The Humble I

A few weeks ago, I posted a short piece on one of my socials about how the tragic human cost in Sudan’s continuing civil war has largely been ignored by Muslim activism and mosque khutbahs, and has failed to generate the sustained international Muslim concern witnessed in response to certain other conflicts.

To date, 13 million people have been displaced in Sudan or live as refugees abroad, 33 million people need humanitarian aid, and – as per current estimates – anywhere between 115,000 to 400,000 people have died. The particularly tragic aspect is that many people there are dying not directly from bullets or bombs, but from hunger, preventable illness, and the destruction of essential services.

Added to this is the horrific condition of women and children, especially women in terms of widespread atrocities like kidnapping, sexual violence and rape. Millions of women who once had homes, husbands and incomes now live in aid or refugee tents with nothing.

In this blog piece, I hope to sketch out, in broad outlines, the basic situation in the civil war, the many warnings in the Hadith corpus about not taking part in civil wars, the role of the scholars and other Muslim nations in such matters, and the general silence of Muslim activism concerning the dire humanitarian plight of ordinary Sudanese Muslims born from this tragic war.

1 – THE OVERALL SITUATION:

Sudan’s civil war is overwhelmingly a conflict between Muslims, and that is one of its most tragic features. It is not a sectarian religious war of the Sunni-Shi’ite sort. It is primarily a struggle for political power, military control, territory and wealth, made more complicated by longstanding ethnic grievances. Both principal military leaders are Muslims. Most of their fighters are Muslims. And most of the people being killed, displaced, starved or terrorised are Muslims too.

Who is fighting whom? On the one hand is the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General al-Burhan, who leads Sudan’s regular national army. He emerged as the country’s de facto ruler following the military takeover in 2021. On the other is Mohamed Dagalo, commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary organisation. These men were once allies who overthrow Sudan’s previous longtime dictator, in 2019, and then joined forces in the 2021 military coup which derailed a transition towards civilian government. But their alliance collapsed, and in 2023, fighting erupted between them. What began as a struggle between two armed groups rapidly became a devastating nationwide civil war.

2 – ISLAM DEMANDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION BETWEEN BELIEVERS:

The Holy Qur’an says: If two groups of believers fight one another, make peace between them. [Q.49:9] And: The believers are but brothers, so make peace and reconciliation between your brethren. [Q.49:10] While one hadith warns: ‘Abusing a Muslim is wickedness, while fighting him is disbelief.’1 Sudan demonstrates how the bonds of religious brotherhood can be ignored by the rival loyalties of ethnicity, political ambition, military allegiance and worldly interests.

3 – POLITICAL SELF-INTERESTS TRUMP ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD:

Nor is Sudan an isolated tragedy. Yemen has witnessed years of devastating Muslim-on-Muslim warfare, compounded by Saudi-led military intervention, Emirati backing of rival factions, and Iranian support for the Houthis. Libya, too, has suffered civil conflict fuelled by competing Muslim factions and their foreign backers. In each case, the bonds of Islamic brotherhood have been subordinated to struggles for power, territory and influence. The tragedy is not that Muslims lack a religion that commands brotherhood, but that worldly loyalties often prove stronger than the moral demands of that brotherhood.

4 – PROPHETIC GUIDANCE IN CIVIL WAR:

As for a civil war, many hadiths speak to what Muslims should do in such a situation. These hadiths speak of civil war, or fitnah, where the rightful cause or authority may be obscured, and not armed rebellion against legitimate authority (baghy), in which the duty to restrain the aggressor might arise. Thus, concerning times of civil strife, the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘Break your bows, cut your bowstrings, and strike your swords against stones. Then, if someone enters upon one of you, let him be like the better of Adam’s two sons.’2

Another hadith says: ‘There will be civil strife in which the one sitting will be better than the one standing, the one standing better than the one walking, and the one walking better than the one running.’3 There is also this: ‘When two Muslims confront one another with their swords, both the killer and the killed are in the Fire.’ The Companions asked why the person killed would also be in the Fire. He ﷺ replied: ‘He was intent on killing his companion.’4

The essential lesson from such hadith is: When there is intra-Muslim conflict, particularly when the rightful cause is unclear, the believer must not add any more fuel to the fire, let alone become an instrument of bloodshed.

5 – NATIONAL INTERESTS OVER ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY:

Currently, Sudan lays bare the distance between the ummah as a spiritual ideal and the Muslim world as a political reality. This failure is on a number of levels. One of them is that Muslim-majority states do not operate as a single political community in terms of aiding their fellow Muslim states politically, militarily or with humanitarian aid.  Of course, there are always exceptions. The reason is straightforward enough. It is because they have competing strategic interests, regional alliances, economic dependencies and security concerns. Sudan illustrates this clearly.

