The Humble "I"

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Khawarij Ideology, ISIS Savagery: Part 3 of 3

It has now been four years since I started this three part instalment. It’s been over three years since I wrote the rough outlines for this third and final part. One thing or another, however, stopped me from completing it. But given Saudi Arabia’s current socio-religious changes or transition under the Crown Prince Muhammad b. Salman; given how so many western ‘ISIS-brides’ wish to return home; given that the ISIS ‘caliph’ was recently killed, and given that even if ISIS as an entity has all but been vanquished, its kharijite ideology lives on, this seems as good a time as any to post the third and final part.

The first instalment of the blog (here) traced the ruthless and murderous pedigree of ISIS back to the first heterodox Muslim sect, the Khawarij. Anyone wishing to get to the nub of today’s Muslim political violence needs to first understand who or what the Khawarij are. Without understanding the religious component of this extremism and misuse of religion, any political analysis of the phenomenon is likely to be significantly flawed.

The second part (which can be read here) tackled ISIS’s claim of being a true caliphate, by addressing the question of what makes a caliphate legitimate in Islam? It also tackles the sensitive topic of jihad, beyond the usual cliches, and addresses whether a Muslim state wages jihad against a non-Muslim one because of their disbelief, or because it has shown hostile intent or aggression against a Muslim state?

This final part discusses the violent political programme which ISIS and al-Qaeda model themselves on: The Management of Savagery. It explains the rationale for the jihadi-takfiri worldview and violence. As for just how instrumental Saudi ‘Wahabbism’ has been to the mass takfir narrative, and to the ideology underpinning ISIS and al-Qaeda, that sits at the centre of our discussion. So with six fairly in-depth sections covered in the first two parts, here are the last five:

VII

In 2004, a treatise was posted on the internet which, as it turns out, was nothing less than a manifesto for global murder and mayhem. It was aptly and unblushingly entitled, idarat al-tawahhush – ‘The Management of Savagery.’ Published online, possibly by an al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Bakr Naji, its aim was to offer a definitive strategy for al-Qaeda and other such groups to establish an Islamic Caliphate.1 It laid out the various stages of the jihadi-takfiri violence in the following terms:

First comes the ‘stage of disruption and exhaustion’ wherein the enemy is politically worn down, economically drained and socially demoralised, by constant campaigns of violence and terror. ‘Diversify and widen the vexation strikes against the Crusader-Zionist enemy in every place in the Islamic world, and even outside of it if possible,’ Naji writes, ‘so as to disperse the efforts of the alliance of the enemy and thus drain it to the greatest extent possible.’

Hand in hand with the above stage comes ‘the management of savagery’. This is a phase of violent resistance and assault, with an emphasis of carrying out shockingly visible acts of terror. This serves as a glaring message to all its enemies, allies and sympathisers alike. Here the objective is to get the enemy, mainly the United States and its allies, to ‘abandon its war against Islam by proxy … and to force it to fight directly.’ Such media managed savagery is intended to recruit new youths into the takfiri fold and program and help push weaker regions of the Muslim world towards breakdown and savagery. Nothing can ever be achieved without the singular method of total warfare: ‘We must drag everyone into the battle in order to give life to those who deserve to live and destroy those who deserve to be destroyed,’ proclaimed the manifesto.

The final stage is to be the empowerment of ‘the regions of savagery’. Here, the sequence of events runs something like this: During “the management of savagery” steps, the first priority is to bring these regions under their administrative control. For such mayhem will spontaneously polarize those who live in these lawless regions of savagery and will drive these people, in their desperate desire to seek stability and security, into the arms of the jihadi-takfiris. ‘We will find,’ explained Naji, ‘that along with this first step there will be a continuous emigration of the youth of other regions to our regions’ in order to flee the anarchy and mayhem so as to live under some political stability. He also noted, of course: ‘There is a difference between the people accepting administration so that security may be provided for them and so forth, and between joining the ranks and working towards set goals and joining in the battle.’ Once under their control, the takfiri indoctrination and extremism can truly begin, and new soldiers and die-hard leaders can arise. About this, Naji wrote that, ‘speaking on the pulpit is easy, and in the newspaper even easier; and in books even easier than that. As for having [one’s] home destroyed and one’s family made homeless, or one’s mother and sister torn to pieces, only the most extraordinary men are capable of [bearing] that. Great leaders and hardened troops will not come forth save in an atmosphere like this.’

As for the relevance of Naji’s treatise, we need only look at how closely al-Qaeda sought to contour this manifesto in its strategies and actions, and how many of the plans laid out in the manifesto have already been carried out by ISIS!

VIII

Despite the plethora of fatwas (commencing two decades before, and right after, 9-11) by senior Salafi/Wahhabi scholars against unbridled takfir, suicide bombings, acts of terror and targeting civilians in war, as well as against political agitation and rebellion against Muslim state authority, a forceful argument has been made that the al-Qaeda/ISIS modus operandi is inspired, in significant part, by Wahhabism. So let’s look into the claim:

Now the idea that al-Qaeda and ISIS are inspired by Wahhabism is not anything strange; especially given how the works of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d.1206H/1792CE), and books from other scholars from the same Wahhabi stream of thought, were a staple diet of both al-Qaeda and ISIS, and were/are core components of their educational curricula. But whilst that is very telling, the real issue is: did ISIS and al-Qaeda pick up their mass takfiri habbits from Wahhabi shaykhs, or is it something that the Saudi Wahhabi/Salafi scholars are free of? (I’m employing the terms Wahhabi and Salafi descriptively, not pejoratively; as well as using them interchangeably.) As for when a charge of takfir may or may not be made against an individual, and the conditions required to be actualised in doing so, I’ve explained the matter here.

It has long been alleged by the Muslim world, and most of its scholars, that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab didn’t just make takfir of certain specific individuals (which he certainly did), but more than that, he made mass takfir of whole Muslim societies and states; and that this mentality of mass takfir was carried on by his descendants and by other leading Wahhabi scholars and ideologues till our present time.

The more informed supporters of Shaykh Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his da‘wah will, at this point, demand that it is upon the accusers to bring a clear, unambiguous statement from him to support the allegation of mass takfir; and they’re quite right on insisting so. They may even point to specific statements from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab refuting those who made such allegations against him during in his own lifetime – of which there are quite a few. From them are: ‘As for what has been mentioned to you that I make generalised takfir [of the masses] (takfir bi’l-‘umum), then this is from the lies of the enemies.’2 There’s also the following:

‘As for the lie and slander, its like is their saying that we make generalized takfir And when it is the case that we do not make takfir of those who worship the idol which is on the grave of ‘Abd al-Qadir [al-Jilani], or the idol upon the grave of Ahmad al-Badawi; and their likes – due to their ignorance and an absence of one to caution them – how could we then make takfir of those who does not commit shirk, when they do not migrate to us, nor make takfir of us, nor fight us?’3

His holding a certain act to be disbelief (kufr), but not accusing one who commits the act to be an unbeliever (kafir), is in keeping with a well known scholarly rule: laysa kullu man waqa‘a fi’l-kufr sara kafir – ‘Not everyone who falls into disbelief becomes a disbeliever.’ And: laysa kullu man waqa‘a fi’l-shirk sara mushrik – ‘Not everyone who commits idolatry becomes an idolater.’ That is, scholars might judge a statement or act to be shirk or kufr, but refrain from declaring the one who utters such a statement or does such an act to be a mushrik or a kafir – either because of not being informed (or sufficiently informed) about the falseness of the act, or due to a mistaken interpretation that warrants giving them an excuse or amnesty.

There are these words too: ‘As for takfir, I only make takfir of whoever knows the religion of the Messenger ﷺ and thereafter insults it, forbids people from it, and manifests enmity towards whoever practices it. This is who I make takfir of. And most of the ummah, and all praise is for God, is not like this.’4

Of course, his detractors will take issue with some of the things he actually considers to be shirk or kufr, or what he included under the category of insulting the religion. Many will also point out that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, once he made an alliance with Ibn Sa‘ud, in 1744, inaugurating what is now called the first Saudi state, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab gave his loyalty and unyielding support to Ibn Sa‘ud, the amir of the new state. Ibn Sa‘ud, in turn, spread the doctrines of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as a core part of his campaigns, killings and crusade, to bring the whole Najd province under his control. Opponents of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab will point out that he endorsed Ibn Sa‘ud’s “jihad” against the people in various regions of the Najd, and took booty from them, and that this is proof writ large that he made large scale takfir upon Muslims – as jihad is only waged against a disbelieving enemy! Eye witness Wahhabi chronicles of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers confirm that Ibn Sa‘ud did wage jihad against various peoples and provinces in the Najd: something these chronicles talk about with much pride and a great deal of satisfaction.5 So is this not a proof of mass takfir? It might well be!

What strengthens these allegations is that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, in the year 1165H/1752CE, declared that the town of Huraymila had apostatised from Islam; including his very own brother Sulayman, their judge (qadi). That is, he made takfir of the whole town. Jihad was duly waged against them, and the booty was distributed among the Wahhabi warriors.6 If we add to this fatwa of town takfir, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s claim that in the Najd, only he alone knew the true meaning of la ilaha illa’Llah; not even the other scholars did, then it’s not surprising that mass takfir and the shedding of Muslim blood is seen to be his legacy. Here are his words:

‘And I inform you of myself – by God, whom there is none deserving of worship save Him: I sought knowledge, and those who knew me believed I had knowledge whilst I did not know the meaning of la ilaha illa’Llah at that time, nor know the religion of Islam, before this goodness that God graced me with. Such was also the case with my teachers; there was no man among them who knew [any of] this. And if someone from the scholars of this and the surrounding areas claims he knew the meaning of la ilaha illa’Llah, or knew the meaning of Islam before this time, or claims about his teachers that someone from them knew that, then he has lied, uttered falsehood, hoodwinked the people, and praised him with something he doesn’t possess.’7

Remember, we are not discussing whether such statements constitute sheer arrogance or some devilish narcissism. Rather, we are looking at the question: Did Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab make mass takfir upon Muslims, from which outfits and misfits like ISIS have taken their cue? Although takfir of even one individual, without the conditions or impediments being taken into consideration, or without the pious caution which is a hallmark of mainstream Islamic orthodoxy, is abhorrent and misguidance. That said:

An argument is made that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s policy was one of noninterference in the military activities of Ibn Sa‘ud, not active support or religious legitimation for them. That is to say, the shaykh’s attempts at religious reform were being eclipsed by the amir’s quest for state consolidation and material prosperity. By the time Ibn Sa‘ud had died, in 1767, and was succeeded by his son ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the Wahhabi capital of Dir‘iyyah, rather than being famous as a centre of learning, became known instead for its opulence, wealth and strength. According to Ibn Bishr, people had grown weary of holding back their desires.8 The sources will have to be scrutinised to see just how well the argument holds up, and to evaluate if Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s takfir of the whole town of Huraymila was an exception to the rule. What is beyond a shadow of a doubt is that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s da‘wah was used as justification – first by Ibn Sa‘ud, then his son – to kill, slaughter and assassinate multitudes of Muslims during Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s own lifetime; there being no public word of condemnation or unambiguous dissent recorded from him.

Again, it’s been suggested that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had a tendency to withdraw from Ibn Sa‘ud’s company during jihad operations. Be that as it may, what we do know is that the shaykh withdrew from his public position, in the year 1773, six years into the rule of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Sa‘ud; and focused on teaching and authoring. He died nineteen years later, at the age of ninety-two, in 1792.

So did Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab make takfir? Yes he did; of, it appears, many individuals and at least one entire town. The contention was usually the issue of istighathah – calling on righteous, deceased persons for the fulfilment of a need. Unlike al-Razi or Ibn ‘Aqil before him who described the act as being shirk or kufr,9 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab went steps further and made takfir of actual individuals who engaged in the act – after what he considered to be iqamat al-hujjah or “establishment of the proof” against them. As for mass takfir, the pro-Wahhabi sources do not mention it, except for Huraymila; and anti-Wahhabi sources, which I’ve chosen to avoid for this discussion, are adamant that he did! And Allah knows best.

