Many non-Muslims died during the lifetime of our Prophet ﷺ. About some he ﷺ spoke more about their virtues than he did their actual disbelief. Mut‘im b. ‘Adi, a respected Makkan idolater, was one such person. The Prophet ﷺ was ever grateful for the support and protection Mut‘im offered him during the trying years of early Islam in Makkah. When his son Jubayr came to the Prophet asking him to release some of those taken prisoners during the Battle of Badr, the Prophet ﷺ said about his non-Muslim father: ‘Had Mut‘im b. ‘Adi been alive and spoken to me about the captives, I would have released them all to him.’1
The Prophet ﷺ would, occasionally, reveal how certain non-Muslims – known for their virtuous behaviour, but rejection of iman and tawhid, or Abrahamic monotheism – would perish in the Afterlife. The Lady ‘A’ishah once asked the Prophet ﷺ about ‘Abd Allah b. Jud‘an, saying: ‘O Messenger of Allah, in the time of pre-Islamic Ignorance, Ibn Jud‘an would keep ties of kinship and feed the poor. Will any of this benefit him? The Prophet ﷺ said: ‘It will not! For he never ever said: My Lord, forgive me my sins on the Day of Judgement.’2
Of course, no one receive Revelation today to know with certainty what specific individual does or does not perish; other than the general Islamic maxim stated in the rigorously authentic hadith: ‘No one will enter Paradise except a Muslim.’3 Who is blessed to be included among the saved and the sanctified, or what truth-seekers will be given an amnesty for not uttering the shahadah in this world, must be left to the Highest and Most Just Judgement.
As for most non-Muslims who died, the Prophet ﷺ generally remained silent about them: They are a people who have passed away; theirs is what they earned and yours is what you earn. And you will not be asked about what they did. [Q.2:141]
So given that prophetic silence was the usual precedence in such matters, surely it befits us to do the same if we have nothing good to say. There is no need to cuss or curse, as there is no need for false flattery. And there is no need to imagine that such a life lived in kufr was anywhere as significant in Allah’s sight than the passing away of his awliya and ‘ulama. (Regrettably, most of us Muslims have chosen to live our lives uninterested in who the awliya or ‘ulama of Allah are and how we might be inspired by them, let alone care about when or how they passed away.)
Islam recognises hubb tib’i – ‘natural love’ or ‘instinctive affection’ – so whoever feels a loss at the passing away of a non-Muslim (famous or otherwise) feels it; whoever doesn’t, doesn’t.
Moreover, the lives of non-Muslims, just like Muslims, are not all alike. Some have lived a principled and moral life, others have not. Some have been sympathetic to Muslims and to Islam as a whole, others have not. Some have worked for bringing justice to Muslim causes, others have done the opposite. Some have brought benefit to wider society in ways they thought best, others have not.
The shari’ah of course sees that condolences can be in order, and that true and consoling words may indeed be offered to friends and family of the non-Muslim deceased, wherever or whenever occasioned.
Beyond that, it is unbefitting for a believer to get caught up in any collective hysteria, or media manipulation of emotions – especially if the non-Muslim was a person of social or cultural prominence; for: They are a people who have passed away; theirs is what they earned and yours is what you earn. [Q.2:141]
If anything, we might wish to invest more energy in praying for right guidance, sound judgement and wise counsel for the living among the non-Muslims, especially if they have an influential role in society. Seeking to invite, or hoping for allies, is surely better than making enemies.
One hadith states: ‘Whoever dresses in clothes of attracting attention (shuhrah, lit. ‘fame’) in this life, Allah shall clothe him in garbs of humiliation on the Day of Resurrection.’1 The way we dress can and often does, therefore, have to do with the inward state of our souls. 
The following is a chapter from my upcoming book, God-willing, called: Salafism Reconsidered: True Salafism, False Salafism & Ijma’ Theology. This is the fortieth chapter, and discusses the issue of whether or not Muslims can publicly criticise their Muslim ruler or government (if so, where, when and how), and if rebelling against state authority would Islamically be allowed? This article is a long read, comprised of seven sections.
WHEN IT COMES to gender interactions, Islam insists on decent and appropriate behaviour and dignified conduct between the sexes. In other words, gender relations must be built upon the virtues of modesty (haya’), dignity (waqar) and respectability (haybah).
According to the standard secular story that’s been repeatedly told to us for the past century or so, just a few short decades after the start of modernity, science was able to defeat religion with its sheer brilliance and power to explain. We’ve been led to believe that for centuries religion had been doing some extremely bad science. It tried to tell us how the universe began, how old the earth is, or where the sun sets each night, or why rainbows exist. But such lamentable attempts were finally put to bed when science came along and investigated reality with reason and evidence, thereby driving religion into near oblivion. As such, and as a result, we can put our worries aside, rest comfortably and enjoy the fruits of science and all the astonishing tech it spawns. At least, that’s what we are meant to believe.
SOME MUSLIMS LABOUR under the mistaken notion that given the enormity of disbelief in Allah’s final Prophet 