Egypt sees Sudan through the lens of Nile security and border stability. Gulf states have interests connected to the Red Sea, trade routes, gold and geopolitical influence. Other governments are concerned about refugees, armed movements, or the spread of instability. Consequently, the question these states ask isn’t simply, How do we protect Sudanese lives? It is also, What outcome best serves our national interests?

This does not mean that every Muslim government has been indifferent. Several have undertaken mediation, diplomacy or humanitarian relief. The problem is that these efforts have not produced a sustained, united and enforceable approach. So the Quranic ideal of mutual Muslim responsibility has no political mechanism or clout through which it can be implemented.

6 – THE ‘ULAMA AND MORAL AUTHORITY:

Historically, Muslim scholars have been understood as inheritors of the Prophets, entrusted with teaching religious truths, cultivating virtue, commanding right and forbidding wrong. Their responsibility extended beyond just explaining the legal rulings of worship. It includes safeguarding the moral conscience of society. Contemporary religious scholars, however, face several obstacles. The most obvious one in the eyes of the general public tends to be their institutional dependence upon state appointment, patronage and funding. This can constrain their willingness or capacity to challenge government policies, particularly foreign policy. Moreover, there is no universally recognised body of scholars capable of speaking authoritatively for the entire Muslim world, especially given their different political loyalties and limitations. On the point of limitation, even a powerful scholarly condemnation cannot, by itself, disarm militias, enforce sanctions or open humanitarian corridors.

That said, we ought to be clear here. Scholars should not be expected to become partisan political activists. In fact, their moral authority would be strengthened by refusing to become mouthpieces for any armed faction.

Moreover, if we are to be just, we will also realise that political decision-making has never been as extremely complex, delicate and multi-layered in human history as it is in our age. Weighing up the lesser of two or more competing evils, as per the scholarly principle of irtikab akhaff al-dararayn, is extremely challenging indeed in today’s world. And only a God-given genius or an utter fool would rush in to pronounce on such matters with any ease or eagerness. 

Despite that, the pressing question still remains: Where is the sustained, collective scholarly mobilisation that makes the protection of Sudanese lives a religious priority, rather than an occasional subject of statements or supplications?

7 – SELECTIVE COMPASSION AND THE WIDER MUSLIM PUBLIC:

Another painful question concerns ordinary Muslims. Why does Sudan so often fail to generate the sustained international Muslim concern witnessed in response to certain other conflicts, like Gaza for example?

Part of the answer lies in the problem of competing humanitarian emergencies. But we should not dismiss the possibility of selective compassion. Muslims, like other communities, can become more emotionally invested in suffering that is geographically, ethnically, politically or culturally familiar to them. But Sudan challenges us to ask whether our conception of the ummah is truly universal or unconsciously selective. Does the suffering of a Muslim child in Darfur stir our conscience as readily as that of a Muslim child elsewhere?

This is not an argument for diminishing compassion towards any other suffering population. Rather, it is an argument for enlarging our moral concern. The Prophet ﷺ said: ‘The example of the believers in their mutual love, affection and compassion is as of a single body, when one limb suffers, the entire body suffers in sleeplessness and fever.’5

The hadith speaks of a shared sensitivity to suffering, not a hierarchy of deserving victims. But there is an additional problem: without sustained organisation, compassion easily becomes exhaustion. People may sorrow, share a video, make a donation and then move on. What is missing is often the organised, institutional continuity that transforms momentary sympathy into lasting service.

FINAL THOUGHTS:

An effective response would need to move beyond expressions of sorrow towards sustained collective action.

Muslim governments should prioritise civilian protection, press for humanitarian access, prevent weapons and financing from prolonging atrocities, and support credible Sudanese-led peace efforts.

Religious scholars should speak consistently against ethnic persecution, unlawful killing, factional fanaticism and Islam’s condemnation of civil war and all who partake in it – without making religious solidarity conditional upon allegiance to a particular side.

Muslim charities should continue to work in these conflicts zones and continue to ddgelop sustained support for displaced Sudanese families, healthcare, education and reconstruction.

Ordinary Muslims should make Sudan part of their regular concern through khutbahs, informed advocacy, trustworthy charitable giving and the cultivation of genuine solidarity.

None of this requires pretending that the Sudanese Armed Forces and RSF have equal records or responsibilities. Justice demands distinguishing between different forms of wrongdoing and holding perpetrators accountable.

Nor should we overlook Sudanese civil society itself. Sudanese volunteers, neighbourhood response groups, medical workers and humanitarian organisations have continued serving communities in extraordinarily dangerous circumstances. Their work reminds us that the moral resources needed for recovery have not vanished from Sudanese society.

And it is Allah’s help that is sought. 

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1. Al-Bukhari, no.7076; Muslim, no.64.
2. Ahmad, no.19678, and its chain is sahih. Cf. al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma’arif, 1995), no.1524.
3. Al-Bukhari, no.7082; Muslim, no.2886.
4. Al-Bukhari, no.31; Muslim, no.2888.
5. Al-Bukhari, no.6011; Muslim, no.2586.