After his demise, the first Saudi state expanded rapidly, growing even richer. It conquered Karbala, in 1802; and captured Makkah, in 1803. It reached its zenith in 1818, when it was vanquished by the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha. It is during the years of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s sons and grandsons, however, that we see categorical mass takfir being made. And that’s what we’ll address next:

IX

The Ottoman-Egyptian armies of Muhammad ‘Ali landed in Arabia, in 1811, reestablishing their control over the Hijaz, and also sacking the capital of the first Saudi state, Dir‘iyyah, in 1818. What helped this all out victory is that large pockets of Arabs, either unconvinced with Wahhabism; disaffected with it; or unhappy with the Sa‘ud (Saudi) state moving into their provinces and wresting control from them, welcomed Muhammad ‘Ali’s armies and lent support to them. In fact, even during a truce between Muhammad ‘Ali and the Saudi state, in 1815, many of these dissatisfied people called for the resumption of attacks upon Saudi-Wahhabi forces. Unsurprisingly, the Wahhabi scholars considered such support to a foreign invasion as a serious act of treachery and disloyalty.

During this political upheaval, Sulayman b. ‘Abd Allah (d.1818), a grandson of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and one of the leading Wahhabi scholars of the time, wrote a tract on the highly sensitive topic of al-wala’ wa’l-bara’a – “Loyalty and Disavowal” – placing it in the context of the Saudi-Ottoman war.10 In it he asserts that any Muslim showing loyalty (muwalat, wala’) to the idolators – of whom he includes the Ottomans – is an idolator like them. The treaties opens with this passage: ‘Realise, may God have mercy upon you, that if a person manifests conformity (muwafaqah) to the religion of the idolators (mushrikin), from fear of them; or flattering them; or compromising so as to ward off harm from them, then he is a disbeliever like them – even if he detests their religion, loathes them, and loves Islam and the Muslims.’11 He continues by saying that those Arabs who assisted the Ottomans with loyalty, support or wealth, allied with them, conformed to their religion, and severed their connection to the [Wahhabi-Saudi] Muslims, ‘become from the soldiers of [worshipping] domes [over graves] (al-qubbab), and idolatry and its people.’12

Another core dimension of wala’ and bara’ah addressed in the tract, and another cause to excommunicate other Muslims, is the issue of al-isti‘anah bi’l-kuffar – “seeking help from the unbelievers” against other Muslims. Citing the verse: O you who believe! Take not the Jews or Christians as friends and allies, they are friends and allies one to another. Whoever amongst you takes them for friends and allies is of them. Indeed, God guides not an unjust people, [Q.5:51] the tract declares: ‘Such is the ruling upon one who allies themselves with the unbelievers from the Magians or the worshippers of idols: then he is of them.’13 By the latter depiction, he means the Ottomans. And once the idea of wala’ and bara’ah had been weaponised in this way, it would have serious repercussions for our contemporary times; as we shall see in sections ten and eleven.

Other statements of mass Ottoman takfir include: Sa‘ud b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the third ruler of the first Saudi state (r. 1803-1814). In one of his letters to an Ottoman governor, he writes: ‘But if you continue upon this condition of yours, and do not repent from the shirk you are upon; nor adhere to the religion of God with which He sent his Messenger; nor abandon idolatry and innovations, we will never cease fighting you until you return to the upright religion of God, and traverse its Straight Path.’14

And if anyone was having doubts about the legitimacy of this mass takfir of the Ottomans, ‘Abd Allah, son of ‘Abd al-Latif – the latter being the most learned Wahhabi scholar of his time – wrote: ‘Whoever does not acknowledge the disbelief (kufr) of the [Ottoman] State, nor differentiate between them and Muslim rebels (bughat), does not know the meaning of la ilaha illa’Llah! If, along with that, he believes the State is Muslim, then this is worse and is graver. This is what is [considered] doubting the disbelief of one who disbelieves in God, or commits shirk with Him. So whosoever aids and abets them against the Muslims, with any type of help, then this is clear-cut apostasy.’15

In fact, the fatwas, tracts and writings of the Wahhabi ‘ulema are replete with the verdict, and unanimous in their conviction, that the Ottoman empire was a disbelieving state; that it was dar al-harb – a “land or war” – exempting those towns, villages or settlements that accepted the Wahhabi da‘wah; and that the Al al-Sa‘ud, the Saudi ruling dynasty, was the true caliphate (khilafah).

Thus, Ibn Sa‘ud’s biography in al-Durar al-Saniyyah describes him as the ‘khalifah in Najd from the [Islamic] year 1157-1179; and the khilafah has continued through his descendants till now.’16 ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan, a prominent Wahhabi scholars of his age during the second Saudi state, described the reign of ‘Abd Allah b. Faysal (r. 1865-1871) as khilafah nubuwwah – ‘caliphate [upon the pattern of] prophethood.’17 And to a previous ruler, he addresses him as: imam al-muslimin wa khalifah sayyid al-mursalin – ‘leader of Muslims, and caliph of the master of the messengers.’18 So the vexing question about whether the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance rebelled against the Ottoman caliphate need not be asked. For in the Wahhabi worldview, the Ottomans were mushriks, and hence had no Islamic rule, let alone being caliphs. In fact, in this worldview, it was the mushrik Ottomans who rebelled against the [Wahhabi-Saudi] caliphate!

X

For our purpose, the Saudi story doesn’t quite end here. Although the victory over the first Saudi state was thorough and complete, by 1824, Turki b. ‘Abd Allah had retaken Riyadh. This marked the beginning of the second Saudi state. Things were going along pretty well, particularly during the reign of Turki’s son, Faysal. But when Faysal died in 1865, and his son, ‘Abd Allah, became the new ruler, this is where the story takes on a greater relevance for our times.

‘Abd Allah’s legitimacy was militarily challenged by his brother Sa‘ud. And although he managed to keep the reigns of leadership for several years, Sa‘ud took power in 1871. For the next decade or so, the second Saudi state was enmeshed in a civil war which erupted between the two brothers. In the same year, in 1871, ‘Abd Allah wrested back control; two years later, in 1873, Sa‘ud seized control for a second time. His reign lasted two years, but in 1875 he was replaced by ‘Abd al-Rahman. A year later, ‘Abd Allah regained power and reigned until his death in 1889. The above ‘Abd al-Rahman succeeded him and reigned for two more years by which time, weakened by all the political infighting, the second Saudi state (with very little territorial expansion during its time, and with diminished religious zeal) was led to its demise in 1891. Ibn Sa‘ud – having regained control of Riyadh in 1902, and most of the Arabian cities and regions by 1926 – established the third, modern Saudi state in 1932; formally calling it the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The point of this history is that they way ‘Abd Allah regained leadership (for a third time) from ‘Abd al-Rahman, was by calling upon the Ottomans for help and support. Although most Wahhabi scholars of the time viewed soliciting the Ottoman “mushriks” for political support to be a necessity, a small, yet powerful clique of leading Wahhabi scholars were incensed by this. Harkening back to the treatise of Sulayman, the grandson of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in his treatment of wala’ and bara’ah, and of al-isti‘anah bi’l-kuffar, as well as add their own take on the matter, they declared that this amounted to an act of disbelief and duly made takfir upon Ibn ‘Ajlan, the Wahhabi judge who backed ‘Abd Allah’s decision. At the forefront of the charge was the preeminent Wahhabi scholar of the time, ‘Abd al-Latif b. ‘Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh (d.1876) and Ibn ‘Atiq (d.1883). The latter wrote a tract on the issue, entitled: Sabil al-Najat wa’l-Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa’l-Atrak – “Path of Salvation and of Separation from Loyalty to the Apostates and the Turks.”19

The tract commences with a few hadith citations, one of which states that the ummah will fight the unbelieving Turks (al-turk al-kuffar) described as having small eyes, ruddy faces, flat noses and faces like leather shields.20 He laments how so many Muslims have fallen into love, loyalty and imitation of non-Muslim ways and lifestyles.21 But the most novel and significant thing to come out of the treatise is that Ibn  ‘Atiq didn’t just emphasise not having wala’ for non-Muslims as a foundational part of faith, but that Muslims must also show bara’ah towards non-Muslims by actively disavowing them and showing contempt for them. So whilst Sulayman’s Dala’il spoke about the unlawful, inadmissible wala’, Ibn ‘Atiq’s Sabil shifted the emphasis to compulsory bara’ah.22

Fast-forward a century or so, and the fatwas of Shaykh Sulayman and Ibn ‘Atiq were given a new lease of life in the writings of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b.1959).23 Inspired by the proof-texts and textual arguments in the Dala’il and Sabil, al-Maqdisi penned (1984) his Millat Ibrahim – “The Religious Way of Life of Abraham” – where he restated the duty to show enmity towards shirk and the mushriks, as part of having true faith, preferably by waging jihad against them. In it, he also re-weaponised wala’ and bara’ah by calling for jihad against what he deemed as nominal or token Muslim states and rulers.24 Ironically, whilst the establishment Saudi scholars had all but disregarded these 19th century tracts on wala’ and bara’ah, and had for varying rationales sanitised and depoliticised them, al-Maqdisi quoted freely and extensively from them, demonstrating their political relevance for today’s Muslim world. Summarising the radical jihadi-takfiri imperative, al-Maqdisi, wrote: ‘Know that from the most particular traits of the Abrahamic way of life, and most important of its essentials, which we see most of the callers in our age falling extremely short in – in fact, most have forsaken them and have let them die out – are: [i] Manifesting bara’ah against the idolators and their false objects of worship; [ii] Proclaiming disbelief in them, their deities, and their methods, legislations and idolatrous laws; [iii] Initiating enmity and hatred of them and their statutes and conditions of disbelief until they return to God; abandoning all of this, disavowing it all and disbelieving in it. God, exalted is He, stated: There is an excellent example for you in Abraham and those who followed him, when they said to their people: ‘We are free of you and that which you worship besides God. We disavow you; and enmity and hatred has arisen between us, until you believe in God alone.’ [Q.60:4]’25

It is his al-Kawashif al-Jaliyyah fi Kufr al-Dawlah al-Sa‘udiyyah – “The Evident Unveilings Concerning the Disbelief of the Saudi State” (1989) which took the Wahhabi weaponised understanding of wala’ and bara’ah to what appears to be its logical conclusion: accusing Saudi Arabia of being a kafir, infidel state. Again, drawing upon Wahhabi scholarship of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and the twentieth century former Senior Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh (d.1969), al Maqdisi insists that Saudi Arabia is a kafir state from three principle angles:

Firstly, that the kingdom, although it legislates with certain shari‘ah laws, also legislates with man-made laws in place of, as well as along with, many shari‘ah prescriptions. Al-Maqdisi calls the kingdom’s attempts at making people believe that it only legislates with shari‘ah laws as ‘an obvious lie!’26 He then goes on to devote the next ten pages or more documenting law after law after law that Saudi Arabia has legislated with respect to home affairs and foreign policy, and which violate shari‘ah teachings.27 To add insult to injury, he also records a volley of fatwas and letters by the former mufti, Muhammad b. Ibrahim wherein he rejects a whole raft of laws the kingdom introduces and which he believed was in opposition to the shari‘ah: these letters also advise the kingdom’s movers and shakers to keep to the straight and narrow, but to little or no avail.28 During this meticulous, yet scathing censure of how the kingdom has adopted man-made laws contrary to the norms of Islamic legislation, al-Maqdisi also marshals certain Quranic verses to nail the point; verses such as: Do they have partners [with God] who have made lawful for them in religion that for which God has not authorised? [Q.42:21] Also: Have you not seen those who pretend that they believe in what is sent down to you and what was sent down before you? They seek the judgement of false gods, although they are ordered to reject them. [Q.4:60] And: Is it a judgement of ignorance that they seek? Who is better in judgement than God for people who have sure faith? [Q.5:50] It should be noted, that despite Muhammad b. Ibrahim’s rejection of certain laws the kingdom introduced, he never once made takfir of the government, or deemed Saudi to be an unIslamic country (even if it did have some unIslamic laws).

Secondly, the kingdom has accepted membership of certain foreign organisations, such as the International Court of Justice and the United Nations, with its Charter, that govern on the basis of man-made laws. Such membership is an endorsement of man-made laws, and man-made laws are tawaghit (sing. taghut) – “false objects of worship” besides Allah.29

Thirdly, al-Maqdisi tries to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia’s ties with, and dependency on, the United States is a reason for it being a kafir state. This he does by giving a detailed, pedantic account of Saudi defense expenditure, showing that although the kingdom has spent billions of dollars on weaponry, Saudi still has a weak and incompetent army. This, he asserts, is because most of this military budget is spent on American advisors, soldiers, trainers and planners who are employed by the kingdom, not for Saudi interests, but for America’s (and for its main ally in the region, Israel).30

Al-Maqdisi’s radical solution to this Saudi ‘fitnah’, as he put it, is simply migration (hijrah) and jihad.31 Migration away from the kingdom (to where, he doesn’t really say), and then jihad against it (as well as against all other Muslim majority states and their leaders who have also substituted (tabdil) divine legislation with man-made laws). Writing about the Kuwaiti constitution, by then a typical example of legislators in Muslim lands replacing shari‘ah rulings with man made laws in their bid to modernise, al-Maqdisi wrote: ‘Before all else, you must disbelieve in this idol –  the [Kuwaiti] constitution and its laws – hate it, show enmity to it, disavow it, and not be pleased or submit except to the rule of God alone. This is so that one actualises the meaning of la illaha illa’Llah … And just as it is obligatory upon you to disavow this idol – i.e. the constitution and its laws – it is likewise obligatory on you to disavow everyone who defends it, protects its laws, and persists in legislating it and enslaving people to it.’32 In other words, enmity is not just to the laws themselves, but also to those who uphold them and defend them: be it rulers, legislators, bureaucrats, army, police, or the secret services. Such an outlook, slow to take off at first, would soon become the pivotal rationale for the jihadi-takfiri program – particularly after the First Gulf war of 1990.

It’s also worth mentioning that the Ottoman tanzimat reforms, which started in 1836, saw many shari‘ah laws being replaced with man-made laws; largely based on the Napoleonic Code and French law. It is this tabdil or “substitution” of shari‘ah laws, alongside Ottoman ideas of istighathah and their contravention of wala’ and bara’ah, that were the principle factors animating Wahhabi takfir of the Ottoman empire.

What is important to note in all of this is that al-Maqdisi draws heavily on the fatwas and works of preeminent eighteenth and nineteenth century Wahhabi scholars like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Sulayman, ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan and Ibn ‘Atiq. In his view, and the jihadi-takfiri cohort which was beginning to grow and mature around him and transnationally, Wahhabism was the doctrine giving legitimacy to the Saudi state; but the Saudi dynasty has for a long time now been biting the hand that feeds it, so to speak, thereby losing the right to govern. Wahhabi theology, once used to confer validity on the Saudi dynasty, had come full circle and was now being used to pull down the House of Sa‘ud! And as black and white, hostile, extreme, and devoid of compassionate concern for human welfare the traditional, non-Wahhabi ‘ulema find the Wahhabi worldview to be, there’s no mistaking al-Maqdisi’s pedigree: it is thoroughly Wahhabi, through and through.

XI

Al-Maqdisi’s voice was not a native Saudi one, being born in the West Bank. It would be a whole ten years after publishing his Kashf al-Niqab (1988) and his Kawashif, and almost fifteen years after his Millat Ibrahim, that the isti‘anah bi’l-kuffar theme would be raised by a native Saudi scholarly voice; putting it into, as al-Maqdisi did, a contemporary context. The first of these voices was that of Humud b. ‘Uqala (1927-2002), who penned al-Qawl al-Mukhtar fi Hukm al-Isti‘anah bi’l-Kuffar (1999). A few other voices followed, like al-‘Uyayri (d.2003), who was the first leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Nasr b. Hamd al-Fahd. After 9/11, it wasn’t just a case of the jihadi-takfiris accusing the Saudis of seeking help from the [American] disbelievers. But due to their participation in the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’, they could be accused of another act of kufr: of helping the disbelievers against other Muslims.

It must, of course, be said that other Salafi scholars have written rebuttals of al-Maqdisi’s views, attempting to offer alternative interpretations whilst trying to remain faithful to the classical Salafi-Wahhabi worldview. Muhammad b. ‘Umar Bazmul’s Mudhakkirah al-Radd ‘ala Kutub Mashbuhah, and Tabdid Kawashif al-‘Anid of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Ra’is, are two such rebuttals. Both tracts attempt to defend Saudi against the takfir charges, and demonstrate how al-Maqdisi’s lack of scholarly credentials and nuance in such delicate issues, and his hastiness and generalisations, are his downfall. Bazmul noted that in his introduction, al-Maqdisi says: ‘I composed these pages out of an urgency of the matter and restricted time. I haven’t spent much time [doing so], nor a lot of effort.’33 To this, Bazmul retorts: ‘This, may God guide him, is what he says about giving such a critical matter its due.’34

Al-Ra’is, while clarifying the issue of al-wala wa’l-bara’ah, writes that some have gone to extremes in understanding the Quranic verses on the topic, while others have fallen short of what is required. He then said: ‘Of those who have gone into extremes in the matter; in fact, the utmost extreme, is this obstinate al-Maqdisi.’35 He then runs through the types of relationships with non-Muslims in respect to wala and bara’ah, seeking to put verses like: You will not find a people who believe in God and the Last Day loving those who oppose God and His Messenger … [Q.58:22] in their proper context. He explains, in fairly typical Salafi fashion, that wala (love, loyalty) for the non-Muslims is of three categories: Firstly, loving a non-Muslim due to their religion or beliefs: this itself is clear-cut disbelief. The Quranic verse applies in this case: Whoever turns to them is of them. [Q.5:51] Secondly, loving a non-Muslim for a worldly motive or reason. This is forbidden and sinful, but not disbelief. You will not find a people who believe in God and the Last Day loving those who oppose God and His Messenger … [Q.58:22] speaks to this. Thirdly, natural love, affection or affinity (wala’ tab‘i, hubb tab‘i) for a non-Muslim due to them being one’s parents, siblings, wife (in the case of a Muslim man being married to a Jewish or Christian lady); or a kind and loveable relative or close friend. The Qur’an says to the Prophet ﷺ about the guidance of his dear uncle, Abu Talib, who was a non-Muslim: You cannot guide whom you love, but God guides whomsoever He wills. [Q.28:56]36 So this is the more nuanced Salafi-Wahhabi take on wala and bara’ah, contrasted with al-Maqdisi’s jihadi-takfir notions, and seemingly even those of nineteenth century Wahhabi thought.

It would be useful to research (if it hasn’t already been done so) just how well highlighted the idea of a natural wala has been in the writings of Salafi shaykhs before 9-11, and how much has come as an afterthought. For it is seldom enough just to have the correct stance. Often, it’s also a case of how one emphasises an issue or downplays it that has a crucial bearing on sound Islamic education and nurturing. 

Ruling by other than the judgement of God (hukm bi ghayri ma anzala’Llah) likewise has its nuances, as well as a difference of opinion between Wahhabi-Salafi scholars. Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim elucidated what looks to be the dominant stance of senior Salafi-Wahhabi jurist-theologians on the matter. He explains that the disbelief (kufr) of ruling by other than God’s judgement is of two types: the greater form of kufr, which takes a person out of the fold of Islam, and a lesser kufr, which makes a person a sinful Muslim; but not an apostate. He says that the greater kufr involves:

[i] To totally reject judging by God’s judgments, believing it is not required at all. [ii] The belief that some other judgement or system of legislation is better than God’s law. [iii] The belief that another judgement is equal to, but not better than, God’s judgement. [iv] The belief that it is permissible to give a judgment that opposes the judgement of God – even if one believes nothing is equal to, or better than, God’s laws. [v] To judge by one’s tribal or cultural norms and conventions, in complete disregard for God’s laws. [vi] To substitute the shari‘ah and shari‘ah courts with man-made systems of legislation, root and branch. As for the lesser kufr, which Ibn ‘Abbas explained was: ‘Disbelief lesser than [the greater] disbelief (kufr duna kufr)’, it is when someone judges in opposition to God’s judgement, whist believing it is forbidden and that one is sinful for doing so.37 Is not God the best of Judges? [Q.95:8] speaks to all the above, as does: Whoever judges not by what God has sent down, such are the disbelievers. [Q.5:44]

About the last category of tabdil – “substituting”, “replacing” the shari‘ah with man-made laws from top to bottom; completely or predominantly, Muhammad b. Ibrahim said: ‘This is the greater, most extensive, clearest obstinacy against the shari‘ah; haughtiest rejection of its laws; and worst defiance of its law-courts [in terms of] organisation, maintenance, provisions, foundations, branches, forms, types, rulings, diktats, or sources of reference. For just as the shari‘ah courts have their reference points they refer to – each relying on the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ – then these courts that judge with a patchwork of disparate man-made laws also have their reference points; be it the French, American, British, or other legal systems … So what disbelief is more audacious than this? Or what greater opposition is there to the testimony that Muhammad ﷺ is the Messenger of God?’38

Other Salafi scholars, in concert with most other non-Wahhabi ones, hold the view that the act of tabdil alone isn’t sufficient to prove disbelief or apostasy in one’s heart, unless accompanied by istihlal – a verbal affirmation that one “believes it to be lawful” to do so. This was the view held by Bin Baz (d.1999), al-Albani (d.1999) and a few other prominent Salafi scholars.39 What that means is that one cannot declare a ruler or a government to be apostates, unless and until they verbally declare their belief that the man-made rules they have substituted, instituted, or inherited are permissible to judge by in opposition to the shari‘ah. Therefore, such governments or leaders are, at best, sinners; not apostates.

So where are we in all this politics and theology? Well the fact remains, whilst the views of the Saudi establishment scholars concerning the Islamic forbiddance of suicide bombings or targeting civilians can and has made significant inroads in the deradicalising process, they appear to be struggling to win the argument against the jihadi-takfiris in other areas such as hukm bi ghayr ma anzala’Llah and isti‘anah. For here, the latter have the firm and decisive support of early Wahhabi fatwas and theology. Not only that, but the way Middle-Eastern politics has and is unfolding, and the current liberalesque reforms in Saudi, only serve to exacerbate the situation. There is, of course, a flip side to all this extremism and radicalism. The voices of our ‘ulema have, since 9-11, been key in combating jihadi-takfiri extremism head on; with the Salafi ‘ulema addressing these concerns earlier still – since possibly the 1980s. Another factor in deradicalisation is simply age: young people who may hold radical views about politics, or about the world and their place in it, will often grow out of their black and white take on things when they grow into the responsibilities of life, marriage, job and family. There’s also the growing mistrust with the promises of Islamism (although the term is semantically problematic, I use it for lack of a better one), particularly after the Arab Spring. And while the Muslim world reconsiders the pros and cons of anti-government protests and uprisings, the ummah is in dire need of a prophetic uprising; that’s for sure. Religious burn outs and religious apathy may, in part, be behind this mistrust: but they are two more reasons for a reduction in extremism. Another is that a large and growing part of the ummah, especially its younger elements, just wish to live a worldly life; have fun; and catch up (or keep up, as the case may be) with the rest of the “progressive” world! Lastly, there are government-orchestrated deradicalisation programs for which, I suppose, we ought to be guardedly thankful.

But seeds had been sown. In the 1980s, al-Maqdisi revived the writings of eighteenth and nineteenth century Wahhabi ‘ulema on the incendiary socio-political topics of wala and bara’ah, and al-isti‘anah bi’l-kuffar. In the 1990s, a group of diehards centred on Humud b. ‘Uqala propagated al-Maqdisi’s books and ideas, and soon added their own works to his. ‘Uqala et al. were pivotal in convincing a generation of how they should hold firmly to the pure Wahhabi ideals, unsullied by the state’s more palatable version of Wahhabism; and how they should stand against Western intrusion and hate both it and the West. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, after 9-11, provided just the right pretext to demonstrate that contempt and bara’ah. We must add to the mix certain jihadi-takfiri foot soldiers, like al-Maqdisi’s one time prodigy, al-Zarqawi (d.2006). Al-Zarqawi, ideologically forged by al-Maqdisi; but his time as actual practitioner of war, terror and mass murder in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the early 2000s, in contrast to a jihadi-takfiri academic like al-Maqdisi, earned this jihadi thug a sizeable following. This self-proclaimed leader of ‘Al-Qaeda in the land of the two rivers’ took his ideas of takfiri terror to new heights, disturbing people like his former mentor and even Bin Laden! And so it is that a mixture of Wahhabi ideology, their application to the contemporary Muslim world by al-Maqdisi, al-‘Uqala, and co., al-Naji’s Management of Savagery, and the grassroots strategies of terror devised by the likes of al-Zarqawi, became the potent mixture that would form the operational basis for the jihadi-takfiri outlook of ISIS and their like. That this well-defined program and outlook is wholly khariji; of Kharijite nature and nurturing, should be of little doubt.

Today’s jihadi-takfiris extend their jihad to all rulers over Muslims states, along with their armies, police force and government administrators. The political logic behind the enmity and violence is simply that: [i] Hakimiyyah, (“sovereignty”, “judgement”) belongs solely to God. [ii] Today’s rulers do not judge by God’s laws, hence they are disbelievers (kuffar). [iii] It is obligatory to fight against them, remove them and replace them with true Muslim leaders. [iv] Those who side with such rulers (be they scholars, bureaucrats, or citizens) are also disbelievers. [v] Since the rulers are disbelievers, all their covenants of security, and domestic or international treatises, are null and void. Only the jihadi-takfiris are true Muslims; hence political violence must fill our cities! For them, fighting and acts of terror are ideally for tamkin – “consolidating” or “establishing” authority over a particular piece of land or region; and if not, then for nikayah – inflicting as much harm, damage, murder and mayhem as possible. Even if one takes out the first two pillar about hakimiyyah, and convince the jihadi-takfiris about the correctness of the second view on tabdil, it only gets replaced with: [i] Wala’ should only be for God and Islam. [ii] Today’s rulers do not have wala for God, Islam or its laws, hence they are disbelievers!

This, then, is the jihadi-takfiri agenda; inspired – in great part – by original, authoritative Wahhabi teachings. And while groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS emotionally employ atrocities of Western foreign policy in Muslim countries, Israel’s oppression of Palestinians, or the murder and tyranny of brutal dictators against their Muslim citizens, as a recruitment tool and motivator; and while many who join their terrorist bandwagons may not be clued up about the details of the core jihadi-takfiri philosophy, the real driver for their raison d’être and savage activism are the above five pillars of their religious-political logic. It is not only Western foreign policies and interventions in the Middle-East and Palestinian grievances that need to be redressed. But to truly take the sting out of these terrorist outfits and their ideologues, we ask that our ‘ulema continue to deconstruct their falsehood, twisted logic and extremism – especially as it concerns the Quranic understanding of wala’ and bara’ah and al-hukm bi ghayri ma anzala’Llah – “ruling by other than the judgement of God”. But merely contenting ourselves with labelling them Kharijites and terrorists, and not tackling their warped understanding of these delicate religious texts and concepts head-on, we do our religion; ourselves; and the wider world a possible disservice.

Conclusion: Whether blaming Wahhabism (and indirectly, Saudi Arabia) for acts of terror carried out in Islam’s name is a red herring or not has been fiercely debated for over two decades. Yet while it is true that there is no single-cause explanation behind why people join terrorist groups, Wahhabi ideas are certainly the main driver behind the jihadi-takfiri worldview – as evinced by the fact that all its main ideologues subscribe to the Wahhabi-Salafi form of religion. We have further seen that even if the charge of mass takfir against Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab seems to be inconclusive; or at best, untrue, mass takfir is undoubtedly found from his descendants and other leading Wahhabi scholars in the end part of the first Saudi state, and throughout the era of the second Saudi state. Given how the earliest Wahhabi historians, Ibn Ghannam and Ibn Bishr, weren’t shy of recording the takfir verdicts (large scale or otherwise) of Wahhabi ‘ulema – in fact, it often seems like a badge of honour – one would expect them to have chronicled any mass takfir of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab himself, if he had done so. And God knows best.

Again, while there are complex political, economical or psychological reason people join terrorist outfits like ISIS; and while other conservative, apolitical forms of Salafism (even if there is religious intolerance), do not necessarily lead to becoming terrorists, we noted how al-Maqdisi infused a new lease of life into the takfir fatwas of the 18th & 19th century leading Wahhabi ‘ulema, which would soon become the very backbone of the jihadi-takfiri worldview and activism.

Likewise, it is absurd to suggest that would-be terrorists, especially in Britain and Europe, end up joining or supporting ISIS by wandering from mosque to mosque or trawling the internet, and stumbling upon the book Kitab al-Tawhid by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, then a few weeks later the book incites them to make their way to Syria, or to plot terrorist attacks in their native countries. The reality is far more involved than that. Yet that mustn’t obscure the fact that core Wahhabi tenets are the linchpin for today’s jihadi-takfiri ideas. Certainly, Sayyid Qutb (d.1966) may have partly inspired some core al-Qaeda members, though less so core ISIS ones. And yes, he may have supplied some of the jihadi-takfiri vocabulary and context. But there is no doubt that the bulk of the jihadi-takfiri theological scaffolding and inspiration is decidedly Wahhabi. Starting with early Wahhabi takfir writings, through to al-Maqdisi, then ‘Uqala and others, the pillars of the jihadi-takfiri method were forged: [1] Hakimiyyah. [2] Apostasy of all the rulers. [3] Jihad against the apostate rulers and regimes to establish an Islamic State. [4] The only viable means to change secular Muslim states is the bullet, not the ballot box. [5] The inevitable conflict between faith (iman) and disbelief (kufr); between the jihaditakfiris and the rest.

As for the non-Wahhabi, classically-trained ‘ulema: In general, for much of the twentieth century these ‘ulema scrutinised the contents of the shari‘ah, in order to accord Muslims some principled accommodation with the emerging global reality. As it happens, Islam’s legal tools were well-disposed to the task. The juristic tool of tahqiq al-manat – identifying the context for laws so as to ascertain their current form and application, and maslahah mursalah – taking account of public interest and utility, moved the legalists of the major centres of Muslim scholarship in the direction of acclimatisation and adaption. Yet while it’s not Islam’s calling to conform to the age – it is, after all, the great global dissent – it can and must furnish Muslims with the spiritual and social technologies required to live in the age and navigate its eclectic mix of challenges. More than that, true religion must offer people insights into how best to heal modernity’s discontents and despair too.

Those doctors of Islam’s legal tools, who are also blessed with being spiritually rooted in the realities of ihsan, teach us that God’s law exists to instantiate mercy not severity; ease not hardship; good news (tabshir) not alienation (tanfir). They insist that today’s times call for tashil; facilitation, but not tasahul; slackness or over-leniency. And that far from caving-in to secular modernity, as the short-sighted or fiqh-less zealots believe, this path maintained a wise, far-sighted openness to gentleness, which long predated the advent of the modern world. Sufyan al-Thawri stated: ‘In our view, knowledge entails granting legal concessions (rukhsah). As for being strict, anyone can do that.’40 Sayyiduna ‘Ali, may God be pleased with him, once said: ‘The scholar is not the one to cause people to despair of God’s mercy, nor to give them licence to sin.’41

Such scholars were also concerned about pseudo-scholars and charlatans, and the weak-spirited, not turning Islam into as many things as modernity wants Religion to be; in that Islam’s texts are twisted and tortured so as to make them compliant with whatever “ism” that happens to be modernity’s prevailing mood or zeitgeist: be it humanism, secularism, materialism, or nationalism; or in more recent times, liberalism, individualism, feminism, etc. Such concerns were not unjustified!

Some of the ‘ulema were also quick to realise that whatever political or religious spectrum Muslims advocate, most Muslim activism and movements that sought change, throughout the twentieth century till today, are locked in the logic of modernity, and can only operate within its hegemonic parameters. Islam, however, premised on the Adamic fitrah and the prophetic Sunnah, lies outside the monoculture’s plethora of philosophies, and so cannot be made subordinate to it. And this is why Islam is, and continues to be, the great global dissent from the totalising ideology of liberal modernity. 

Another insight of the ‘ulema was that one cannot simply go crashing into the juggernaut of modernity, as it has a tendency to flatten anything that comes charging at it. Therefore, instead of the Wahhabi obsession of defining what we are against, these ‘ulema privileged the notion of what we are for. Of course, shirk is shirk and tawhid is tawhid, and never the twain shall meet. Thus, for example, a Muslim’s relationship with non-Muslims would be guided by privileging this Quranic passage over others: God does not forbid you in terms of those who neither wage war against you on account of your religion, and nor drive you from your homes, from being kind to them and treating them justly. God loves the just. God only forbids you from befriending those who wage war against you on account of your religion, or drive you from your homes, or aid others in your expulsion. Whoever befriends them, those are the unjust. [Q.60:8-9] The Wahhabi insistence on enmity and hate would be privileged by the prophetic virtue of loving guidance and goodness for the non-Muslims wandering in the darkness and distractions of disbelief.

Of course, such privileging, or giving emphasis to one thing over another, isn’t without its dangers and difficulties. For those unschooled in ihsan – in the beauty of shari‘ah-rooted suluk or spirituality – will only bring ugliness into the world. If we are to be constructive healers, healing the world a day at a time or an act at a time, we must ensure that our fiqh deliberations are infused with the profound wisdoms and insights of our suluk tradition.

Let me wrap-up the post (and, indeed, this series) with these reflections – which speak of where we Muslims need to be heading. Explaining his own contention: ‘Being heretics to the Monoculture requires both courage and style,’ Abdal Hakim Murad writes:

‘The challenge of modern Muslimness is to combine a confident dissent from the global culture with a sense of service and humility. Triumphalism is no less damaging to the soul than an inferiority complex. Where loyalty is for God, and love is for what humanity is called to become, the believer can combine pity for the monoculture’s shrunken victims with gratitude for God’s guidance.’42

Part of that gratitude and humility, he says, involves an awareness that not everyone can muster up the strength to be different: ‘Human nature is conformist and the monoculture increasingly demonises Muslim distinctiveness. Browbeaten Muslims, anxious to please, are everywhere; they are no use to their communities, or, ultimately, to their hosts, since they cannot function as healers, only as a chorus of frightened eulogists. Allah is testing us through them; and the only successful response to this test is to be forgiving, and try and find an ointment for the scars inflicted by the melting-pot, as it grows ever hotter, year after year.’43

We ask Allah for guidance, courage, humility and safety.

Allahumma ‘rzuqna’l-iman wa’l-aman fi kulli bilad
wa’ruqna’l-fahm wa tasihhu’l-jihad
anta rabb wa nahnu al-‘ibad.
wa’rzuqna khayr
al-zad.

1. First posted on the now defunct al Ekhlas website, it was translated into English in 2006 by William McCants and released by the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point. See: Stern & Berger, ISIS: the State of Terror (London: William Collins, 2015), 23. A translation is downloadable here.

2. Al-Durar al-Saniyyah fi’l-Ajwabat al-Najdiyyah (n.p, 2004), 10:131, a collection of essays, tracts and fatwas by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and early Wahhabi scholars,

3. Mu’allafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Riyadh: Jami‘ah al-Imam Muhammad b. Su‘ud, 1398H), 4:11.

4. Al-Durar al-Saniyyah, 1:82-3.

5. Cf. Ibn Ghannam, Tarikh Najd (Riyadh: Dar al-Thuluthiyyah, 2010), volume two devoted to the jihad campaigns, ending in 1206H with the death of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd (Riyadh: Matbu‘at Darat al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1982), 1:46, which speaks about the first of many jihad campaigns.

6. Consult: Unwan al-Majd, 1:65, 69-72.

7. Al-Durar al-Saniyyah, 10:51.

8. Cf. Unwan al-Majd, 1:44.

9. See: al-Razi, Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1981), 17:63; Ibn ‘Aqil, approvingly cited in Ibn al-Jawzi, Talbis Iblis (Cairo: Dar Ibn al-Haytham, 2004), 388-89; also al-Alusi, Ruh al-Ma‘ani (Beirut: Dar al-Ihya al-Turath al-‘Arabi, n.d.), 6:128. As for Ibn Taymiyyah, then he has a separate treatise on the issue, entitled: al-Istighathah fi Radd ‘ala’l-Bakri (Riyadh: Maktabah Dar al-Minhaj, 1426H).

10. The tract is called, al-Dala’il fi Hukm Muwalat Ahl al-Ishraq (The Proofs Against Loyalty to the Idolators), and can be found in al-Durar al-Saniyyah, 8:121-43.

11. Al-Durar al-Saniyyah, 8:121.

12. ibid., 8:121. Al-‘Anqari writes in the next volume, 9:157: ‘The reason for composing the Dala’il is that Shaykh Sulayman authored it when the Turkish armies invaded Najd in his time, intending to eradicate the religion from its foundations.’

13. ibid., 8:127-28.

14. ibid., 1:312. Towards the end of a letter to the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, Ibrahim Pasha, written at the close of the year 1810CE.

15. ibid., 10:429.

16. ibid., 16:355.

17. ibid., 14:122.

18. ibid., 14:77.

19. Sabil al-Najat wa’l-Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa’l-Atrak (Riyadh: n.p., 1415H).

20. ibid., 25. The hadith about fighting the Turks is given in al-Bukhari, no.2928; Muslim, no.2912.

21. ibid., 62-3.

22. ibid., 23 onwards.

23. For a comprehensive review of al-Maqdisi’s life, ideology and influence as one of the most important radical jihadi thinkers of our age, see: Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

24. Millat Ibrahim (Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, www.tawhed.ws).

25. ibid., 18.

26. Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyyah fi Kufr al-Dawlah al-Sa‘udiyyah (Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, www.tawhed.ws, 1421H), 17.

27. ibid., 18-21, 24-28, 34-35.

28. ibid., 39-68.

29. Cf. ibid., 79-104.

30. ibid., 118-31.

31. ibid., 178-80.

32. From al-Maqdisi’s Kashf al-Niqab ‘an Shari‘at al-Ghab (Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, www.tawhed.ws), 102-3.

33. Kawashif al-Jaliyyah, 4.

34. Mudhakkirah al-Radd ‘ala Kutub Mashbuhah (n.p, n.d.), 86.

35. Tabdid Kawashif al-‘Anid (Cairo: Dar al-Imam Ahmad, 2007), 86-7.

36. ibid., 91-8. Also consult: al-Fawzan, I‘anat al-Mustafid bi Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 2002), 356, on natural wala’ towards non-Muslims.

37. See: Fatawa wa Rasa’il Samahat al-Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. ‘Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh (Makkah: al-Hukumah al-Makkah al-Mukarramah, 1399H), 12:284-91. This letter is published as a separate epistle, under the title of Tahkim al-Qawanin.

38. ibid., 12:289-90.

39. Cf. al-Halabi (ed.), al-Tahdhir min Fitnah al-Takfir (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn Khuzaymah, 1997), 13-44, for al-Albani’s fatwa; and pp.45-9 for Ibn Baz’s approval of al-Albani’s fatwa and that istihalal is a condition for judging by other than God’s laws to be kufr akbar. Also cf. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Baz, Majmu‘ Fatawa wa Maqalat Mutanawwi‘ah (Riyadh: Dar al-Qasim, 1420H), 5:355.

40. Quoted in Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Jami‘ Bayan al-‘Ilm wa Fadlihi (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 1994), no.1467.

41. Cited in al-Qurtubi, Kitab al-Tadhkirah (Riyadh: Maktabah Dar al-Minhaj, 1425H), 800.

42. Murad, Commentary on the Eleventh Contention (Cambridge: The Quilliam Press, 2012), 68; no.39.

43. ibid., 68.

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Times Will Get Worse Before They Get Better: But How?

Q. Do times get worse throughout the ages, after the Prophet’s era ﷺ? And is there a basis for believing this in the textual sources of Islam? Can you also say something about the return of Jesus, peace be upon him, and the coming of the Dajjal, and how they fit into the overall pattern of decay, deterioration and then revival?

A. In the Name of God, Most Gracious, All-Merciful. As a general rule, what you’ve said is true. We are taught in Islam that times do indeed deteriorate: that each age is followed by an age worse than it. However, this is not without its exceptions. The following is usually cited to support the downward spiral of history:

From al-Zubayr b. ‘Adi, who said: We came to Anas b. Malik and complained to him about what was happening from al-Hajjaj. So he said:

إِصْبِرُوا فَإِنَّهُ لَا يَأْتِي عَلَيْكُمْ زَمَانٌ إِلَّا الَّذِي بَعْدَهُ شَرٌّ مِنْهُ حَتَّى تَلْقَوْا رَبَّكُمْ.

‘Be patient! For there will not come a time upon you except that after it will be worse than it, until you meet your Lord.’ I heard this from your Prophet, peace be upon him.1

Taking the above words of our Prophet ﷺ as our starting point, let’s explore some of their context, meanings and implications:

1. As for the context, it is the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwan (r.65-86H/685-705CE ), fifth Umayyad ruler. He became caliph after a number of tragic intra-Muslim schisms and civil wars had blighted the ummah over the past five years: the death of al-Husayn at Karbala; the battle at Harrah and the subsequent looting of Madinah; and the siege of ‘Abd Allah b. al-Zubair at the Ka‘bah. Given all these woeful tribulations, ‘Abd al-Malik set about trying to consolidate his rule and to restore some order to the expanding Muslim empire. History credits him with much good and success. But part of this consolidation of power required that he end Ibn al-Zubayr’s nine year claim to the caliphate based in Makkah. This he did by unleashing against him his ruthless lieutenant, al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf. After laying siege to Makkah, and shelling the Sacred Precinct using catapults, Ibn al-Zubayr was killed then crucified, in 73H/692CE.

2. As for al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf (the one people were complaining to Anas about), a glimpse of his cruel and unsparing character can be seen in al-Dhahabi’s brief biographical remarks on him: وَكَانَ ظَلُوْماً ، جَبَّاراً ، نَاصِبِيّاً ، خَبِيْثاً ، سَفَّاكاً لِلدِّمَاءِ ، وَكَانَ ذَا شَجَاعَةٍ ، وَإِقْدَامٍ ، وَمَكْرٍ ، وَدَهَاءٍ ، وَفَصَاحَةٍ ، وَبَلاَغَةٍ ، وَتعَظِيْمٍ لِلْقُرَآنِ … وَلَهُ حَسَنَاتٌ مَغْمُوْرَةٌ فِي بَحْرِ ذُنُوْبِهِ ، وَأَمْرُهُ إِلَى اللهِ ، وَلَهُ تَوْحِيْدٌ فِي الجُمْلَةِ ، وَنُظَرَاءُ مِنْ ظَلَمَةِ الجَبَابِرَةِ وَالأُمَرَاءِ – ‘He was a tyrant, a despot, hater of ‘Ali and the Prophet’s family, wicked, and a shedder of blood. He was [also] fearless, audacious, shrewd and cunning; as well as being an eloquent and persuasive speaker who venerated the Qur’an … He has some good deeds amidst an ocean of sins; his affair is left to God. He had faith, in general, and wasn’t alone among the oppressive tyrants and leaders.’2 He perished in 95H/714CE.

Maybe it was during al-Hajjaj’s onslaught against Ibn al-Zubayr; or when, between 700H-703H, he put down the full scale uprising of Ibn al-Ash‘ath and his followers; or when he brought his brutal governorship to Iraq and to the eastern Islamic lands, that Anas related this hadith. Certainly the people, including Anas himself, had much cause for grievance against al-Hajjaj. But Anas reminds them of something decidedly prophetic: in the face of tyranny from those in power, patience – not to be confused with complacency – is what brings about relief and divine help.

3. Along with the two sahabah, Anas and Ibn al-Zubayr, another leading Muslim sage who lived through the brutal governorship of al-Hajjaj was al-Hasan al-Basri. He counselled us how, as believers, we are not meant to see politics as merely the playing-out of the various interests of people vis-a-via one another. Rather, we must see it more so as the playing out of the af‘al al-rabb – the divine acts – within human society. Without trying to understand what God is saying to us through how He causes the political fortunes of people to unfold, we fail to engage in the kind of politics the Qur’an wishes us to engage in. It is from such Quranic “seeing” that al-Hasan al-Basri once said of al-Hajjaj: إِنَّ الْحَجَّاجَ عَذَابُ اللَّهِ فَلَا تَدْفَعُوا عَذَابَ اللَّهِ بِأَيْدِيكُمْ وَلَكِنْ عَلَيْكُمْ بِالِاسْتِكَانَةِ وَالتَّضَرُّعِ – ‘Indeed, al-Hajjaj is a punishment from God, so do not repel it by your hands. Instead, take to humility and imploring God.’The Qur’an says: وَلَقَدْ أَخَذْنَاهُمْ بِالْعَذَابِ فَمَا اسْتَكَانُوا لِرَبِّهِمْ وَمَا يَتَضَرَّعُونَWe seized them with punishment, yet they humbled not themselves to their Lord, nor did they implore Him. [23:76]. Also: وَكَذَلِكَ نُوَلِّي بَعْضَ الظَّالِمِينَ بَعْضًا بِمَا كَانُوا يَكْسِبُونَ – Thus do We let some of the unjust have power over others because of their misdeeds. [6:129] ‘Hence if those governed desire to rid themselves of the injustices of an unjust ruler, they too must abstain from unjust [sinful] acts.’4 Listening to what the af‘al al-rabb are telling us is key to the political well-being of Muslims.

4. One last word related to our context. Al-Hasan al-Basri was once asked by some young activists to endorse Ibn Ash‘ath’s uprising against al-Hajjaj, to which he replied: أَرَى أَنْ لا تُقَاتِلُوْهُ؛ فَإنَّهَا إِنْ تكُ عُقُوْبَةً مِنْ اللهِ فَمَا أَنْتُمْ بِرَادِّي عُقُوبَةَ اللهِ بِأَسْيَافِكُم، وَإِنْ يَكُنْ بَلاءً، فَاصْبِرُوا حَتّٰى يَحْكُمَ الله وَهُوَ خَيْرُ الْحَاكِمِيْن – ‘I hold that you should not fight him. For if this is a punishment from God, you shall not repel God’s punishment by your swords. But if this be a trial, then be patient, till God judgement comes; and He is the best of Judges.’5 Ticked-off by his reply, and riled up by zeal and more than a hint of recklessness, they fought against al-Hajjaj, and he slew all of them. On hearing about the ill-fated uprising, al-Hasan al-Basri went on to remark: لَوْ أَنَّ النَّاسَ إِذَا ابْتُلُوا مِنْ قِبَلِ سُلْطَانِهِمْ صَبَرُوا مَا لَبِثُوا أَنْ يُفْرَجَ عَنْهُمْ ، وَلَكِنَّهُمْ يَجْزَعُونَ إِلَى السَّيْفِ فَيُوَكَّلُونَ إِلَيْهِ ، فَوَاللَّهِ مَا جَاءُوا بِيَوْمِ خَيْرٍ قَطُّ – ‘If the people only showed patience when they are being tried by their rulers, it would not be long before they would be given relief from it. But they always rush for the swords, so they are left to their swords. By God, not even for a single day did they bring about any good!’6

If this last sentence of al-Hasan al-Basri seems somewhat sharp, see it – not as some kind of endorsement of the tyrannical status quo; as those with shallow intellects claim – but as a reprimand to all those who failed to heed the af‘al al-rabb; who turned their backs on the duty to be patient; who probably convinced other impressionable souls to do likewise and follow them to their deaths through an ill-judged activism; and who indirectly helped rationalise and entrench further tyranny of shabby tyrants. So what good did such rabble-rousing and rebellion actually bring about to society or to the common person? And what about activism being accountable to the well-established Islamic “Law of Consequences”? As for the few who may have misread the af‘al al-rabb, or erred in their qualified scholarly ijtihad, theirs is a different case.

The above depicted something of the turbulent context. As for what it means for the times to grow steadily worse, then that’s what we’ll discuss now:

5. One of the objections raised against the meaning of the hadith is that within four years of al-Hajjaj’s demise, it was the rule of the eighth Umayyad caliph, the righteous ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (r.99-101H/717-720CE). A paragon of godliness and learning, he reversed the preceding tyranny and returned the Muslims to a culture of justice, learning and piety. So this apparently shows that not every age is followed by an age worse than it. Or does it? In answering this dilemma, scholars have offered the following explanations:7 [i] the hadith is to be understood as describing what is usually the case: [ii] that the hadith speaks of an overall comparison between each successive age; and [iii] the deterioration is referring to the demise of the scholars and the loss of religious knowledge and guidance. Let’s look at each opinion in more detail:

6. For the first opinion, Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani wrote: ‘This generalisation is problematic in that some ages have [apparently] not been worse than the ones before them. Such is the case with the times of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, which was shortly after the time of al-Hajjaj; and information concerning ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s time is well-known.’8 He then states that this worsening is what is predominantly the case, but not always the case. This view was held by al-Hasan al-Basri who, when asked about ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz coming after al-Hajjaj, said: لَابُدَّ لِلناَّسِ مِنْ تَنْفِيْس – ‘People need some breathing space!’9

7. The second opinion, that each age contains more overall excellence than the age which follows, is explained by Ibn Hajr, thus: ‘Others have replied [saying] that what is meant by the excellence [of the preceding age compared to what comes after] is overall excellence of one age in comparison to the overall excellence of another. For in the age of al-Hajjaj, many sahabah were alive, whilst in the age of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz [many] had died. And an age wherein the sahabah are present is better than one that comes after, as the Prophet ﷺ stated: “The best of mankind is my generation,” recorded in the Two Sahihs; and in his saying: “My sahabah are the custodians for my ummah, when they depart what has been decreed for my ummah will come to it.” Related by Muslim.’10

8. As for the third opinion, Ibn Hajr quotes these words of Ibn Mas‘ud: ﻻ ﻳَﺄْﺗِﻲ ﻋَﻠَﻴْﻜُﻢْ ﺯَﻣَﺎﻥٌ ﺇِﻻ ﻭَﻫُﻮَ ﺷَﺮٌّ ﻣِﻤَّﺎ ﻛَﺎﻥَ ﻗَﺒْﻠَﻪ ، ﺃَﻣَﺎ ﺇِﻧِّﻲ ﻻ ﺃَﻋْﻨِﻲ ﺃَﻣِﻴﺮًﺍ ﺧَﻴْﺮًﺍ ﻣِﻦْ ﺃَﻣِﻴﺮٍ، ﻭَﻟَﺎ ﻋَﺎﻣًﺎ ﺧَﻴْﺮًﺍ ﻣِﻦْ ﻋَﺎﻡٍ، ﻭَﻟَﻜِﻦْ ﻋُﻠَﻤَﺎﺅُﻛُﻢْ ﻭَﻓُﻘَﻬَﺎﺅُﻛُﻢْ ﻳَﺬْﻫَﺒُﻮﻥَ، ﺛُﻢَّ ﻻ ﺗَﺠِﺪُﻭﻥَ ﻣِﻨْﻬُﻢْ ﺧُﻠَﻔَﺎﺀَ، ﻭَﻳَﺠِﻲﺀُ ﻗَﻮْﻡٌ ﻳُﻔْﺘُﻮﻥَ ﺑِﺮَﺃْﻳِﻬِﻢ – ‘There will not come upon you a time, except that it is worse than the time before it. I do not mean a leader better than another leader, nor a year better than another year. But your scholars and learned ones shall depart, and you will not find anyone to succeed them. Then there will come a people who will give fatwas according to their mere opinion.’11 In another wording: ﻭَﻣَﺎ ﺫَﺍﻙَ ﺑِﻜَﺜْﺮَﺓِ ﺍْﻷﻣْﻄَﺎﺭِ ﻭَﻗِﻠَّﺘِﻬَﺎ ﻭَﻟَﻜِﻦْ ﺑِﺬَﻫَﺎﺏِ ﺍﻟْﻌُﻠَﻤَﺎﺀِ ﺛُﻢَّ ﻳُﺤْﺪِﺙُ ﻗَﻮْﻡٌ ﻳُﻔْﺘُﻮﻥَ ﻓِﻲ ﺍﻷﻣُﻮﺭِ ﺑِﺮَﺃْﻳِﻬِﻢْ ﻓَﻴَﺜْﻠِﻤُﻮﻥَ ﺍﻹﺱﻻَﻡَ ﻭَﻳَﻬْﺪِﻣُﻮﻧَﻪ  – ‘It is not due to an abundance of rain or its scarcity. Rather, it is because of the disappearance of the scholars. Then there’ll come a people who will give fatwas on matters based on mere opinion, thereby disgracing and destroying Islam.’12 So this view demonstrates that the worsening has less to do with political leaders or economic fortunes – ‘I do not mean a leader better than another leader, nor a year better than another year’ – and has far more to do with the absence of scholars and scholarly guidance. Indeed, Ibn Hajr deems this to be the best explanation.13

9. As for the apex of these worsening times, when religious guidance will be eclipsed by deceptions and distraction, that will happen during the times of the Dajjal; as one hadith puts it: مَا بَيْنَ خَلْقِ آدَمَ إِلَى قِيَامِ السَّاعَةِ خَلْقٌ أَكْبَرُ مِنَ الدَّجَّالِ – ‘Nothing between the creation of Adam until the establishment of the Hour is graver than [the matter of] the Dajjal.’14 In another hadith, we learn this disturbing news: فَيَأْتِي عَلَى الْقَوْمِ فَيَدْعُوهُمْ، فَيُؤْمِنُونَ بِهِ وَيَسْتَجِيبُونَ لَهُ، فَيَأْمُرُ السَّمَاءَ فَتُمْطِرُ، وَالْأَرْضَ فَتُنْبِتُ، فَتَرُوحُ عَلَيْهِمْ سَارِحَتُهُمْ، أَطْوَلَ مَا كَانَتْ ذُرًا، وَأَسْبَغَهُ ضُرُوعًا، وَأَمَدَّهُ خَوَاصِرَ، ثُمَّ يَأْتِي الْقَوْمَ، فَيَدْعُوهُمْ فَيَرُدُّونَ عَلَيْهِ قَوْلَهُ، فَيَنْصَرِفُ عَنْهُمْ، فَيُصْبِحُونَ مُمْحِلِينَ لَيْسَ بِأَيْدِيهِمْ شَيْءٌ مِنْ أَمْوَالِهِمْ، وَيَمُرُّ بِالْخَرِبَةِ، فَيَقُولُ لَهَا: أَخْرِجِي كُنُوزَكِ، فَتَتْبَعُهُ كُنُوزُهَا كَيَعَاسِيبِ النَّحْلِ – ‘Then he [the Dajjal] shall come to a people and call them; and they will believe in him and respond to him. At which he will instruct the sky, and it will send down its rain; and the earth, and it will grow its vegetation. Then in the evening the grazing animals will come back to them: their humps high; their udders full; their flanks bulging. He will then come to another people and summon them. But they will reject what he has to say. So he will leave them. By daybreak, they will be utterly impoverished, possessing nothing. He will pass through the wasteland and tell it to bring forth its treasures; and these treasure will follow him like swarms of bees.’15 So economic prosperity awaits those who accept the Dajjal; the Anti-Christ – this arch-deceiving, one-eyed imposter – even though such people will have sold their souls to the devil in order to gain it! As for the faithful who deny him, they must fortify their faith and patiently endure like never before.

And then there’s this disconcerting hadith: يَنْزِلُ الدَّجَّالُ فِي هَذِهِ السَّبَخَةِ بِمَرِّقَنَاةَ – وادٍ بالمدينة – فَيَكُونُ أَكْثَرَ مَنْ يَخْرُجُ إِلَيْهِ النِّسَاءُ ، حَتَّى إِنَّ الرَّجُلَ لَيَرْجِعُ إِلَى حَمِيمِهِ وَإِلَى أُمِّهِ وَابْنَتِهِ وَأُخْتِهِ وَعَمَّتِهِ فَيُوثِقُهَا رِبَاطًا مَخَافَةَ أَنْ تَخْرُجَ إِلَيْهِ – ‘The Dajjaal will come to this marsh in Marriqanat – a valley in Madinah – and most of those who go out to him will be women. To the extent that a man will come to his mother-in-law, mother, daughter, sister, and aunt, and will have to constrain them firmly for fear that they will go out to him.’16 Precisely what makes Dajjal a magnet for women, and what will he offer that causes this mass feminine allegiance to him, is a question that must be explored at another time. Although given the essence of Dajjal’s fitnah is to make truth appear as falsehood; and falsehood as truth, whatever he peddles, it will be nothing short of putting them (and others) to trial in their very faith and salvation. We seek refuge in God from the trials of the Anti-Christ.

Before saying a few words about the hadith’s implications for us today, let us look at the ‘exceptions’ to the rule. Let’s say something about the good that is still to come; and about how the future is for Abrahamic monotheism. So believing hearts need not despair.

10. One of these exceptions is that the political fortunes of the Muslims will take a turn for the better with the return of the caliphate or khilafah. So we read at the start of one hadith (whose soundness is open to some question), that: يَكُونُ اخْتِلاَفٌ عِنْدَ مَوْتِ خَلِيفَةٍ فَيَخْرُجُ رَجُلٌ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْمَدِينَةِ هَارِبًا إِلَى مَكَّةَ فَيَأْتِيهِ نَاسٌ مِنْ أَهْلِ مَكَّةَ فَيُخْرِجُونَهُ وَهُوَ كَارِهٌ فَيُبَايِعُونَهُ بَيْنَ الرُّكْنِ وَالْمَقَامِ – ‘Disagreement will occur at the death of a caliph; and a man from Madinah will flee to Makkah. Some of the Makkans will go to him, bring him out against his will, and pledge allegiance (bay‘ah) to him between the Corner [of the Ka‘bah] and the Station [of Abraham] …’17 In another hadith: يَقْتَتِلُ عِنْدَ كَنْزِكُمْ ثَلَاثَةٌ ، كُلُّهُمْ ابْنُ خَلِيفَةٍ ، ثُمَّ لَا يَصِيرُ إِلَى وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمْ – ‘Three men, all of whom are sons of a caliph, will fight over your treasure, but none of them shall get to it …’18 Then there is this good news: تَكُونُ النُّبُوَّةُ فِيكُمْ مَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ أَنْ تَكُونَ ثُمَّ يَرْفَعُهَا إِذَا شَاءَ أَنْ يَرْفَعَهَا ثُمَّ تَكُونُ خِلَافَةٌ عَلَى مِنْهَاجِ النُّبُوَّةِ فَتَكُونُ مَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ أَنْ تَكُونَ ثُمَّ يَرْفَعُهَا إِذَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَرْفَعَهَا ثُمَّ تَكُونُ مُلْكًا عَاضًّا فَيَكُونُ مَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَكُونَ ثُمَّ يَرْفَعُهَا إِذَا شَاءَ أَنْ يَرْفَعَهَا ثُمَّ تَكُونُ مُلْكًا جَبْرِيَّةً فَتَكُونُ مَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ أَنْ تَكُونَ ثُمَّ يَرْفَعُهَا إِذَا شَاءَ أَنْ يَرْفَعَهَا ثُمَّ تَكُونُ خِلَافَةً عَلَى مِنْهَاجِ النُّبُوَّةِ ثُمَّ سَكَتَ – ‘Prophethood will remain among you for as long as God wishes it to, then God will raise it up when He wishes to. Then there will be khilafah upon the way of Prophethood, and it shall remain among you for as long as God wishes it to; then God will raise up whenever He wishes to. Then there will be harsh kingship which will remain among you for as long as God wishes it to, then God shall raise it up when He wishes to. Then there will be tyrannical kingship and it shall remain among you for as long as God wishes it to, then He will raise it up whenever He wishes to. Then there will be khilafah upon the way of Prophethood.’ Then he was silent.19

Of course, we can question if a medieval-styled khilafah could or should ever be revived in the modern era. Or have deep reservations about whether a khilafah could ever simply be transplanted onto the structures of a modern state – especially given that the all-invasive modern state monopolises legislation, whilst a classical Muslim state doesn’t legislate at all: traditionally, legislation belongs to God, as understood and deciphered by the ‘ulema. But that is not a reason to negate the return of the khilafah or speak in a way to undermine its prophesied return. As for what shape or form the khilafah will take, well that’s an open ended question; and there’s likely to be more than one viable political arrangement. But what’s clear, though, is that liberal, secular democracy isn’t quite the believers’ story, nor really their desired end.

11. Another exceptional good is the time and rule of the charismatic al-Mahdi. Although there are many spurious hadiths about the Mahdi, there are also a number that are sound. Among them: الْمَهْدِيُّ مِنِّي أَجْلَى الْجَبْهَةِ أَقْنَى الأَنْفِ يَمْلأُ الأَرْضَ قِسْطًا وَعَدْلاً كَمَا مُلِئَتْ جَوْرًا وَظُلْمًا يَمْلِكُ سَبْعَ سِنِينَ – ‘The Mahdi is from me; he will have a broad forehead and an aquiline nose. He will fill the Earth with fairness and justice, as it was filled with oppression and tyranny; and he shall rule for seven years.’20 Also: الْمَهْدِيُّ مِنَّا أَهْلَ الْبَيْتِ يُصْلِحُهُ اللَّهُ فِي لَيْلَةٍ – ‘The Mahdi is from us, the People of the Household; and Allah will ready him in a single night.’21 That night is indeed fast approaching.

12. At some point around the time of the Mahdi, Jesus Christ, peace be upon him, shall be returned to Earth: وَالَّذِي نَفْسِي بِيَدِهِ لَيُوشِكَنَّ أَنْ يَنْزِلَ فِيكُمُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ حَكَمًا مُقْسِطًا فَيَكْسِرَ الصَّلِيبَ، وَيَقْتُلَ الْخِنْزِيرَ، وَيَضَعَ الْجِزْيَةَ، وَيَفِيضَ الْمَالُ حَتَّى لاَ يَقْبَلَهُ أَحَدٌ – ‘By Him in whose hand is my soul! The son of Mary will soon descend among you as a just judge. He will break the cross, slay the swine and abolish the jizyah-tax. Wealth shall flow abundantly so much so that none shall take it.’22 And that: يَقْتُلُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ الدَّجَّالَ بِبَابِ لُدٍّ – ‘The son of Mary shall slay the Dajjal at the gates of Lod.’23 A time where: لَتَذْهَبَنَّ الشَّحْنَاءُ وَالتَّبَاغُضُ وَالتَّحَاسُدُ – ‘Mutual spite, hatred and jealousy shall depart.’24 And: فَيَكُونُ عِيسَى ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلاَمُ فِي أُمَّتِي حَكَمًا عَدْلاً وَإِمَامًا مُقْسِطًا يَدُقُّ الصَّلِيبَ وَيَذْبَحُ الْخِنْزِيرَ وَيَضَعُ الْجِزْيَةَ وَيَتْرُكُ الصَّدَقَةَ فَلاَ يُسْعَى عَلَى شَاةٍ وَلاَ بَعِيرٍ وَتُرْفَعُ الشَّحْنَاءُ وَالتَّبَاغُضُ وَتُنْزَعُ حُمَةُ كُلِّ ذَاتِ حُمَةٍ حَتَّى يُدْخِلَ الْوَلِيدُ يَدَهُ فِي فِي الْحَيَّةِ فَلاَ تَضُرَّهُ وَتُفِرُّ الْوَلِيدَةُ الأَسَدَ فَلاَ يَضُرُّهَا وَيَكُونُ الذِّئْبُ فِي الْغَنَمِ كَأَنَّهُ كَلْبُهَا وَتُمْلأُ الأَرْضُ مِنَ السِّلْمِ كَمَا يُمْلأُ الإِنَاءُ مِنَ الْمَاءِ وَتَكُونُ الْكَلِمَةُ وَاحِدَةً فَلاَ يُعْبَدُ إِلاَّ اللَّهُ وَتَضَعُ الْحَرْبُ أَوْزَارَهَا – ‘Jesus, son of Mary, peace be upon him, will be a just judge and a just ruler among my nation. He will break the cross, slay the swine, abolish the jizyah, and charity will be left untouched. None will be appointed [to collect zakat] on sheep or camels. Rancour and mutual hatred will disappear. The harm of every harmful creature will be removed, such that a baby boy will put his hand in a snake without him being harmed; a baby girl will chase a lion and not be harmed; and a wolf will roam among sheep like their sheepdog. The Earth shall be filled with peace, just as a vessel is filled with water. The people will be united, and none shall be worshipped except God; and war will lay down its burdens …’25

Thus the End of Days will see an earthly bliss, with the hypocrites perishing; non-Muslims converting to Islam en mass; and Islam and Abrahamic monotheism ultimately becoming triumphant: لَيَبْلُغَنَّ هَذَا الْأَمْرُ مَا بَلَغَ اللَّيْلُ وَالنَّهَارُ وَلَا يَتْرُكُ اللَّهُ بَيْتَ مَدَرٍ وَلَا وَبَرٍ إِلَّا أَدْخَلَهُ اللَّهُ هَذَا الدِّينَ بِعِزِّ عَزِيزٍ أَوْ بِذُلِّ ذَلِيلٍ عِزًّا يُعِزُّ اللَّهُ بِهِ الْإِسْلَامَ وَذُلًّا يُذِلُّ اللَّهُ بِهِ الْكُفْرَ – ‘This affair shall reach wherever night and day reach. And God will not leave a dwelling of brick, nor of fur, except that He will cause this religion to enter it; bringing honour or humiliation: honour which God brings with Islam, or humiliation which He gives to disbelief.’26

But between now and then there’s plenty of work to be done, much du‘a to be made, and a great deal of inward purification to engage in. But this triumph of Islam must be seen in terms of the af‘al al-rabb, not the egotistical nafs. For we won’t be given to glory in a glory that never vanishes, if we seek to glory in a glory that does.

We must also be clear that, at root, there’s a parting of ways between Islam and the liberal monoculture when it comes to what human beings fundamentally are, what it is possible for them to be or become, and what it means to be liberated or free. Islam teaches that the human person is imbued with a ruh, a “spirit,” that yearns to know God, truth and beauty. For the monoculture, there is no spirit or soul, merely a “self.” And this self is made up of our whims, wants and desires. Islam teaches that the intellect or reason’s role, in light of Revelation, is to enable us know the good and what’s morally right, and direct our desires towards it. Reason is a restraint on desires, it is master of desires; and so the importance of self-mastery or mastery of self in Islam. In stark contrast, the monoculture would have us believe that reason is not, and cannot be, master of desire but only its servant. Reason can tell us not what to desire or want, but only how to get whatever it is we desire or want. For the monoculture, it’s not about restraining our desires or mastering the self; it’s about slavery to self. The monoculture’s freedom is freedom of the self; freedom to be servile to the self. Islam’s freedom is freedom from the dictates of the self; freedom from self-slavery. That being the case, any fiqh that isn’t rooted in this reality; any taysir or ease which fails to factor this into its fatwas, is sloppy and short-sighted and, in the long run, part of the actual problem.

True, meaningful peace, then, can only come with tawhid; with Abrahamic monotheism. It’s clear that the monoculture is heading the wrong way. It’s leading us like lemmings to a cliff-edge. It’s driving the bus of humanity over the edge; and Muslims must be the ones to apply the brake. Monotheism’s message of hope; of healing, must restore direction and meaning back into peoples’ lives. It must help steer them towards God and the good. Key to much of this is sabr – patience, perseverance, and deepening our commitment to God. The Prophet ﷺ foretold: يَأْتِي عَلَى النَّاسِ زَمَانٌ الصَّابِرُ فِيهِمْ عَلَى دِينِهِ كَالْقَابِضِ عَلَى الْجَمْرِ – ‘There will come upon the people a time where a person patiently practicing his religion will be like holding on to hot coal.’27 And finally there’s this hadith: وَاعْلَمْ أَنَّ النَّصْرَ مَعَ الصَّبْرِ وَأَنَّ الْفَرَجَ مَعَ الْكَرْبِ وَأَنَّ مَعَ الْعُسْرِ يُسْرًا – ‘And know that victory comes with patience, relief with affliction, and ease with hardship.’28

And God alone is Granter of success.

1. Al-Bukhari, no.7068.

2. Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1998), 4:343.

3. Ibn Sa‘d, Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir (Cairo: Maktaba al-Khanji, 2001), 9:165; no.3883.

4. Ibn Abi’l-‘Izz, Sharh al-‘Aqidah al-Tahawiyyah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1984), 381.

5. Ibn Sa‘d, Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir, 9:164.

6. ibid., 9:165.

7. Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Egypt: al-Dar al-‘Alamiyyah, 2012), Kitab al-Fitan; Ch.6; 15:610-13.

8. ibid., 15:612.

9. ibid., 15:612.

10. ibid., 15:612.

11. Al-Darimi, Sunan, no.188; al-Tabarani, Mu‘jam al-Kabir, no.8551. Al-Darimi records the narration with the words: ‘I do not mean a year more fruitful than another year’ and also with, ‘your best’ occurring between the words, ‘your scholars and learned ones’. Ibn Hajr states, Fath al-Bari, 15:613, that the chain of the report is hasan.

12. Fath al-Bari, 15:613.

13. ibid., 15:612.

14. Muslim, no.2946.

15. Muslim, no.2937.

16. Ahmad, no.5353. Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ut analysed the separate chains of this hadith in his critical edition to Musnad Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1996), 9:255-56, declaring them to all be weak. The hadith does, however, have support from the narration of Samurah b. Jundub, as per Ahmad, no.20027; and Abu Umamah; Ibn Majah, no.4077, to yield a final, collective grading of sahih. Cf. al-‘Adawi, al-Sahih al-Musnad min Ahadith al-Fitan wa’l-Malahim wa’l-Ashra’at al-Sa‘ah (Riyadh: Dar al-Hijrah, 1991), 497.

17. Ibn Majah, no.4286. After analysing its various chains, it was graded da‘if in al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Da‘ifah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1988), no.1965.

18. Ibn Majah, no.4084. Ibn Kathir said its chain is qawi sahih in al-Bidayah wa’l-Nihayah (Beirut  & Damascus: Dar Ibn Kathir, 2010), 17:43. Al-Albani, having criticised its chain as well as a part of its wording, said: ‘However, its meaning is sound.’ Cf. Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Da‘ifah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1992), no.85.

19. Ahmad, Musnad, no.18406; Ibn Hibban, no.1631. It was declared as sahih by al-‘Iraqi, Mahajjat al­-Qarab fi Mahabbat al-‘Arab (Riyadh: Dar al-‘Asimah, 2012), 176; as well as by al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1995), no.5.

20. Abu Dawud, no.4585, with a hasan chain. Cf. al-Albani’s critical edition of al-Mishkat al-Masabih (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1979), no.5454.

21. Ibn Majah, no.4075, and it is sahih. Consult: al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1991), no.2371.

22. Al-Bukhari, no.2222; Muslim, no.242.

23. Al-Tirmidhi, no.2244, where he said: ‘The hadith is hasan sahih.’

24. Muslim, no.244.

25. Ibn Majah, no.4077. Al-Albani has a separate tract on this entire lengthy hadith, only a tiny part of which I cited. He breaks-up the hadith into forty-nine segments, then goes on to show what segments are supported and strengthened by other hadiths, and what have no support or corroboration. In this tract, entitled: Qissatu’l-Masih al-Dajjal wa Nuzuli ‘Isa ‘alayhi al-salatu wa’l-salam (Amman: al-Maktabah al-Islamiyyah, 1421H), 47, he begins by analysing the chain in detail, grading it weak (da‘if). He then starts a detailed analysis of each of the 49 segments of the hadith, declaring on p.49: ‘However, the hadith is, overall, sahih. Most of its segments are found in other hadiths, except a few parts which I couldn’t find any support of corroboration for.’ The parts of the hadith quoted above correspond to segment nos.43-45; pp.113-115, in the tract. Ibn Hibban, Sahih, no.1904, supports the first part; and a sahih mursal and a sahih mawquf in ‘Abd al-Razzaq, Musannaf, nos.20843-44, corroborate the second and third parts.

26. Ahmad, no.16509, and it is sahih. Cf. al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 1995), no.3.

27. Al-Tirmidhi, no.2260. It was given a grading of sahih in al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1985), no.957.

28. Al-Tabarani, al-Mu‘jam al-Kabir, no.11243; al-Quda‘i, Musnad, no.745. Ibn Badran says, Sharh Kitab al-Shihab (Beirut & Damascus: Dar al-Nawadir, 2007), no.136, that the hadith, with its collective chains, is hasan.

Dhu’l-Hijjah: Honouring the Days of Abraham

Belly_PilgrimsGoingToMeccaThe sacred month of dhu’l-hijjah (the last month in the Islamic calendar) is upon us, bringing with it all its virtues and blessings. It is the month of the pilgrimage or hajj, in which God has marked out, for pilgrims and non-pilgrims alike, some exceptionally blessed days. The Prophet, upon whom be peace, taught us the spiritual courtesy that Muslims should seek to nurture in themselves in respect to such heavenly downpour; he informed: ‘Indeed your Lord has, in these days of your life, [divine] gifts, so present yourself to them.’1 Among the month’s blessings and lordly gifts that should be avidly sought are:

1. The Ten Best Days of the Year: The Prophet, peace be upon him, said about the first ten days of dhu’l-hijjah: ‘The best days in the world are the [first] ten days.’2 According to most of our Quranic exegists, it is by these very same days that God has taken the following oath: By the dawn and the ten nights. [89:1-2]3 The significance of these ten days lie in the fact that they are intimately connected with the Prophet Abraham and all that the rites of the pilgrimage he instated symbolise – in terms of the oneness and holiness of God, and the life lived in loving surrender to Him. 

2. Rewards of Doing Good Deeds in These Days: Given that the first ten days of dhu’l-hijjah are the choicest and most virtuous of the entire year, it won’t come as a surprise that one hadith tells us: ‘There are no days in which deeds are more loved by God than these [ten] days.’4 Another hadith says: ‘There are no days greater with God, nor in which good deeds are more loved by Him, than these ten days. Therefore, increase in glorifying God (tasbih), praising Him (tamhid), declaring His unity (tahlil) as well as extolling His greatness (takbir).’5 Just as pilgrims discharge their duty by making the journey to Makkah so as to give expression to the love that drives them to draw closer to God; so too can non-pilgrims express their yearning by honouring these days and increasing in acts of worship, reverence and remembrance.

3. Fasting the Day of ‘Arafah: The rites of the pilgrimage reveal that Abraham, peace be upon him, is a constant point of reference. It starts with the tawaf, or seven circuits of the Ka‘bah. This is followed by the sa‘y, a speedy walk between the hillocks of Safa and Marwa,  commemorating the desperate search of Hagar, Abraham’s handmaiden, for water for her infant son Ishmael. Another rite occurs at Mina, where pilgrims cast pebbles at three stone pillars that symbolise Satan, whom Abraham had repudiated at these three places. It is on the open plain of ‘Arafah, however, that the culminating rite of hajj unfolds. Here the pilgrim, already focused on God by days of uninterrupted worship, have time to look deeply into one’s life. What have we done in the service of God and humanity? What recurrent weakness must we strive to combat? Whom have we wronged? What is holding us back from the purity which is the prerequisite of spiritual knowledge?6 ‘Arafah, then, is the place of profound introspection, cleansing, petition and prayer.

For non-pilgrims, ‘Arafah (the 9th day of the month) is a highly recommended day of fasting. The Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, was asked about fasting the day of ‘Arafah, to which he replied: ‘It expiates the sins of the previous year and the coming year.’7 Another hadith on the matter says: ‘There is no day in which God frees people from the Fire more so than on the day of ‘Arafah. He draws close to those [at ‘Arafah] and then revels to His angels, saying: What are these people seeking?’8

4. Offering the Sacrifice: The tenth day of the month is the Day of Sacrifice (yawm al-nahr) which, again, is a commemoration of the Prophet Abraham, peace be upon him. For it was he who, in devoted obedience to God’s command, was about to sacrifice his son (which according to the majority of Muslims scholars was Ishmael, not Isaac), for whom a ram was miraculously substituted at the very last moment: And when [his son] was old enough to walk with him, [Abraham] said: ‘O my son, I have seen in a dream that I must sacrifice you. What think you?’ He said: ‘O my father! Do what you are commanded. God willing, you shall find me steadfast.’ Then when they had both surrendered to God, and he had turned him down upon his face, We called him: ‘O Abraham!’ You have fulfilled the vision. Thus do We reward those who are excellent.’ That indeed was a clear test. Then We ransomed him with a great sacrifice. [37:102-7]

The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ‘The greatest day of the pilgrimage is the day of sacrifice.’9 The day of sacrifice (yawn al-nahr) is also called ‘id al-adha: “the Festivity of Sacrifice”. It is the day where the head of the house slaughters a camel, cow, sheep or goat in commemoration of Abraham’s sacrifice. Most scholars say that it is highly desirable to offer a sacrifice, if one has the means to do so. Another group of scholars holds it to be obligatory, based on the hadith: ‘Whoever can afford to offer a sacrifice, yet does not do so, then let him not approach our place of prayer.’10 There is also this injunction expressed in the following hadith: ‘When the ten days commence and one of you intends to sacrifice, let him not cut his hair or nails.’11

5. Extolling the Greatness of God: Starting from the day of ‘Arafah, up until the ‘asr prayer on the 13th, believers are urged to extol God’s greatness (takbir), with as fervent a passion as Abrahamic monotheists can muster. Ibn Taymiyyah said: ‘The soundest view about the takbir – which the majority of the salaf, jurists from the Companions, and leading imams were upon – is to commence proclaiming it from fajr on the day of ‘Arafah, till the last day of tashriq (the 13th day), after each prayer.’12 And although nothing authentic has been related from the Prophet, peace be upon him, in terms of how the takbir should be worded, it is authentically established from Ibn Mas‘ud that he would say: ‘God is great! God is great! None deserves to be worshiped except Him. God is great, God is great. To Him belongs all the praise (Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar la ilaha illa’Llah wa’Llahu akbar Allahu akbar wa lil’Lahi’l-hamd).’13

Nasala’Llahu’l-tawfiq wa’l-taysir.

1. Al-Tabarani, Mu‘jam al-Kabir, 19:234.

2. Al-Bazzar, no.1128; Ibn Hibban, no.3853. Al-Mundhari graded the chains to be hasan and sahih respectively in his al-Targhib wa’l-Tarhib (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 2013), no.1150.

3. Cf. Ibn al-Jawzi, Zad al-Masir (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1984), 9:103-4; al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‘ li Ahkam al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1996), 20:27.

4. Al-Bukhari, no.969.

5. Al-Tabarani, al-Kabir, 3:110, with a hasan chain, as per al-Mundhari, al-Targhib wa’l-Tarhib, no.1148.

6. See: Shalabi, Islam: Religion of Life (USA: Starlatch Press, 2001), 77.

7. Muslim, no.1162.

8. Muslim, no.1348.

9. Abu Dawud, Sunan, no.1945. It was graded sahih by al-Albani, Irwa al-Ghalil (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1979), no.1101.

10. Ibn Majah, Sunan, no.3123, and it is sahih. Consult: Sahih al-Jami‘ al-Saghir (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1986), no.6490.

11. Muslim, no.1977.

12. Majmu‘ Fatawa (Riyadh: Dar ‘Alam al-Kutub, 1991), 24:220.

13. Ibn Abi Shaybah, Musannaf, 2:1:2; Hakim, Mustadrak, 1:300, with a sahih chain – as per al-Albani, Irwa al-Ghalil, 3:125, no.653.

* This is a piece I wrote for www.islamicate.co.uk reposted with kind permission.

Did Abu Hurayrah Have Secret Spiritual Knowledge?

dreamstimefree_147987Al-Bukhari records in his Sahih, no.120, that Abu Hurayrah stated: ‘I preserved from the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, two vessels of knowledge. The first I have disseminated among people. If I were to circulate the other, my throat would be slit.

Some contend the vessel of knowledge Abu Hurayrah, may God be pleased with him, felt unable to disseminate, from fear of his gullet being cut, was esoteric, spiritual knowledge of the faith. This interpretation, however, runs counter to other reports from him that contextualise the above words.

The following elaborations from Abu Hurayrah himself will, I hope, clarify that rather than being some ‘special’ spiritual knowledge that had to be kept from the uninitiated, Abu Hurayrah was referring to knowledge of certain political dissensions (fitan, sing. fitnah) which were soon to be unleashed on the ummah. Abu Hurayrah held back from narrating certain hadiths concerning Yazid b. Mu‘awiyah and the Ummayads, and the upheavals that were about to take place after the year 60H, fearing for his life.

Abu Hurayrah relates that God’s Messenger, peace be upon him, said: ‘Seek refuge in God from the turn of [the year] seventy and from the rule of young boys.’1

Abu Hurayrah himself said: ‘Woe to the Arabs for a calamity that is fast approaching: the rule of young boys! If you obey them they shall cause you to enter the Fire, but if you disobey them they shall smite your necks with swords.’2

‘Umayr b. Hani narrated: ‘Abu Hurayrah would say: Hold on to the two temples of Mu‘awiyah. O God, let me not reach the year sixty!’3

When the Ka‘bah had been burnt and destroyed by the army of Husayn b. Numayr [in the year 63H], ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Amr stood before it tearful, and declared: ‘People! By God, if Abu Hurayrah had informed you that you would fight the grandson of your Prophet or burn the House of your Lord, you would have said that there is no greater liar than Abu Hurayrah! But now you know! So expect divine retribution [in the form of] being split into factions and tasting the torment some of you will mete out against others.’4

Abu Hurayrah advised: ‘O son of my brother, be kind to your sheep, wipe their mucus from them, improve their pastures and pray in their vicinity; for they are among the animals of Paradise. By the One in whose hand is my life! There will soon come a time upon people when a small flock of sheep will be dearer to its owner than the house of Marwan.’5

During the reign of Yazid, three heinous incidents occurred: the Prophet’s grandson, al-Husayn b. ‘Ali, was killed; Madinah was ransacked for three days, resulting in the deaths of many Companions; and the Ka‘bah was attacked and burnt, at which time Yazid perished. Abu Hurayrah died just before all this occurred, in 59H. May God be pleased with him.

Let us conclude by citing the explanation of Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani to the initial words of Abu Hurayrah. He writes in his magisterial commentary to Sahih al-Bukhari:

‘Scholars have taken the “vessel” which he did not disseminate, to mean those hadiths where the names, conditions and times of these wicked leaders were spelled out. Abu Hurayrah would, however, hint to some of it, without being explicit, for fear of his life; like when he relates: ‘Seek refuge in God from the turn of the year sixty and the rule of young boys’ – referring to the caliphate of Yazid b. Mu‘awiyah whose rule commenced in 60H. God answered Abu Hurayrah’s prayers, since he died the year before it … Ibn Munayyir said: The Bataniyyah use these hadiths to justify their falsehood of believing the shari‘ah to have an outer, exoteric (zahir) and inner, esoteric (batin) meaning: even if the result of this esoterism is the disintegration of the religion!’6

1. Ibn Abi Shaybah, Musannaf, no.37235. It is hasan, as per al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma‘arif, 2002), no.3191.

2. Ibn Abi Shaybah, no.37236.

3. Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, al-Isabah fi Tamyiz al-Sahabah (Cairo: 2008), 13:57.

4. Al-Dhahabi, Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala (Beirut: Mu’assassah al-Risalah, 1982), 3:94.

5. Malik, al-Muwatta, Book 49; hadith no.31.

6. Fath al-Bari (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1989), 1:288-9.

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